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5foreword
Established in 1982, the Polish Association of Constitutional Law (‘The 
Polish Branch of the International Association of Constitutional Law’ un-
til 1992) has – since its early days – participated in the work undertaken 
by the International Association of Constitutional Law (IACL). The mem-
bers of the Polish Association include Polish representatives to the bodies 
of the IACL and members that have been involved in the scholarly activity 
of the IACL, in particular in the work carried out by the World Con-
gresses in: Belgrade (1983), Paris and Aix-en-Provence (1987), Warsaw 
(1991), Tokyo (1995), Rotterdam (1999), Santiago de Chile (2004), Ath-
ens (2007), Mexico (2010), and Oslo (2014).
It has become a tradition of the Polish Association that the outcome 
of those international scholarly conferences is published in a collection 
of contributions delivered by Polish scholars at the conferences. Initially, 
the collections were published in various periodicals and, later, also on 
the Internet; since the Congress in Athens, the contributions have been 
compiled in separate volumes, namely: VII World Congress of Constitutional 
Law, Athens 11-15.06.2007. Lectures of the Polish Delegation, Kozminski 
University Publishing House (2008) and VIII World Congress of Constitu-
tional Law, 6-10 December 2010. Polish Reports, Wydawnictwo Sejmowe 
(2011). Wishing to preserve that worthwhile initiative, this volume 
comprises papers delivered by our fellow scholars at last year’s IX World 
Congress in Oslo. We would like to thank the Constitutional Tribunal 
of the Republic of Poland for the compilation and publication of this 
collection.
Krzysztof Skotnicki
President of the Polish Association of Constitutional Law
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Judicial dialogue and the new doctrine 
of constitutional sovereignty in Judgments 
of central european constitutional courts
Abstract
The enactment of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Un-
ion has resulted in many judgments of national courts in some Member 
States in which the concept of sovereignty plays an important role. The 
application of this concept seems to be significant in national legal dis-
courses pertaining to constitutional law. The paper will thus concentrate 
on the meaning of the concept of sovereignty and its application by con-
stitutional courts in Hungary and Poland; it will also analyse the potential 
influence of sovereignty on the wider aspect of the acceptance and imple-
mentation of the principle of the supremacy of EU law in these Member 
States. From the perspective of the theory of judicial discourse, it seems 
that the principle of the supremacy of EU law remains a double-bladed 
sword. On the one hand, there is a view on the primacy of EU law from 
the perspective of the Court of Justice of the EU and, on the other, there 
is the reception of that principle by national courts in the Member States. 
It seems that the three doctrines adopted by constitutional courts in Ger-
many, Hungary and Poland do not necessarily lead to the inefficacy of EU 
law in these countries. Moreover, it also seems that there is no unanimous 
reason, and the political power and formal positions of the constitutional 
courts in these Central and Eastern European (CEE) states are different in 
many respects.
1  LLD, Łódź; PhD, Łódź; LLM, Cambridge; Affiliation: University of Debrecen (Hungary) 
– John von Neumann Senior Research Visiting Scholar; University of Łódź (Poland) – Asso-
ciate Professor.
Golecki, Judicial dialoGue and the new doctrine of constitutional sovereiGnty in 
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Introduction
Recent developments in the law of the European Union have raised 
the question concerning the scope of application and the meaning 
of the principle of primacy within the context of judicial rulings. Two 
waves of judgments by certain national courts in Central and Eastern Eu-
rope (CEE) seem to be conspicuous. The first wave comprises judgments 
of some CEE constitutional courts that include doctrines on the relation-
ship between national constitutional law and European law. This wave 
of judgments has resulted in the adoption of different versions of the prin-
ciple of primacy or autonomy between the law of the European Union and 
national constitutional law in different CEE states. In Poland, the doctrine 
of the constitutional supremacy of the Polish Constitution was adopt-
ed (strong version), whereas the Czech Constitutional Court adopted 
the doctrine of the constitutional review of EU law (weak version). Finally, 
the position adopted by the Hungarian Constitutional Court was based on 
the doctrine of absolute separation between the Hungarian Constitution 
and EU law. Later on, the doctrines of the three CEE constitutional courts 
converged under the shadow of the judgments of the Federal Constitu-
tional Court of Germany concerning the constitutionality of the enact-
ment of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union. The enact-
ment of the Treaty thus resulted in significant judgments of constitutional 
courts in some Member States, in which the concept of sovereignty and 
the doctrine of sovereign powers started to play an increasingly impor-
tant role. The application of this concept seems to be significant not only 
in national legal discourses pertaining to constitutional law, but also for 
the prospective development of the European legal order. It seems that 
the judicial discourse in Europe has been split into two parallel, yet not 
necessarily congruent, relationships: one between the judiciary in Member 
States and the Court of Justice, on the one hand, and the dialogue of con-
stitutional courts in some Member States with both the Luxemburg Court 
and other constitutional courts, on the other. The former type of judicial 
dialogue traditionally plays an important, if not crucial, role in preserv-
ing efficacy of EU law and its applicability in Member States. The latter 
“constitutional” dialogue seems to be split between the vertical dimension 
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and the horizontal one, namely the dialogue with the Court of Justice 
of the EU and the dialogue with other constitutional courts. The question 
arises whether there is any congruence between the doctrines adopted by 
the constitutional courts, the number of preliminary references from a giv-
en state and the number of judgments by the Court of Justice of the EU 
on the infringement of EU law by a given state.
The construction of a European legal order through judicial 
monologue
The autonomous character of EU law has been established due to 
the process based on the judicial understanding of the autonomy of the Eu-
ropean Communities, and later on – the European Union, as a separate 
legal order. The autonomy has been understood in two ways. First of all, 
the autonomy could be understood as the internal one. In a series of cases, 
the ECJ established the doctrine of the superiority of EC law over the legal 
systems of the Member States. In two benchmark cases, the ECJ intro-
duced this concept, stating in the Van Gend en Loos case (26/62; 1963) that 
EC law created “a new legal order” and reaffirming this later in the Costa v. 
ENEL case (6/64; 1964), where it was emphasised that the Communities 
were in reality governed by their “own legal system”. These developments 
gave rise to the assertion that EC law must be superior to any other legal 
system of any Member State, albeit the content of this doctrine has never 
been clear.
Firstly, the question arises how to solve a potential conflict between 
EC law and the constitution of a Member State. The question seemed 
to be pressing, since many Member States, especially in Central Europe, 
had adopted the doctrine of the superiority of constitutional rule over any 
other law, including international or EC/EU law. One potential solution 
to this problem was unsuccessfully offered by the authors of the Treaty es-
tablishing a Constitution for Europe. Article I-6 of the Treaty establishing 
a Constitution for Europe contained the explicit statement concerning 
the superiority of the EU legal order: “The Constitution and law adopted 
by the institutions of the Union in exercising competences conferred on it 
shall have primacy over the law of the Member States”.
10
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Additionally, Article I-6 has been supported by the political declaration 
of the Member States, according to which the explicit statement on the su-
periority of EU law should not be treated as constitutive in the sense that it 
was intended to create a new legal principle. According to the declaration, 
the principle of primacy was rather to be found as declaratory and based 
on the long-standing doctrine having been established by the European 
Courts, since Declaration 1 reads as follows: “The Conference notes that 
Article I-6 reflects existing case-law of the Court of Justice of the European 
Communities and of the Court of First Instance”.
The idea of inserting the primacy claim into the system of quasi-con-
stitutional rules on the European level failed when the Constitution for 
Europe was doomed to failure by voters in France. Another solution was 
to be found; and indeed, it has been found. A solution based on a political 
obligation rather than on the existence of an explicit rule is in the Treaty 
on the Functioning of the European Union. The obvious primacy claim 
of Article I-6 was removed from the Lisbon Treaty and was eventually ex-
pressed in Declaration 17 annexed to the Final Act of the Intergovernmen-
tal Conference which adopted the Treaty: “The Conference recalls that, in 
accordance with well settled case law of the Court of Justice of the Euro-
pean Union, the Treaties and the law adopted by the Union on the basis 
of the Treaties have primacy over the law of Member States, under the con-
ditions laid down by the said case law”.
Most interestingly, the Conference additionally decided to attach, to 
the Final Act, the Opinion of the Council Legal Service on the primacy 
of EC law as set out in 11197/07 (JUR 260). The opinion explicitly re-
fers to the well-established judicial practice: “It results from the case-law 
of the Court of Justice that primacy of EC law is a cornerstone principle 
of Community law. According to the Court, this principle is inherent to 
the specific nature of the European Community”.
This solution creates a very interesting puzzle, where the policy prin-
ciple is to be supported by the legal doctrine and judicial practice, rather 
than the other way around, which is much more common in constitution-
al law. In many legal systems (English, French, German, Polish), the con-
cept of sovereignty sets out limits for the application of the principle of su-
periority. From the functional perspective, the concept (or a constitutional 
11
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principle) of sovereignty plays an important role, creating a ground for 
the so-institutionalised Kompetenz-Kompetenz dilemma. 
After enlargement – from judicial dialogue to a spill-over effect? 
It should however be noted that the solutions to this problem might 
be found through the interactive process, transforming the monologue 
of the Court of Justice into a more refined and complex version of judicial 
discourse leading to genuine judicial dialogue. This kind of dialogue tak-
ing place between Member States and the European Courts seems to be 
a new and powerful tool shaping the division of labour between European 
Courts and courts in Member States. Two types of judicial dialogue may 
be distinguished.
The first type is a vertical dialogue between the ECJ and the supreme 
and other courts of Member States. The institutional framework for this 
kind of dialogue is based on the preliminary reference procedure provided 
for in Article 267 TFEU (Łazowski 2010).
The other type of judicial dialogue is rather informal and based on 
observation, adjustment and coordination of the judicial practice of differ-
ent judicial institutions in Member States. This kind of judicial dialogue 
may take different forms, ranging from explicit references to other courts’ 
decisions to implicit references to some concepts and doctrines applied by 
other courts in Member States (Kumm 2005). Two ways of setting this 
problem by the Polish and German Constitutional Courts call particular 
attention. In three of its judgments, the Polish Constitutional Tribunal 
established a refined doctrine of constitutional supremacy and its limits. 
In the judgment of 27 April 2005 in the case P 1/05, the Polish Consti-
tutional Tribunal found the European Arrest Warrant Framework Deci-
sion unconstitutional, since the Polish Constitution explicitly prohibited 
the extradition of Polish citizens, whereas the EAW Framework Decision 
was based on the cooperation requiring “surrender” of an offender to an-
other Member State. The Tribunal, however, suspended the annulment 
of the EAW Framework Decision for an 18-month adjustment period, and 
meanwhile the Polish Constitution was amended, enabling the operation 
of the EAW system between Poland and other countries. The same decision 
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was taken by the Federal Constitutional Court of Germany, which also 
found the Framework Decision unconstitutional in Germany.2 Howev-
er, the immediate annulment of the European Arrest Warrant Framework 
Decision put Germany in a difficult situation (Komarek 2007).
In another ruling, concerning the constitutionality of the Treaty of Ac-
cession between Poland and the EU, the Polish Constitutional Tribunal 
emphasised the need for cooperation and political participation, criticising 
the extension of the pro-European interpretation of legal acts in Polish law. 
Departing from a relatively traditional concept of supremacy as control 
over the interpretation of the Constitution, the Tribunal reached the con-
clusion that the principle of interpreting the Constitution in a manner 
that is favourable to EU law has its limits, and “in no event may it lead to 
results contradicting the explicit wording of constitutional norms”.3 Ad-
ditionally, the Tribunal explicitly established its right to review the con-
stitutionality of EU law and to determine its potential contradiction with 
the Polish Constitution. The Tribunal found that:
When reviewing the constitutionality of the Accession Treaty as a rat-
ified international agreement, including the Act concerning the con-
ditions of accession (constituting an integral component of the Ac-
cession Treaty), it is also permissible to review the Treaties founding 
and modifying the Communities and the European Union, although 
only insofar as the latter are inextricably connected with application 
of the Accession Treaty.4
At the same time, the Tribunal sketched a broader concept of a multicen-
tric legal order and inclusive sovereignty, stressing the need for coopera-
tion and participation in the EU law-making process, since the application 
2  The German Federal Constitutional Court: 2 BvR 2236/04 of 18.7.2005.
3  Quoted from the translation of a summary of the judgment of the Polish Constitutional 
Tribunal in the case K 18/04 (11.5. 2005) in S. Biernat (ed), Selected Rulings of the Polish Con-
stitutional Tribunal Concerning the Law of the European Union (2003-2014) (Trybunał Konstytu-
cyjny, Warszawa 2014)  59; (<http://trybunal.gov.pl/uploads/media/SiM_LI_EN_calosc.pdf>).
4  ibid. 56.
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of EU law is based on coexistence of different legal rules produced by dif-
ferent law-making bodies and applied by various court structures.
Finally, the Polish Constitutional Tribunal established a doctrine 
of constitutional identity which amounts to a claim for sovereignty in par-
ticular areas, strictly limited to basic constitutional principles and the pro-
tection of human rights. Thus, the source of sovereignty seems to be found 
in the sophisticated concept of rights, rather than in political power and its 
monopoly over the territory. This problem loomed on the horizon togeth-
er with the doubts concerning the constitutionality of the Treaty of Lis-
bon. In the judgment concerning the Treaty of Lisbon, the Polish Consti-
tutional Tribunal clearly articulated the concept of constitutional identity 
as a source of sovereignty which enables the state to be involved in the EU 
within the constitutional limits. The Tribunal observed that:
The guarantees of that balance in the Constitution are “normative an-
chors”, which serve the protection of the state’s sovereignty, in the form 
of Article 8(1), Article 90 and Article 91 of the Constitution. In the view 
of the Constitutional Tribunal, the indicated constitutional provisions 
have not been infringed by the provisions of the Treaty of Lisbon chal-
lenged in the application. The accession to the European Union and 
the relevant conferral of competences do entail surrendering sovereign-
ty to the European Union. The limit of conferral of competences is de-
termined in the Preamble to the Constitution by recognising the state’s 
sovereignty as a national value; and the application of the Constitution 
– inter alia with regard to the realm of European integration – should 
correspond to the meaning which the introduction to the Constitution 
assigns to regaining sovereignty understood as a possibility of deter-
mining the fate of Poland.5
Similar reservations to the unlimited primacy of EU law have been raised 
by the Federal Constitutional Court of Germany, the Czech Constitutional 
5  Quoted from the translation of the judgment of the Polish Constitutional Tribunal in the 
case K 32/09 – judgment of 24 November 2010 (Constitutionality of the Lisbon Treaty); see 
S. Biernat (ed), supra n. 3,  204-205 (<http://trybunal.gov.pl/uploads/media/SiM_LI_EN_
calosc.pdf>).
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Court and the Hungarian Constitutional Court. It has been suggested that 
the doctrine of sovereignty has been used by the constitutional courts in 
Central Europe primarily for the domestic, internal reasons. Wojciech 
Sadurski has pointed out that the constitutional courts attempt at gain-
ing recognition and legitimacy through the process of the protection 
of the national system against exuberant, extensive application of the prin-
ciple of the primacy of EU law (Sadurski 2006, 2012). This strategy, albeit 
modified, has not been invented in any post-communist country (ibid.). 
The courts in Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic simply adopted 
a sceptical attitude towards the superiority of EC law, which was expressed 
many years earlier by the German Federal Constitutional Court in two 
waves of the so-called “Solange” cases in 1974 and 1986.6
The German Federal Constitutional Court emphasised the need for 
the constitutional control and protection of constitutional rights, concen-
trating on the relationship between the German Constitution and the de-
velopment of EC/EU law in a long series of cases, including the Brun-
er case [1994], the Banana case [1997], and the Treaty of Lisbon case 
[2009]. The Court cautiously avoided any direct invalidation of EC law, 
at the same time setting out the potential limits of constitutionality in 
respect of the application of EU law (Kumm 1999). It seems that the re-
cent case concerning the constitutionality of the Lisbon Treaty comprises 
the complete doctrine of sovereignty based on the concept of Staatenver-
bund – the Sovereign Association of Sovereign States.7 The Court explicitly 
referred to the development of the primacy of EU law, taking into account 
three fundamental issues: the inexplicit and vague character of the principle 
of the primacy of EU law; the unlimited power vested in the Constitutional 
Court so as to control and guard the constitutional order; and the charac-
ter of the EU as the purpose-oriented association of interdependent, rather 
6  Federal Constitutional Court of Germany, judgment of 29 May 1974, 37 BVerfG 27 and 
judgment of 22 October 1986, 73 BVerfG 339.
7  Federal Constitutional Court of Germany, judgment of 30 June 2009, BVerfG, 2 BvE 2/08, 
paras: 33, 229, 235, the English translation available also at the website of the Federal Consti-
tutional Court (<https://www.bundesverfassungsgericht.de/entscheidungen/es20090630_2b-
ve000208en.html>).
15
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than independent, but sovereign states. The German Court expressed these 
three concepts in the following three lucid passages:
1. “The primacy of Union and Community law over national law is still 
not explicitly regulated” (para 33);
2. “The obligation under European law to respect the constituent pow-
er of the Member States as the masters of the Treaties corresponds to 
the non-transferable identity of the constitution (Article 79.3 of the Basic 
Law), which is not open to integration in this respect. Within the bound-
aries of its competences, the Federal Constitutional Court must review, 
where necessary, whether these principles are adhered to” (para 235);
3. “Article 24.1 of the Basic Law underlines that the Federal Republic 
of Germany takes part in the development of a European Union de-
signed as an association of sovereign states (Staatenverbund) to which 
sovereign powers are transferred. The concept of Verbund covers a close 
long-term association of states which remain sovereign” (para 229).
The last sentence directly expresses the concept of internal sovereignty 
within a long-term association of states, taking into account that states 
can cease to participate in this endeavour. In a sense, states remain sov-
ereign by possessing control over the degree of participation, the content 
of participation or lack thereof, in a similar way in which the Constitu-
tional Court exerts control over the constitutionality of EU law in Ger-
many, even if it represents an astonishing compliance with EU law and 
only very rarely decides against the validity of EU law or its applicability 
in Germany. This position has recently been reinforced in the provisional 
decision of the German Federal Constitutional Court pertaining to the va-
lidity of the Decision of the Governing Council of the European Central 
Bank of 6 September 2012 concerning Outright Monetary Transactions 
(OMT) and the continued purchases of government bonds on the basis 
of this Decision and of the predecessor programme for Securities Markets 
(SMP), where the German Court repeats that the protection of constitu-
tional identity remains its exclusive prerogative and this doctrine has been 
commonly accepted in other EU Member States, and makes reference to 
the respective judgments of national constitutional and supreme courts. 
16
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It seems that the German Federal Constitutional Court treats the doctrine 
of constitutional identity and a special concept of sovereignty in respect 
of the participation in the EU as a consolidated doctrine shared by many 
other constitutional courts and belonging to the common constitutional 
identity of these Member States.8 In the decision, the Court referred to 
the concept of constitutional control exercised by national constitutional 
courts, emphasising procedural aspects of constitutional sovereignty. The 
Court thus reinforced the doctrine and commented on the practice of dif-
ferent supreme and constitutional courts in other EU Member States, con-
sidering these judgments as reflecting common constitutional principles 
and practices of the EU Member States. The Court observed that:
The above-mentioned principles concerning the protection of the con-
stitutional identity and of the limits of the transfer of sovereign pow-
ers to the European Union can also be found, with modifications de-
pending on the existence or non-existence of unamendable elements in 
the respective national constitutions, in the constitutional law of many 
other Member States of the European Union (...).9 This applies to all 
constitutional organs, authorities and courts. It results from the con-
stitutional principles of democracy (Article 20 sec. 1 and sec. 2 GG) 
and the rule of law (Article 20 sec. 3 GG), as well as from Article 23 
sec. 1 GG, and is safeguarded under European Union law by the prin-
8  BVerfG, 2 BvR 2728/13 of 14.1.2014, paras 1-105.
9  The German Federal Constitutional Court explicitly referred to the following judgments: 
the Kingdom of Denmark: Hojesteret, judgment of 6 April 1998 – I 361/1997 – para 9.8.; 
for the Republic of Estonia: Riigikohus, judgment of 12 July 2012 – 3-4-1-6-12 – sec. nos. 
128, 223; for the French Republic: Conseil Constitutionnel, decision no. 2006-540 DC of 
27 July 2006, 19th recital; decision no. 2011-631 DC of 9 June 2011, 45th recital; for Ire-
land: Supreme Court of Ireland, Crotty v. An Taoiseach (1987), I.R. 713 (783); S.P.U.C. (Ire-
land) Ltd. v. Grogan, (1989), I.R. 753 (765); for the Italian Republic: Corte costituzionale, 
decision no. 183/1973; decision no. 168/1991; for the Republic of Latvia: Satversmes tiesa, 
judgment of 7 April 2009 – 2008-35-01 – sec. no. 17; for the Republic of Poland: Trybunał 
Konstytucyjny, judgments of 11 May 2005 – K 18/04 – points 4.1., 10.2.; of 24 November 
2010 – K 32/09 – point 2.1. et seq.; of 16 November 2011 – SK 45/09 – points 2.4., 2.5., 
with further references; for the Kingdom of Sweden: Chapter 10 Art. 6 sentence 1, Form of 
government; for the Kingdom of Spain: Tribunal Constitucional, declaration of 13 December 
2004, DTC 1/2004; for the Czech Republic: Ústavni Soud, judgment of 31 January 2012 – 
2012/01/31 – Pl. ÚS 5/12 – para VII).
17
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ciple of conferral (Article 5 sec. 1 sentence 1 and sec. 2 TEU) and 
the obligation of the European Union to respect the national identities 
of the Member States (Article 4 sec. 2 sentence 1 TEU, cf. BVerfGE 
123, 267 <352>).
Besides the institutions of the European Union, German constitution-
al organs are also responsible to make sure that the programme of in-
tegration is observed.10
However, the Court decided to suspend the case and to refer questions for 
a preliminary ruling on the interpretation of various provisions of EU law 
to the Court of Justice of the EU, in accordance with point (b) of the first 
paragraph of Article 267 TFEU. Concurrently, control over a decision and 
the content of the decision remain two separate issues.
The same issue of controlling the application of EU law was raised by 
the Hungarian Constitutional Court just at the moment of accession. On 
1 May 2004, the Hungarian Parliament enacted a law “on measures con-
cerning agricultural surplus stocks” (the Surplus Act); the law was intend-
ed to implement Commission Regulation (EC) no. 1972/2003 of 10 No-
vember 2003 and Commission Regulation (EC) no.  60/2004 of 14 
January  2004, which had introduced transitional measures with regard 
to trade in agricultural products and the sugar sector. In the case 17/04 
AB Hat, dated 25 May 2004, the Constitutional Court of the Republic 
of Hungary decided that the Surplus Act was unconstitutional due to be-
ing contrary to the requirement of legal certainty, as it was retroactive. As 
A. Sajo, one of Hungarian constitutional lawyers and judges, pointed out, 
the problem was: “how did the Hungarian Constitutional Court relate to 
Community law? Wasn’t the Hungarian Constitutional Court consider-
ing and/or disregarding Community law, although it thought otherwise?” 
(A. Sajo 2004). In its later rulings, the Hungarian Constitutional Court 
reaffirmed the decision, explaining that the Court limits the application 
of its power to control constitutionality only to domestic laws. The Court 
expressed the view that: 
10  BVerfG, 2 BvR 2728/13 of 14.1.2014, paras 1-105; the English translation available also 
at the website of the Federal Constitutional Court: <https://www.bundesverfassungsgericht.
de/SharedDocs/Entscheidungen/EN/2014/01/rs20140114_2bvr272813en.html>.
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The Constitutional Court also interpreted the relevant articles 
of the Constitution on sovereignty, democracy, rule of law and Eu-
ropean cooperation. According to the Court, the so-called European 
clause cannot be interpreted in a way that would deprive the clauses 
on sovereignty and rule of law of their substance. The Court referred 
however to its former jurisprudence on the free limitation of the exer-
cise of attributes of sovereignty by the holder of the sovereignty, i.e. in 
fact by the legislator.11
This line of argument, reflecting the internal division between international 
law which is not controlled in respect of its constitutionality and the in-
ternal law, including implemented EU law, which constitutes the subject 
of control on account of constitutionality, has also been reflected in the de-
cision concerning the constitutionality of the Lisbon Treaty in Hungarian 
law (Blutman L., Chronowski N. 2011). In its decision 143/2010 of 12 July 
2010 (the ‘Lisbon Treaty Decision’), the Hungarian Constitutional Court 
adopted two views. The first view concerns the formal aspect of the con-
stitutional control, enabling the Court to control the scope of the trans-
fer of sovereignty from the state to the institutions of the European Un-
ion. Interpreting Article 2/A of the Hungarian Constitution,12 the Court 
thus observed that Article 2/A had in fact created a normative ground for 
the Court to assess whether and to what extent the transfer of competences 
in case of the prospective amendments to the EU treaties would be com-
patible with the Hungarian Constitution. It seems that this position should 
be maintained under the new Hungarian Constitution, since Article  E 
of the Fundamental Law of Hungary (adopted on 18 April 2011; in force 
since 1 January 2012) essentially copied the so-called “European Clause” 
contained in Article 2/A of the former Constitution. Secondly, the Court 
11  Hungarian Constitutional Court, decision 61/B/2005. AB, judgment of 29 September 
2008, ABH [2008]; press release in English, available at: <http://www.mkab.hu/letoltesek/
en_0143_2010.pdf>.
12  “In the interest of participating as a Member State of the European Union on the basis of 
international treaties – to the extent required to exercise rights and to perform obligations set 
forth in the basic treaties – Hungary may exercise some of its authorities stemming from the 
Constitution in conjunction with the other member states through the institutions of the Eu-
ropean Union”. (The EU-clause, ex Art. 2/A 1989 Const.)
19
Golecki, Judicial Dialogue and the New Doctrine of Constitutional Sovereignty in Judgments...
pointed out that the doctrine of sovereignty should still be treated as 
the source of constitutional identity. The Hungarian Constitutional Court 
expressed the view that the Constitution cannot be interpreted in a way that 
would deprive the constitutional provisions on sovereignty and on the rule 
of law of their substance. Concurrently, the Court referred to the concept 
of sovereignty as the indirect, albeit ultimate, limitation of the principle 
of the primacy of EU law. Additionally, the principle of the rule of law lim-
its the operation of the principle of the primacy of EU law.13
The participatory character of sovereignty has also been emphasised by 
the Czech Constitutional Court. In the decision on the constitutionality 
of the European Arrest Warrant Framework Decision, the Czech Court, 
unlike its counterparts in Germany and Poland, found that the require-
ment of cooperation was more important that the sole literal meaning 
of the legal act, and did not decide against the constitutionality of the said 
act. The doctrine, having been elaborated by the Czech Constitutional 
Court in its decision Pl ÚS 50/04 of 8 March 2006, was based on the as-
sumption that the Court plays an essential role in deciding on the scope 
of integration, since it preserves the constitutional doctrine of sovereignty. 
The Court observed that: 
(…) the delegation of a part of the powers of national organs may per-
sist only so long as these powers are exercised in a manner that is com-
patible with the preservation of the foundations of state sovereignty 
of the Czech Republic (…). In such determination the Constitutional 
Court is called upon to protect constitutionalism (…).14
Later on, in its decision from 2009, the Czech Constitutional Court also 
ruled the Treaty of Lisbon to be constitutional. However, at the same time, 
the Court set out limits for the transfer of powers from the sovereign state to 
the EU institutions, directly referring to the famous Kompetenz-Kompetenz 
13  The decision 143/2010. (VII. 14) of the Constitutional Court of the Republic of Hungary 
on the constitutionality of the Act of promulgation of the Lisbon Treaty.
14  Quoted from the translation available at the website of the Constitutional Court of the 
Czech Republic: <http://www.usoud.cz/en/decisions/>.
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expression,15 since “there would be a breach of the Czech Constitution if, 
on the basis of a transfer of powers, an international organization could 
continue to change its powers at will, and independently of its members, 
i.e. if a constitutional competence (competence-competence) were trans-
ferred to it”.16 Thus, it seems that in all relevant jurisdictions – namely 
Germany, Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic – the judicial under-
standing of the sovereignty doctrine is based on two fundamental assump-
tions. First of all, the European Union does not exert sovereign powers, 
and thus the principle of the primacy of EU law should be limited to 
those cases where the Member States transferred the power to the EU. 
Nevertheless, there are some “inalienable” powers, namely, the powers to 
waive the power of transferring power. Accordingly, the whole process 
of the transfer of powers should be controlled by constitutional courts, 
since the courts control the constitutionality of the integration process, 
understood as further long-term association of cooperating sovereign 
states. The judicial empowerment of constitutional courts seems to play an 
important, if not pivotal, role in this process. 
In search of an explanation for a striking divergence
The phenomenon of the judicialisation of the European Union plays 
an important role in the discourse pertaining to the theory of Europe-
an integration. It seems that the integration through the judicial activism 
of the European Court of Justice and the so-called “constitutionalisation” 
of the European integration gives strong arguments in favour of the Ne-
ofunctionalism as a theory which explains the integration as a process 
based on the spill-over effect. According to the classical definition pro-
posed by L. N. Lindberg:
15  cf. the more recent judgment of the Czech Constitutional Court which declared the CJEU 
judgment void; judgment of 31 January 2012, Pl. ÚS 5/12. 
16  The constitutionality of the Lisbon Treaty in the Czech Republic; decision of the Constitution-
al Court of the Czech Republic 2009/11/03 - Pl. ÚS 29/09; quoted from the translation avail-
able at the website of the Constitutional Court of the Czech Republic: <http://www.usoud.cz/
en/decisions/?tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=466&cHash=eedba7ca14d226b879ccaf91a6dcb2>.
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‘spill-over’ refers to a situation in which a given action, related to a spe-
cific goal, creates a situation in which the original goal can be assured 
only by taking further actions, which in turn create a further condition 
and a need for more action, and so forth. (…) the initial task and grant 
of power to the central institutions creates a situation or series of sit-
uations that can be dealt with only by further expanding the task and 
the grant of power. Spill-over implies that a situation has developed 
in which the ability of a Member State to achieve a policy goal may 
depend upon the attainment by another Member State of one of its 
policy goals. (Lindberg 1963, p. 10)
This mechanism may play an important role in the case of the application 
of EU law by national courts. It is not strange then that the unique posi-
tion and role assigned to the ECJ – i.e. that of an initiator of judicial mul-
tilevel dialogue – led some theorists to the proposition that the Court plays 
a central role, initiating the integration on the legal level, where the politi-
cal discourse is blocked by the lack of unanimity or power of major players 
on both the EU and the national levels (Weiler 1991 and 1994). The con-
struction of governance structure based on the judicial activism of the ECJ 
has even been explained as judicial coupe d’état, where the European Court 
created the doctrine of the primacy of the European Communities law 
(Stone Sweet 2007).
The spill-over effect may however play an adverse role of an obstacle 
in integration, since the Member States, and especially their courts, may 
adopt a similar set of doctrines, reasoning, concepts and legal instruments 
in order to diminish the effect and scope of the doctrine of the primacy 
of EU law (Arnull 2007). This position has been taken by some Inter-
governmentalists, who claimed that States remained principal actors on 
the European scene and were ultimate decision-makers. This position has 
been defended unsuccessfully by different authors (cf. Moravcsik 1993, 
Carruba et al. 2005, 2008). The failure of Intergovernmentalism lies prob-
ably in the fact that it has not been successful in explaining the integra-
tion process through the lens of intergovernmental cooperation shaped by 
the states on the legal level. It seems that the discretion enjoyed by the ECJ 
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was not in fact curbed by any successful strategy adopted by any Member 
State (Stone Sweet and Brunell 2012).
It seems however that things have changed with the enlargement and 
the creation of a platform for the horizontal judicial discourse, and the co-
ordination of state driven policy concerning the minimisation of the dis-
cretion successfully having been controlled by the ECJ. W. Sadurski has 
demonstrated successfully how the CEE constitutional courts have limited 
the application of EU law by rejection of the full application of the doc-
trine of the primacy of EU law (Sadurski 2012).
Sadurski explains the process in two ways. First of all, he demonstrates 
how sovereignty still plays an important role in post-communist coun-
tries. He envisages that the constitutional doctrine of sovereignty plays 
a double role. Firstly, it preserves control over the protection of rights on 
the part of national constitutional courts. Secondly, it also plays an im-
portant role in empowering these constitutional courts in front of other 
domestic actors, especially the elected lawmaker. It seems however that 
this explanation is only partly satisfactory. Sadurski appears to be right in 
his suggestion that the enlargement confronted the ECJ with homogenous 
constitutional courts applying the unified argumentation and holding very 
similar institutional positions characterised by the three elements: ex post 
and ex ante review; an individual claim (actio popularis); and the ultimate 
character of their judgments which cannot be reviewed by any other in-
stitution, becoming in fact the last word in the constitutional and quasi 
constitutional dialogue, such as the one concerning the relation between 
a domestic constitution and EU law.
Sadurski proposes a straightforward explanation suggesting that the eu-
roscepticism of the CEE constitutional courts stems from the historically 
shaped pattern of transformation, where rights adjudication was earlier 
than the division of power in which the CEE constitutional courts did not 
in fact take significant part. This led the CEE courts into the Solange story 
pattern, i.e. the repetition of earlier reservations expressed by the German 
and Italian constitutional courts. Secondly, the Solange strategy has been 
adopted by the courts strengthening their position in front of other actors, 
namely the lawmakers.
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It seems however that both explanations are seriously weakened by 
the following two contingencies. Firstly, unlike the Solange story, the later 
judgments of the CEE constitutional courts have been based on the pres-
ent, unconditional criticism and open rejection of the primacy doctrine 
by the German Federal Constitutional Court in 2010.17 It appears that 
the spill-over effect led in this case to the adverse direction, resulting in 
the fragmentation of the primacy principle, understood and applied in 
different ways in different Member States.18 Secondly, the argument about 
the domestic game of power which led the CEE constitutional courts 
to the declaration of the sovereignty principle and the implied doctrine 
of constitutional superiority does not seem to be satisfactory, given the fact 
of differences in the political situation between Poland and Hungary.
The Polish Constitutional Tribunal in fact declared the need to shift 
some of its competences to the lawmaker. In the EAW case, the Tribunal 
emphasised the need for action to be taken by the Parliament, which inev-
itably led to the amendment of the Polish Constitution.19 Thus, the Tribu-
nal proved to be unwilling and unable to stretch the pro-European inter-
pretation of the Constitution, leaving the final decision on the resolution 
of the alleged conflict between the EU and the Polish constitutional law to 
the parliamentary majority. A strikingly different solution has been adopt-
ed by the Czech Constitutional Court, which declared the constitutionality 
of the EAW, strengthening its own position vis-à-vis the Czech Parliament 
and the Czech President.20 Later on, in the Lisbon Treaty case, the Czech 
Constitutional Court declared its competence to review the constitution-
ality of the EU Treaties (Komarek 2013).21
Meanwhile, nothing of this kind took place in Hungary. The Hungarian 
Constitutional Court has never declared its position concerning the pri-
macy of EU law or of the Hungarian Constitution, observing the sepa-
ration doctrine according to which the Court revised the Hungarian law 
17  German Federal Const. Court, BVerfG, 2 BvE 2/08, 30.6.2009.
18  The opposite conclusion may be drawn however from an analysis of the preliminary refer-
ence procedure in new Member States; cf.: A. Łazowski (ed) (2010); M. Broberg and N. Fenger 
(2013).
19  Judgment of 27.4.2005, P 1/05, Polish Cons. Tribunal (“EAW case”).
20  Judgment of the Czech Constitutional Court of 3 May 2006, Pl. ÚS 66/04.
21  cf. the Czech Constitutional Court, judgment of 31 January 2012, Pl. ÚS 5/12.
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exclusively.22 Even in the case of the Lisbon Treaty, the said Court declared 
compatibility between the Hungarian Constitution and the act of ratifica-
tion of the Treaty and its incorporation into Hungarian legal order.23
Additionally, it should be mentioned that references to European 
law and to the obligations resulting from the Hungarian membership 
in the EU became an additional power in the Court’s struggle for power 
against the Hungarian lawmaker that recently amended the Fundamen-
tal Law, narrowing the Constitutional Court’s competences. In its recent 
judgment concerning the constitutionality of the Fourth Amendment to 
the Hungarian Fundamental Law, the Hungarian Constitutional Court 
referred openly to EU law and the necessity of applying rules conferred by 
the supranational institutions as the argument in favour of its control over 
amendments to the Constitution, stipulating that:
The power of the Constitutional Court is a restricted power in the struc-
ture of division of powers. Consequently, the Court shall not extend 
its powers to review the constitution and the new norms amending it 
without an express and explicit authorization to that effect. (…) The 
Constitutional Court shall moreover consider the obligations Hungary 
undertook in its international treaties or those that follow from mem-
bership in the EU, along with the generally acknowledged rules of in-
ternational law, and the basic principles and values reflected therein. 
All of these rules – with special regard to their values that are also incor-
porated into the Fundamental Law – constitute such a unified system 
(of values), that shall not be disregarded neither in the course of consti-
tution-making or legislation, nor in the course of constitutional review 
conducted by the Constitutional Court.24
22  cf. case 17/04 AB. Hat, the Hungarian Constitutional Court, 25.5.2004.
23  Decision 143/2010 of 12.7.2010 (the “Lisbon Treaty-decision”).
24  The Constitutional Court of Hungary (2013.5.23) on the constitutional review of the Fourth 
Amendment to the Fundamental Law of Hungary, decision II/00648/2013 of 2013-04-23; 
summary in English at the official website of the Hungarian Constitutional Court <http://
www.mkab.hu>, available also at: <http://www.codices.coe.int/NXT/gateway.dll/CODICES/
precis/eng/eur/hun/hun-2013-2-005?fn=document-frameset.htm&f=templates$q=$uq=$x-
=$up=1$force=2777>
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The Court simply stated that it had to take the international obliga-
tions of Hungary into account and thus it had to maintain control over 
the process of the introduction of constitutional amendments by a 2/3 
parliamentary majority. It seems that, within the context of the Hungari-
an constitutional law and the system of constitutional control adopted in 
the recently amended Fundamental Law, the primacy doctrine may po-
tentially serve as the argument of last resort in favour of the wider scope 
of control exerted by the Hungarian Constitutional Court.
Conclusion
Certainly the evidence justifying external or internal operation of a giv-
en legal rule should be referred to the practice of adjudicating bodies and 
the justifications provided by them. In other words, whether the EU cre-
ates one complex legal system, being compatible with the Neofunctionalist 
theories, or a set of independent legal systems, as it has been stressed by In-
tergovernmentalists, depends on the practice of the EU Courts, the courts 
in Member States and on the justification of these practices.
It seems that the alleged scepticism or at least partial refusal of the un-
conditional acceptance of the primacy of EU law by some constitutional 
courts does not give any significant argument against the Neofunctional-
ism as the most influential theory of European integration.
On the other hand, the application and extension of the liability for 
breach of EU law may enhance the coherence of judicial practice even on 
the level of constitutional courts. This seems to be possible under the as-
sumption that the standardisation is plausible, given the incentive struc-
ture and institutional framework of the participants to the judicial dia-
logue in the European legal order. This issue could fruitfully be analysed 
from the perspective of an economic analysis of law applied to the stand-
ardisation of judicial practice.
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krzysztof J. kaleta1
constitutional Justice beyond liberal 
constitutionalism*
Preface
1. Democratic ideals and constitutional institutions serving their im-
plementation undergo endless changes. In consequence, formed during 
the Enlightenment and maintained in a liberal spirit, the philosophical 
foundations of contemporary constitutionalism are today the subject 
of uneasy verification. Ponderous questions to constitutionalists emerge, 
namely, whether constitutional institutions in their present shape keep up 
with the dynamic changes of democratic axiology, and whether hitherto 
institutions are a functional device for realising socially important values.
The aim of this paper is to provide a critical analysis of the crucial insti-
tution of liberal constitutionalism – judicial control over the constitution-
ality of laws. It seems that the eternal dispute about the nature of relations 
between democracy and constitutionalism – at the centre of which there 
lies the debate on the legitimacy of constitutional review – enters a new 
phase. The new constitutional order, being formed before our eyes, forces 
a change of perspective in considering the role and legitimacy of constitu-
tional review by the judiciary and its relation to democratic axiology.
I start the proposed analysis with a reconstruction of the role of consti-
tutional review in a traditional model of liberal constitutionalism (part I). In 
part II, I attempt to describe a new paradigm of a constitutional institution’s 
legitimacy in the era of the transformation of the public sphere. It is com-
posed of specific normative requirements addressed to a constitution and 
a constitutional court itself. In the institutional dimension, these require-
ments come down to the postulate of reflexive action of the constitutional 
1  PhD, University of Warsaw/ Sejm of the Republic of Poland; email: <k.j.kaleta@gmail.com>
*  Parts I-III of the paper constitute an abridged translation of my article entitled ‘Sądownic-
two konstytucyjne a refleksyjny konstytucjonalizm (przeszłość – teraźniejszość – przyszłość)’, 
published in S. Biernat, Konstytucja Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej w pierwszych dekadach XXI wieku 
wobec wyzwań politycznych, gospodarczych, technologicznych i społecznych (Warszawa 2013) 27-44.
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court in the conditions of globalism and constitutional pluralism (part III). 
This means discursive openness of the constitutional court in the dialogue 
on the content of basic laws. However, the liberal model of a constitutional 
court as a custodian of the individual’s rights needs to be complemented 
with a new function, as a centre promoting the political solidarity of a con-
stitutional community, so that constitutional courts can continue their tra-
ditional stabilising role (maintaining constitutional orders). Hence, in part 
IV, I endeavour to sketch the place of a constitutional court in reinforcing 
solidarity bonds within the community.
The affirmation of specific non-liberal constitutional solutions is not 
the goal of this paper. These solutions should be assessed with great caution 
as well as the knowledge of the realities and political culture of the com-
munities in which they have been adopted. I refer to them only for illus-
trative purposes, when presenting the symptoms of wider processes. My 
intention is only to  show that institutional frameworks and substantive 
foundations determined by liberal constitutionalism prove too narrow for 
effectuating present constitutional claims of individuals and communities, 
who more and more vociferously demand moral recognition and real par-
ticipation in public life.
I. The significance of constitutional review in liberal democracy
2. More than 200 years since the triumph of liberal constitutionalism, 
a constitution still remains an expression of community aspirations and in-
dividual expectations. Hence, the integrational function of basic law (i.e. 
maintaining the solidarity of a community) appears with full force. The key 
role in sustaining this symbolic function of the constitution was played by 
judges. It is thanks to their activity in the second half of the 20th century that 
the process described by D. Rousseau as the resurrection of the constitution 
as a normative act2 establishing the identity of a political community took 
place. Therefore, the in-depth consideration of the constitution cannot be 
separated from reflection on the place and role of the judiciary, especially con-
stitutional judges in the transformation of contemporary constitutionalism.
2  D. Rousseau, ‘Une Résurrection: La Notion de Constitution’ (1990) 1 Revue du Droit Public.
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3. Constitutional justice, considered both as a political idea and a le-
gal institution, is  a  function of the place and time in which it is estab-
lished. Therefore, it is determined by past experiences, faces the challenges 
of the present day, as well as is inspired by the expectations of the future.
The judicial control of legislation is a flagship institution of liber-
al constitutionalism. Thus, it grew in the soil of the philosophical tenets 
of the Enlightenment as an answer to the progressive process of advancing 
the democratisation of power. The idea of judicial control over the consti-
tutionality of law is typically regarded as a necessary and practical comple-
ment to the assumptions of the liberal theory of the rule of law. Spanning 
two centuries, this idea, on the one hand, underwent dynamic institution-
alisation and, on the other, was the subject of acute doctrinal and polit-
ical disputes as regards its democratic legitimacy. For it is beyond doubt 
that “quis custodiet ipsos custodes is the weak spot in the role attributed to 
the rule of law in liberal democratic theory”.3
4. Progressing juridification of the lifeworld (referring to the termi-
nology of Habermas) meant that democratically created legislation inter-
fered more and more with the individual’s rights. So constitutionalism, 
based on liberal foundations, needed new mechanisms to control the pow-
er of parliaments. Courts were appointed as the centres of these mecha-
nisms. An accomplished exponent of this kind of political philosophy was 
K. Popper, who believed that, in the long run, all political problems are 
legal-institutional ones, and that the real progress of equality is determined 
by the institutional control of power.4 There is not a shred of doubt that 
the union of constitutional liberalism and democracy is rather a marriage 
of convenience, for, from a philosophical and historical point of view, they 
are two separate orders, sometimes based on opposite values.5 The basis 
of the legitimacy of liberal constitutional governance – namely the counter-
factual concept of political self-limitation of the sovereign people by means 
of an act of substantial constitution – implies that judges are equipped 
3  J.M. Maravall, ‘The Rule of Law as a Political Weapon’ in J.M. Maravall and A. Przeworski 
(eds), Democracy and the Rule of Law (Cambridge University Press 2003) 266.
4  K. Popper, Open Society and Its Enemies (Routledge, London, New York 2002) 426. 
5  F. Zakaria, ‘The Rise of Illiberal Democracy’ (1997) 76(6) Foreign Affairs 22-23. 
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with a broad discretionary power. It resulted from the right to interpret 
principles of  the social contract in the context of problems stemming 
from current politics. In this way, the authorisation of current politics, in 
the light of a priori established and substantively understood constitution-
al principles, became one of the basic functions of constitutional judges.6 
The problematic nature of their power derived from the lack of democratic 
legitimacy, when juxtaposed with the legislator’s power.
Irrespective of the differences in the subject of normative justifica-
tion for the existence of the judicial control of constitutionality (such as 
the implementation of the principle of checks and balances in the Ameri-
can model and the hierarchical compliance of normative acts in the Euro-
pean model), it is undeniable that the judicial control of legislation was in 
practice meant to be a crucial factor in correcting, or even forming, state 
policy, and having custody of the legislature. Hence, the strong empha-
sis of the juridical nature of judges’ decisions played a vital self-legitimis-
ing role. The juxtaposition of the legal and political aspects of the work 
of judges was the axis of the liberal narrative legitimising constitutional 
jurisprudence. 
5. The judicial control of constitutionality, relying on the above-men-
tioned foundations became a lasting element of modern democratic sys-
tems and, at the same time, a major catalyst of transformations within 
democratic axiology. The effect of the convergence of democratic and lib-
eral ideals was the formulation of liberal democracy, in which democrat-
ically created policy must fit in the framework set by the rigid principles 
of constitutionalism. C. Sunstein aptly observes that although it is often 
declared that constitutions are the expression of the identity of those who 
write them, in reality it is just the opposite. Liberals treat the constitution 
as an element of the previous imposition of rules (pre-commitment strat-
egies). In this way, communities use their founding documents as protec-
tion against the most typical problems in their political life.7
6  A. Stone Sweet, Governing with Judges (OUP 2000) 137.
7  C. Sunstein, ‘Against Positive Rights’ (1993) 1 East European Constitutional Review 35-38.
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Therefore, we may assume that modern constitutionalism is based on 
the liberal principle of legitimacy, which invokes the hypothetical con-
sent of demos as a premise legitimising law. It assumes that citizens may 
only be legitimately subject to those norms that rely on arguments and 
premises that the citizens themselves cannot rationally rebut. It became 
conceptually possible to separate the sovereign’s will (constituent power) 
and the legislative body, until their mutual confrontation.8 Constitutional 
courts were seen as the arbiters of these disputes, and thus were placed 
above current politics – as the exponents of a higher category of rationality. 
This process also meant a considerable reduction of the sovereign’s role 
in constitutional policy. The Western, and thus liberal, model of democra-
cy was to be primarily symbolised by the figure of an independent judge.9 
Even B. Ackerman, the liberal constitutionalist most staunchly affirming 
the role of the people in constitutional governance, limits its activity to ex-
ceptional, incidental events described as “constitutional moments”.10 This 
means that a constitutional court may easily monopolise the constitutional 
debate. J. Rawls suggests a public test for whether an argument may be 
a “public reason”. A question to be asked is whether such an argument 
could be considered, for example, in justification of a court decision, par-
ticularly in justification of a constitutional-court judgment. J. Rawls clear-
ly states that “in a constitutional regime with judicial review, public reason 
is the reason of its supreme court”.11
II.  Legitimacy of constitutional institutions in the era 
of the transformation of the public sphere
6. The rising importance of a constitutional judiciary in the institution-
al design of contemporary democracies impels certain authors to conclude 
8  M. Granat, Od Klasycznego Przedstawicielstwa do Demokracji Konstytucyjnej (Ewolucja Pra-
wa i Doktryny we Francji) (Lublin 1994) 137. 
9  F. Zakaria, ‘The Rise of Illiberal Democracy’ (1997) 76(6) Foreign Affairs 27.
10  B. Ackerman, The Future of Liberal Revolution (Yale University Press 1992) 48-54. 
11  J. Rawls, Political Liberalism (Columbia University Press 1993) 231.
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that we live in an age of juristocracy, that is to say, of judicial supremacy.12 
Today, however, even from the perspective of the assumptions of political 
liberalism, the place of courts in the public sphere is no longer so easily 
identifiable. The legitimacy of the present-day public sphere poses many 
difficulties connected with the evolution of the understanding of the very 
notion of ‘power’, as well as with the erosion of hitherto used notions, and 
related searches for new formulas for legitimising power. The theses of a le-
gitimacy crisis of contemporary power, more and more expressly present 
in public opinion, are the most important symptoms of changes related to 
moving to new social structures, as well as to a new understanding of pol-
itics and the constitutional institutions that provide checks in this respect.
In social sciences, it seems that the currently dominant way of un-
derstanding legitimacy is not the search for a single, universal principle 
validating a social order, but the treatment of such legitimacy as a complex 
communication process in which arguments drawn from various systems 
(moral, political, and legal) may be employed. The overlapping of various 
discourses is now one of the distinctive features of modern constitution-
alism. This entails the necessity to refer to the transformation processes 
of the two planes of analysis, being equally important for the legitima-
cy of a constitutional court. These planes are the currently prevailing 
trends in  jurisprudence in the theory of democracy and in the theory 
of constitutionalism.
7. The last decades of the 20th century witnessed a clear delibera-
tive turn, thanks to which democratic legitimacy started to be viewed in 
connection with a public deliberation process about collective decisions 
of a political community.13 The deliberative view of  democracy entails 
the necessity to remodel the concept of power, which is exercised “with 
others and not over others”.
12  R. Hirschl, Toward Juristocracy. The Origins and Consequences of the New Constitutionalism 
(Harvard University Press 2004); K. E. Whittington, Political Foundations of Judicial Suprem-
acy (Princeton University Press 2007). 
13  J. S. Dryzek, Deliberative Democracy and Beyond. Liberals, Critics, Contestations (Oxford 
University Press 2000) 1. 
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The supporters of this trend identify themselves as representatives 
of a new, original political philosophy. According to Ch. F. Zurn, the de-
liberative theory of democracy has overcome the weaknesses of both aggre-
gative majoritarianism and liberal constitutionalism traditionally oriented 
towards the protection of a minority (minoritarian constitutionalism). 
It offers a thorough and more convincing approach to legitimacy in con-
stitutional democracy, by recognising the problem of pluralism and taking 
into account the role of political interactions in the search for reasons on 
the basis of which public issues should be resolved.14 Such a view allows 
meritocratic and popular elements to be combined, because:
Contemporary theories of deliberative democracy likewise attempt to 
combine a focus on the quality of decision-making process characteris-
tic of expertocratic models with a focus on popular input and participa-
tion characteristic of populist models, without, however, succumbing 
to the potentially antiegalitarian elitism of the former or the potentially 
ungrounded decisionism of the latter.15
8. Constitutional institutions also undergo dynamic transformations. 
As G. Teubner notes, if we adopt a broad definition of constitutionalism 
– namely as a collection of meta-norms (principles) similar in nature to 
Hart’s secondary rules determining how norms of a lower level are to be 
forged, applied, executed and interpreted16 – then we must not ignore 
the observation that it is precisely as secondary norms that they “give an 
answer not just to the cognitive question of ‘What is valid law?’, but also 
to the more intricate normative question of ‘Who are the legitimate actors 
and what are the legitimate procedures for producing law ?’”.17
14  Ch. F. Zurn, Deliberative Democracy and Institutions of Judicial Review (Cambridge Uni-
versity Press 2007)  65-66. 
15 ibid. 83. 
16 A. S. Sweet, ‘Constitutionalism, Legal Pluralism and International Regimes’ (2009) 16(2) 
Indiana Journal of Global Legal Studies 626. 
17 G. Teubner, ‘Societal Constituitionalism: Alternatives to State-Centred Constitutional 
Theory’, Leon Petrażycki memorial lecture (Faculty of Law and Administration, University of 
Warsaw, 24 May 2004) 45. 
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It appears that a characteristic feature of contemporary constitutionalism 
is a break with cast-iron opposition between the legal and political compo-
nents, which was the foundation of the liberal constitutionalism theory.18 At 
the source of these processes lay dynamic transformations within the public 
sphere, which – as J. Habermas pointed out – are not indifferent to the qual-
ity of democracy. In the strictest sense of the constitutional aspect, what is 
meant here are changes connected mainly with the dispersion of sovereign-
ty, the proliferation of the constitutional sources of law and the pluralism 
of centres for the interpretation of constitutional values. Contemporary po-
litical power is marked by strong institutional dispersion under the influence 
of multilevel constitutionalism, the effect of which has been the overlapping 
of the spheres of influence in the case of particular power segments, includ-
ing those that are supranational in nature. A pluralistic constitutional order 
is utterly different from a highly homogeneous, hierarchically ordered system 
in which the supreme position is taken by a constitution and where a consti-
tutional court operates as its sole and authoritative interpreter. M. Rosenfeld 
put it aptly when remarking that new constitutionalism relies on numerous 
sets of norms which mutually cross, overlap, share one space and are con-
nected more horizontally than vertically.19
For these reasons, it seems necessary to search for such a theory of con-
stitutionalism that would allow a better understanding of current politi-
cal practice, and would simultaneously allow the political-legal system to 
be stable. Hence, the constitution is increasingly regarded as a “purposive 
device whose true value lies in its instrumental efficacy rather than its on-
tological  legitimacy”20 and in its a priori nature, derived from the idea 
of pre-commitment.
9. According to N. Walker, we live in “post-holistic constitutional-
ism”, in which constitutional claims are far more partial and fragmen-
tary. New constitutional networks are rather focused on material values 
18 R. Bellamy, Political Constitutionalism (Cambridge University Press 2007) 2-3. 
19  M. Rosenfeld, ‘Rethinking Constitutional Ordering in an Era of Legal and Ideological 
Pluralism’ (2008) 6 ICON 417. 
20 E. Carolan, The New Separation of Powers. A Theory for the Modern State (Oxford Univer-
sity Press 2009) 5. 
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and not democratic procedures, and concentrate on  individual rights 
and public goods.21
The effect of the mentioned processes is also the fragmentation 
of the logic of action in the public sphere – each public sphere develops 
its own formal rationality that is at odds with rationalities of other codes. 
G. Teubner writes of “social constitutionalism”, in which:
inevitably despite all attempts at co-operation, a new specialised divi-
sion of labour will be formed in which private law will have the task 
of working out the independence and autonomy of social partial con-
stitutions, whereas public law will concentrate on developing typically 
political constitutions, on creating political surrounding of civic con-
stitutions, and on making network connections between various par-
tial constitutions.22
It has to be remembered that the framework of discussion about fun-
damental rights is decisively expanding – and encompasses many compli-
cated issues around which consensus may only be attained in a discursive 
way (bio-ethical problems, environmental safety, the claims of certain so-
cial groups demanding legal recognition of their identity, etc.). The orig-
inal aim of constitutionalism was setting the limits of the state’s power in 
its relations with individuals, whereas nowadays the problem is drawing 
the limits of the interference of supranational powers not only in the sphere 
of private autonomy but also the autonomies of other integrated commu-
nities – for example, families and religious or cultural groups. It means 
that, for legal institutions, embracing horizontal relations between indi-
viduals, within the scope of constitutional guarantees, is equally important 
as the formation of citizen-state relations.
More and more frequently, constitutional matters are presented in 
the categories of good public governance. This means that input legiti-
macy connected with traditional institutions of political representation is 
supplanted by output legitimacy, focused on effectiveness in the execution 
21  N. Walker, ‘Constitutionalism and Incompleteness of Democracy: An Interactive Relation-
ship’ (2010) University of Edinburgh School of Law, Working Papers Series No.2010/25, 25.
22  G. Teubner, op. cit. 27. 
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of the competences conferred upon the institutions. In reference to consti-
tutional courts, this results in making them evaluable through assessment 
of their effectiveness in influencing constitutional practice; their activity is 
regarded as an element of implementing the principles of good governance 
in the constitutional domain.23 The traditional liberal model of constitu-
tional judiciary reduced the mentioned effectiveness to effective protection 
of the individual’s fundamental rights. Practically, this meant that stress 
lay on the professionalisation of judges, who saw their role as guardians 
of fundamental rights, legally conceptualised and objectified as regards 
their content. However, such a model does not seem to be a satisfying 
answer to the challenges outlined above, connected with the transforma-
tion of the public sphere. This is one of the reasons why a crisis of liberal 
constitutionalism is more and more frequently alluded to.24
III. Reflexivity of constitutional institutions
10. The adjustment of constitutional institutions to a new social reality 
becomes a challenge for theoreticians of the rule of law. It means an increas-
ingly close connection between thus far opposed dimensions of constitu-
tionalism: the effectuation of public autonomy (i.e. articulation of the peo-
ple’s will) and the protection of private autonomy (the so-called qualification 
of this role through the prism of the individual rights). This would enable 
constitutional institutions to be invigorated with a republican spirit.
The challenge is therefore to devise a proper institutional architecture 
which would secure an open forum for the articulation of a broad spec-
trum of attitudes existing within a  political community (a state) made 
up of smaller communities. Sustaining a constitutional order that would 
meet the challenge of integrating the pluralistic spheres of the function-
ing of civil society, by eliminating possible conflicts between the regional 
logics on which they are based, thus emerges as a challenge to institutions 
which are emanations of the rule of law. Simultaneously, a new socio-legal 
23  A. Harding, P. Leyland, Constitutional Courts. A Comparative Study (Wildy Simmonds & 
Hill Publishing 2009) 24.
24  M. Tushnet, ‘A New Constituionalism for Liberals?’ (2003) 28 New York University Re-
view of Law & Social Change 357.
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order should provide for an appropriate level of legitimacy – attained in 
a discursive way – for decisions taken within these structures.
Therefore, today’s theories of democratic legitimacy and constitution-
alism are inseparably connected by the search for procedures which would 
allow the system to be simultaneously effective and reflexive, understood 
as an ability to make and implement political decisions that enjoy an ap-
propriate level of legitimacy. In reference to particular branches of govern-
ment, this postulate translates into various directives. In the case of the leg-
islature, it may be assumed that everything comes down to the postulate 
that a responsive model of law-making should correspond to assumptions 
of the deliberative concept of democracy, while the activity of administra-
tive authorities and of the judiciary should aim to provide the broadest 
possible legal inclusion of citizens. These are important and responsible 
tasks since, as G. Teubner observes, the inclusion/exclusion distinction has 
perhaps become the fundamental meta-code of the 21st century, mediat-
ing all other codes.25
It seems that the above findings allow the positing of the thesis that con-
cern for the quality of communication processes (i.a. equal access to partici-
pation in public affairs) is the backbone of contemporary constitutional chal-
lenges. As a result, the responsiveness and reflexivity in the activity of judges 
– treated as participants of public deliberation, involved both in general 
practical discourse as well as in the legal discourse, where the latter is a special 
kind of the former – also gain in importance. It is apparent that, under such 
new conditions, courts may legitimise their power primarily through effec-
tiveness in forming reflexive frameworks of discourse around the individual’s 
rights considered in a series of complicated interdependencies.
11. The abolition of experts’ monopoly on knowledge about public 
affairs would surely be favourable to designing broad frameworks of de-
bate about political decisions.26 The awareness of the values of pluralism 
25  G. Teubner, Constitutional Fragments. Societal Constitutionalism and Globalisation (Oxford 
University Press 2012) 137.
26  U. Beck thoroughly covers the role of experts as guardians of rationality in Reflexive Mod-
ernization. Politics, Tradition and Aesthetics in the Modern Social Order (Stanford University 
Press 1994) 46-52. 
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in contemporary societies precludes the radical act of the previous au-
to-foundation of the bases of democracy.27 This is a completely different 
perspective than the traditional formula of liberal constitutionalism based 
on the pre-commitment and limitation of political power in the name 
of substantial values. The core of interactive democracy, according to 
P. Rosanvallon, is to be “permanent generalisation”, namely the ability 
of public institutions to react continuously to all forms of political ex-
clusion, and to include potentially discriminated individuals or groups in 
public debate. A significant element is the capability to interpret debate 
results in terms of constitutional principles.28 It means shifting the accents 
towards output legitimacy, combining an institution’s legitimacy with its 
social recognition. The authority is a derivative of both judges’ competence 
and the trust that society places in them.29
The suggested formula is to be a response to the scant, virtually non-ex-
istent participation of citizens in executing judicial power in contemporary 
political systems. In search for an answer to the question quoted at the out-
set – Quis custodiet ipsos custodes? – Rosanvallon points directly to the peo-
ple themselves as the controllers and supervisors of all political decisions. 
According to the idea of “counter-democracy”, the real demos act as a su-
pervising and vetoing body by making ongoing political judgements. It is 
through this kind of activity that the legally non-institutionalised forms 
of practising sovereignty, which provide opportunities for a specific “res-
urrection” of demos in contemporary constitutionalism, find expression. 30
A reflexive institution may perform its function only as long as it oper-
ates with awareness that its authority does not include the final say in con-
cluding the constitutional discourse. Therefore, the new constitutional or-
der must be supported on the institutional arrangements that promote, on 
the one hand, the information openness of the constitutional court and, 
on the other, the activity of citizens at the level of constitutional policy.
27  P. Rosanvallon, La Légitimité Démocratique. Impartialité, Réflexivité, Proximité (Paris 2008) 213.
28  ibid. 337-338. 
29  ibid. 262. 
30  P. Rosanvallon, La Contre-Démocratie. La Politique à L’âge de la Défiance, Seuil 2006. 
41
Kaleta, Constitutional Justice Beyond Liberal Constitutionalism
12. A constitutional court should therefore show concern for providing 
the equal and free participation of individuals and social groups in the le-
gal formulation of political will. Obviously, of crucial importance here will 
be concern for fundamental communication values such as the freedom 
of speech and access to public information, now considered in the context 
of cyberspace.
The key institutional challenge seems to be designing such a model 
for proceedings before the constitutional court that would guarantee, in 
the broadest possible manner, the participation of the “social factor” in 
constitutional court proceedings. This involvement would rely on the sup-
ply of information to the said court in the examination of complicated 
cases that require capturing a number of dependencies that are difficult to 
deal with at the stage of an abstract review (including the horizontal im-
pacts of fundamental rights) and which emerge from the structures of net-
work society. This also means the intensification of co-operation with so-
cial partners described, not incidentally, as “friends of the court” (amici 
curiae). This co-operation is an instrument of communication between 
the constitutional court and the public. The institution of a constitutional 
complaint is also of utmost importance if the above-indicated attitudes 
and values are to materialise in jurisdiction, as such an institution is a di-
rect instrument of reflexive response to an infringement of the individual’s 
rights both in horizontal and vertical relations.
However, a real challenge is the enhancement of civic participation 
on  the  constitutional level. In this context, constitutionalists and legal 
philosophers put forward ideas concerning various forms of weak con-
stitutionalism, which would make constitutional institutions, and a con-
stitution itself, more discursive and open to citizen participation. This 
would help overcome distrust with which liberal constitutionalism refers 
to constituting authority.31 One may indicate specific examples of consti-
tutional solutions already practised today in Latin American states, pro-
moting a more participational procedure for constitutional change. The 
constitutional provisions of Ecuador, Venezuela and Bolivia provide for 
31  J. I. Colón-Ríos, ‘The End of the Constitutionalism-Democracy Debate’ (2011) 1(4) Vic-
toria University of Wellington Legal Research Papers 19.
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the possibility of convoking a constituent assembly by gathering the sig-
natures of  the appropriate number of citizens (12%, 15% and 20% re-
spectively). This means placing the right to initiate debates on the direc-
tion of constitutional reforms in the hands of organised communities. As 
J. I. Colón-Ríos rightly observes, this mechanism revolutionises the old 
dispute between democracy and constitutionalism by shifting the accents 
of the former debate from the constitutional court onto the direct relation 
between citizens and the constitution.32
IV. Solidarity as a constitutional value
13. Naturally, authentic changes are possible only if the proposed in-
stitutional architecture is imbued with values on which the new constitu-
tional order is to be built, and of which constitutional judges should be 
custodians. The hitherto dynamic development of constitutional judiciary 
was marked by principles that were classical instruments of building a lib-
eral constitutional order (i.a. legality and proportionality), but in new cir-
cumstances the value of solidarity seems to be the most significant.
N. Walker aptly notes that constitutionalism is fundamentally an an-
swer to empirical and normative incompleteness of democracy, under-
stood as an ideal of the rule of the people – its intrinsic incapability to 
secure conditions in which democratic ideals could be realised.33 Solidarity 
is precisely one of the unfulfilled ideals of democracy.
The idea of solidarity remains in some opposition to the liberal-dem-
ocratic model of  modern constitutionalism. The latter is constructed 
on the basis of a rigorous concept of  law’s autonomy in regard to other 
normative orders, which is revealed through the primacy of the substan-
tively viewed fundamental rights of the individual over communal val-
ues or goals. Liberalism, focused on negative freedoms, does not generate 
normative foundations strong enough to support and advance collective 
solidarity in the face of complicated social problems.34
32  ibid. 27. 
33  N. Walker, op. cit. 1. 
34  Li-Ann Thio, ‘Constitutionalism in Illiberal Polities’ in M. Rosenfeld and A. Sajo (eds), 
The Oxford Handbook of Comparative Constitutional Law (Oxford University Press 2012) 136.
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14. The axis of tension between liberal and non-liberal visions of polit-
ical order is the conflict between private autonomy, expressing the suprem-
acy of a subject’s rights and of freedoms understood in a negative way, and 
public autonomy, affirming primarily the right to political participation 
and a number of ‘positive freedoms’. These differences translate into a con-
crete shape of constitutional institutions.
From the perspective of liberalism, both dimensions are separate. Lib-
erals embed concern for solidarity either uniquely in the private sphere 
(philanthropy) or else they comprehend it as the task of institutions op-
erating in compliance with abstract principles of procedural justice (e.g. 
J. Rawls). However, republican philosophy (communitarianism) strives to 
include “individual human dignity and the social dimension of human 
existence”.35 In this way, the individual and collective dimension of sol-
idarity fuse, directly united with the status of the individual in a politi-
cal community. The ethical status of solidarity is far more profound – it 
becomes a duty of any member of a community.36 A characteristic trait 
of  republican political thought is the conviction that: “Nor can politi-
cal institutions effectively embody moral voices unless they are sustained 
and criticized by an active citizenry concerned about the moral direction 
of the community”.37
The currently prevailing model of liberal democracy is based on two 
pillars. Democratic legitimacy is catered for by the mechanism of free and 
equal universal suffrage, which legitimises current policy carried out by 
the legislature and the executive. From the start of modern constitution-
alism, in the post-revolutionary age, universal suffrage was sanctioned as 
a display of individuals’ solidarity, an expression of the unanimity of their 
will. But this was solidarity taken in purely abstract terms, trying theo-
retically to cope with the issue compared by J. J. Rousseau to squaring 
the circle – how to remain free while simultaneously being subject to law? 
35  See the declaration of Responsive Communitarian Platform: <http://communitariannet-
work.org/about-communitarianism/responsive-communitarian-platform/>.
36  The ‘obligation of solidarity’ category in contemporary social thought appeared expressly 
for the first time in Pope Paul VI’s encyclic entitled Populorum Progresssio of 1967, in which it 
is presented as a universal moral duty of people in charge of public affairs.
37 Responsive Communitarian Platform, op. cit. 
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On the grounds of the model presented, the liberal element, express-
ing itself in the institutions of the rule of law upheld by the judiciary, is 
responsible for the steerability and stability of the whole system. The judi-
ciary has to protect minority rights by securing at least a minimum level 
of formal solidarity within a community. In this way, liberalism has given 
rise to court-centric, rights-based constitutionalism.38
Thus, it may be said that liberal constitutionalism distinguishes itself 
by the ontological primacy of the constitution over the state and its poli-
cy.39 The constitution primarily must ex ante preserve the individual’s free-
dom from the potential dangers posed by each and every subsequent polit-
ical majority. On the other hand, a material view of constitutional rights, 
characteristic of liberal constitutionalism, makes them an insurmountable 
barrier for any collective goals, including even those that have a constitu-
tional anchor.
The most comprehensive justification of this model has been delivered 
by R. Dworkin in his concept of “rights as trumps”. The conviction that 
individual rights are non-reducible in the face of any sovereign power (even 
democratically legitimised) serves to protect the fundamental principles 
of human dignity and political equality. To the American philosopher, this 
right of every citizen “to treatment as an equal” is the foundation of legal 
order. It is based on the claim that “the weaker members of a political com-
munity are entitled to the same concern and respect of their government as 
the more powerful members have secured themselves.”40
This view of R. Dworkin proves that some form of the fulfilment 
of solidarity is also possible on the ground of liberal constitutionalism. 
However, it is a very narrow understanding of this idea, and closely related 
to the concept of fundamental rights. In effect, the mentioned idea finds 
justification to a greater extent in the pre-societal rights of community 
members, which must be protected by constitutional institutions, rather 
than in current politics. But in the republican view, rights acquire their 
content within and not beyond current policy, thus they must, to a greater 
38  Li-Ann Thio, op. cit. 135.
39  M. La Torre, Constitutionalism and Legal Reasoning. A New Paradigm for the Concept of Law 
(Dortrecht 2007) 8. 
40  R. Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously (Duckworth London 1978) 198-199, 227. 
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extent, be collated with strictly political goals, including the requirements 
of an active pro-solidarity policy.
15. Political solidarity may be realised both in vertical relations (be-
tween the state and the individual) as well as horizontal ones (between 
individuals). Both dimensions expose a vast area in which solidarity may 
be pursued, that is, the space in which individual ethics meets the general 
rules of social life. Liberal constitutionalists are decisively far less inter-
ested in mutual relations between them, whereas republican (communi-
tarian) thinkers expose the mutual connection between both dimensions 
of the functioning of the individual, through the lenses of both civic rights 
and duties. This should not be surprising because the active promotion 
of a substantive vision of the common good is characteristic of all illiberal 
polities.41 Also in this context, Latin America provides interesting exam-
ples of the incorporation of a new axiology into constitutions.
The example of Ecuador’s constitution may be interesting, as it di-
rectly incorporates in the basic law the concept of “the good way of living 
system” (Title VII)42, which demands that public politics is founded on 
the principles of equality, equity, progressivity, interculturalism, solidarity 
and nondiscrimination, and also that the criteria of quality, efficiency, ef-
fectiveness, transparency, responsibility and participation (Article 340) are 
taken into account. The constitutional idea of “the good way of living” is 
to express what is meant by the indigenous “sumak kawsay”. The individ-
ualistic pursuit of “a better life” – characteristic of western liberal civilisa-
tion, is replaced with the postulate “to live well” within a just community. 
Naturally, the concept of the good way of living may easily be instru-
mentalised by a particular political power. Hence, a necessary complement 
of new material constitutional models is an independent constitutional 
court, operating reflexively on the basis of such models, and overseeing 
the quality of deliberation in public matters. 
41 ibid. 134.
42  See the English translation of the Constitution of the Republic of Ecuador, available at:
 < http://pdba.georgetown.edu/Constitutions/Ecuador/english08.html>
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16. The above considerations allow the positing of a thesis that 
the liberal paradigm of legitimacy of constitutional justice sets too narrow 
a framework to allow the normative potential embedded in the constitu-
tional idea of solidarity to be used to the full. Championing solidarity by 
a constitutional court would rely here on identifying barriers or disrup-
tions in the creation and development of solidarity bonds within particular 
communities in different spheres of political or social activity.
In carrying out these tasks, a constitutional court should also show 
great restraint. From the perspective of the essence of constitutional jus-
tice, the proper area of concern for solidarity would be nothing but a polit-
ical community viewed as the broadest of solidarity spheres and considered 
on the level of the nation-state.43 A constitutional court should therefore 
oversee the solidarity distribution of a certain good, namely of political 
power. For, as M. Walzer reminds us:
The community is itself a good – conceivably the most important good 
– that gets distributed. But it is a good that can only be distributed by 
taking people in, where all the senses of that latter phrase are relevant: 
they must be physically admitted and politically received. Hence mem-
bership cannot be handed out by some external agency; its value de-
pends upon an internal decision. Were there no communities capable 
of making such decisions, there would in this case be no good worth 
distributing.44
However, contemporary pluralist societies need institutions that me-
diate reflectively between smaller communities, by securing equal access 
to participate in public affairs. Constitutional judges should play the part 
of custodians of the rules of the political game, protecting against “bad 
solidarity” (like particularism or various forms of domination) expanding 
43  As an aside, let us only add that, under present conditions, the state is not actually the 
broadest sphere of solidarity, for we are witnessing the formation of supranational communi-
ties. In this way, solidarity also gains a new dimension. Courts, considerably involved in these 
processes, acquire a new plane of activity. Their role is here incomparably more difficult, since 
the directives of solidarity may be expressed here both as a call to deepen integration and as an 
obligation to protect the constitutional identity of the national community that they represent.
44  M. Walzer, The Spheres of Justice (Basic Books New York 1983) 58. 
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in public space. In the fulfilment of this task, a constitutional court should 
show well-advanced reflexivity, which may indeed function as legitimising 
its judicial decisions (output legitimacy).
The connection of solidarity with the idea of the rule of law is increas-
ingly being recognised by legal and political thinkers. As L. Morlino points 
out, the rule of law determines a procedural dimension of the quality 
of democracy. However, it stays in close connection with decisional output, 
namely the effects of political decisions and their implementation.45 One 
can clearly see that contemporary constitutionalism links the authority 
of power and law with the formula of output legitimacy, and pushes input 
legitimacy, connected with the traditional idea of political representation, 
to the background.
In consequence, as A. Czarnota rightly notes: 
The best means to achieve social solidarity in contemporary late-mod-
ern society is to construct it in reference to the discursive method, 
the institutional foundation of which would be the rule of law. Dem-
ocratic rule of law guarantees the sphere of public and private auton-
omy. Thus, they guarantee the freedom of opinion, which is indispen-
sable for the functioning of democracy. Simultaneously, they allow for 
the public sphere to be arranged in such a manner as to realise a policy 
of social cohesion, namely of social solidarity.46
Constitutional courts seem to be an element of the institutional struc-
ture of constitutionalism that best safeguards the just rules of the dis-
tribution of political power in a community. It ensures that no one is 
left out of it because their legal subjectivity is questioned. In economic 
matters, traditionally related to issues of solidarity, constitutional courts 
play second fiddle. Here, all kinds of political, and not legal, instruments 
45  L. Morlino, ‘“Good” and “Bad” Democracies: How to Conduct Research into the Qual-
ity of Democracy’ (2004) 20(1) Journal of Communist Studies and Transitions Politics 7.
46  A. Czarnota, ‘Prawo a współczesne odmiany solidaryzmu społecznego’ in A. Łabno (ed), 
Idea solidaryzmu we współczesnej filozofii prawa i polityki (Warszawa 2012) 72-73. 
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of governance are more adequate, and naturally more sensitive to compli-
cated interdependencies between the spheres of social and economic life.47
V. Conclusion
 17. The transformation of the public sphere of contemporary de-
mocracies means that constitutional courts are expected not so much 
to fulfil a reactive function in protecting individual rights, but rather to 
actively participate in forging legal frameworks for discourse on the con-
stitutional identity of a community. Only in this way, and not through 
deficient electoral procedures, the principle of the sovereignty of the peo-
ple can be fully realised in new political circumstances. In other words, 
the basic task falling to judges is to correct all actions that threaten soli-
darity understood primarily as the inclusion of “others” by encompassing 
them in the common category of the political “we”. This is of particular 
importance in the context of the prevailing pluralism of contemporary 
communities. Therefore, of equal importance are the institutional mech-
anisms for activating citizens to participate in constitutional politics. 
Constitutional courts, by becoming more responsive to various structures 
of a network state, in which the significance of constitutional values is 
now determined, may serve as a guarantor of pro-solidarity attitudes, by 
reinforcing the space of trust within the “community of communities”, 
namely a state.
In consequence, the thesis that solidarity determines the foundation 
of the legitimacy of power in its modern formula seems to be justified. 
However, the idea of solidarity is realised differently in various spheres 
of public life. As a constitutional value, it constitutes a general direc-
tive binding in the whole network of communities making up a con-
temporary state; as a  legal principle, it may serve as an autonomous 
constitutional model determining the form of a political community 
(a state); by contrast, in the policy sphere, it is a directive to implement 
relevant social programmes, run by the administration, in order to en-
hance solidarity.
47  Li-Ann Thio, op. cit. 143. 
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E. Durkheim, one of the fathers of the doctrine of solidarity, discerned 
this dependence, claiming that democracy may “(…) appear as the politi-
cal system by which the society can achieve a consciousness of itself in its 
purest form. The more that deliberation and reflection and a critical spirit 
play a considerable part in the course of public affairs, the more demo-
cratic the nation”.48 Therefore, judges should protect the authority of law 
understood as the instrument of social integration founded on the consti-
tutional idea of solidarity. 
48  E. Durkheim, Professional Ethics and Civic Morals (Routledge Sociology Classics, New 
York 2001) 89. 

51
toMasz tadeusz koncewicz1
the european comity of circumspect 
constitutional courts.  
searching for constitutional reason, 
relevance and voice2
Stop for a second in a rushing crowd. There is the Other next to you. Meeting Him is 
the greatest experience of all. Talking to the Other, feeling him out while at the same 
time knowing that he sees and understands the world differently, is crucial to building 
the atmosphere for positive dialogue.3
Some PEOPLE BELIEVE IN FATE, OTHERS DON’T. I DO and I don’t. It may 
seem at times as if invisible fingers move us about like puppets on strings. But for sure, 
we are not born to be dragged along. We can grab the strings ourselves and adjust our 
course at every crossroad, or take off at any little trail into the unknown.4 
I. European constitutionalism. Setting the scene 
I will argue below that the European constitutional landscape to-
day is being dominated by the overlapping consensus of constitutional 
courts which forms the heart of supranational adjudication in Europe 
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2 This paper builds on, and follows, my paper entitled ‘Constitutional Identity in the Euro-
pean Legal Space and the Comity of Circumspect Constitutional Courts’ presented at the IX 
World Congress of Constitutional Law in Oslo, 16-20 June 2014. Published in the present 
form, it is a more nuanced and expanded (yet by no means final!) version of the arguments 
presented at the 2014 Congress and in the “Oslo paper”.   
3  R. Kapuścinski, Ten Inny [The Other] (Warszawa 2010) [the English translation of the quot-
ed passage is mine].
4  Thor Heyerdahl, Kon-Tiki Across the Pacific by Raft (Foreword to the 35th Anniversary Edn, 
New York, London, Toronto, Sydney 2009) [italics in the original].
koncewicz, the european coMity of circuMspect constitutional courts...
52
IX World Congress of Constitutional Law (Oslo, 16‑20 June 2014) Contributions by Polish Scholars
with different interests, power struggles and jostling for better positions. 
Post-national law sees law as a never-ending discourse and conflict as writ-
ten into the DNA of the system. Dogmatic and exclusive “either … or” 
logic becomes untenable as hierarchy is highly divisive from the external 
perspective of pluralistic systems which look for ways to coexist and co-
operate, and not simply cancel each other out. Each system stakes its own 
claim to constitutional distinctiveness. The uniqueness of European legal 
space resides in different courts speaking for their respective legal systems 
and coming up with divergent interpretations of the systemic relationship 
between EU law and national laws. Seen from this perspective, the main 
concern of European constitutionalism should be the proper understand-
ing and categorisation of the EU as a supranational community designed 
to complement states, and not replace them, to provide a new platform for 
citizens’ interests and to protect them beyond state borders, often against 
the excesses of their own states.5 It recognises that a constitutional court 
aspiring to be “good” must be able to go beyond the mere defence of its 
constitution when it is attacked and accept the challenge of promoting do-
mestic constitutional values as part of the European constitution-building 
process. It aims at redrawing the constitutional status quo and points to-
wards new opportunities and methods of understanding the world of Eu-
ropean constitutionalism. Such an approach stems from accepting that 
the legitimacy of judicial power comes not only from within the systems 
but is also a consequence of systems interacting, learning and adapting.
Judges usually see their legal order above all the others and consider 
themselves at the centre of the legal universe. They are solely to protect their 
own legal systems from outside encroachments. EU law questions this state 
of affairs rather dramatically and demands that account be taken of perspec-
tives different from one’s own. The Court of Justice (hereinafter: the CJ or 
the Court) asserts, in the name of the autonomy and effectiveness of EU 
5  For an approach underlining the rupture by “Van Gend case law” with the traditional reading 
of constitutions and states, see M. Everson, J. Eisner, The Making of a European Constitution. 
Judges and Law Beyond Constitutive Power (Routledge 2007) 41, and A. Vauchez, ‘The Trans-
national Politics of Judicialization. Van Gend en Loos and the Making of EU Polity’ (2010) 
16(1) European Law Journal 1, and more recently A. Vauchez, L’Union par le droit. L’invention 
d’un programme institutionalle pour l’Europe (Paris 2013), in particular Chapter III pp. 181-223. 
53
Koncewicz, The European Comity of Circumspect Constitutional Courts...
law, the full and unconditional primacy of the said law over any national 
law, whereas a constitutional court anchors the primacy of EU law in its 
constitution and claims residual jurisdiction to strike down EU law as in-
compatible with constitutional norms. This approach means that we are 
faced with a constitutional impasse, as neither court is willing to defer to 
the other. Reconciliation and reasonable deference should rather come in 
good time from the reassurance that EU law is no threat. Such reconcili-
ation, however, hinges on necessary accommodations to be made by both 
sides of the process: the CJ and national courts. It is thus crucial to work out 
theories of justification and deliberations which would have judges strive for 
mutual understanding by generalising and universalising their language,6 re-
nouncing a single and universally operational theory. The sharing of a com-
mon legal discourse then becomes a challenge and takes the place of an ob-
solete search for “who has the ultimate authority”. It is much more difficult 
to try to communicate and search for a common understanding than simply 
entrench behind constitutional lines and lie in wait.
According to A. Stone Sweet, Europe possesses an overarching constitu-
tional structure, comprised of fundamental rights and the shared authority 
of judges to adjudicate individual claims. In this system, “no single organ 
possesses the ‘final word’ when it comes to a conflict between conflicting 
interpretations of rights; instead, the system develops through inter-court 
dialogue, both cooperative and competitive”.7 Constitutional pluralism 
teaches us that there is a necessary overlap of legal sources without ex ante 
hierarchy; it is the individual who has a choice which source to plead, and 
judges then have a choice of which right to enforce. Pluralism is more sub-
jective and is defined as an attitude which recognises plurality, in the ob-
jective sense understood as sources, jurisdictions and interpretations.8 In 
this sense, plurality is much easier than pluralism. As a result of all this, 
6  M.P. Maduro, Interpreting European Law: Judicial Adjudication in a Context of Constitution-
al Pluralism, available at <www.ejls.eu/2/25UK.pdf>.
7  A. Stone Sweet, ‘A Cosmopolitan Legal Order. Constitutional Pluralism and Rights Adju-
dication in Europe’ 1(1) Global Constitutionalism 53-90. 
8  Plurality is more objective and connotes overlapping jurisdictions, whereas the latter is more 
subjective and stands for an attitude which embraces plurality, wants to maintain it and not to 
destroy it. See N. Walker, in M. Avbelj and J. Komárek (eds), ‘Four Visions of Constitutional 
Pluralism’ (2008) 2(1) European Journal of Legal Studies 336.
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constitutional courts are urged to move away from the traditional no-
tion of a constitutional court as a guardian of a constitution only towards 
a court that is more engaged in a constructive dialogue on the European 
stage and reads its mandate through the prism of European constitution-
alism. Constitutional courts today become agents of the common project. 
It is very important that courts at the level of Member States and the EU 
play the game, balance sovereign and community needs, and voice their 
concerns within the procedural and institutional framework of EU law. It 
is all the more important nowadays when the argument “from the Consti-
tutional identity” is being employed as a legitimate counter-argument in 
the debate over the importance of uniformity and integrity of EU law. The 
latter is ready to take the back seat, something that was hardly conceivable 
forty years ago. This bestows upon constitutional courts a sense of pur-
pose, relevancy, recognition and, last but not least, responsibility. (A) new 
function(s) call(s) for (a) new framework(s) and the judicial comity aims 
at providing it/them.
The primacy dispute should be seen as a never-ending process, rather 
than a zero-sum game, and a move from “hierarchical primacy” to “discur-
sive primacy”. It is time to embrace the fact that constitutional courts at 
the national and EU level function as a motor for, and a critique of, Eu-
ropean constitutionalism. Hierarchic concepts are out of date and unable 
to capture the uniqueness and complexity of this new emerging comity 
of constitutional courts operating at different levels and guided by their 
distinct constitutional allegiances, and yet bound together in their desire 
to act jointly and with due regard to “the other”. The EU not only teach-
es others, but also learns from others. That is why constitutional courts 
must present the EU with their own vision of European constitutionalism 
before the CJ. Conflicts of jurisdictions and divergent judgments cannot 
be prevented by means of exclusive jurisdictions and hierarchical rules 
introduced in advance and in a universal manner. Rather, the question 
is one of the willingness to step back and recognise the other forum to 
be more appropriate, for whatever reason, for settling the dispute. This 
has nothing to do with the hierarchy or the last word though, but rather 
with the strength of the argument in favour of declining jurisdiction for 
the benefit of the other or recognising the other. This restraint is a two-way 
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sword and cuts both ways. Supranational judicial comity is based on a con-
structive dialogue as a means to judicial protection of human rights. As 
such, it would elevate judicial comity to the legal duty of each and every 
court to deliver justice.9 Constitutionalism will then be the result of reas-
surance that every actor plays according to the rules. There are and will be 
spheres of different and overlapping jurisdictions which interpret the same 
text and monitor each other’s interpretation. As a result, we must come 
to terms with the novel jurisprudence of mutual monitoring.10 Factors re-
lated to time, adaptation, and accommodation all play their part. Judicial 
cooperation has contested action and discord inherent in the concept.11 
Constitutional courts need a complex deliberative theory for tackling chal-
lenges coming their way in the wake of EU law. The compromise is badly 
needed between reasonable deference towards the CJ, on the one hand, 
and legitimising and constructive defiance, on the other. It is clear that 
every time a constitutional court makes concessions, it is preparing to gain 
some ground elsewhere. Constitutional discourse is like a chain novel: full 
of turns, bumps and ruptures. What counts though is that there is an 
agreement to continue adding new chapters, plots and characters. After all, 
it is nothing spectacular since the entire project is about finding the right 
balance between diversity and uniformity, between stepping back and 
learning from others’ visions and stepping forward and explaining one’s 
vision to others. The most important of this comparative constitutional-
ism is that it is not about mere citations to others. It is about readiness to 
change, absorb and acknowledge that other courts have something impor-
tant to say. It involves a constructive critique and comparative reasoning. 
Mutual influence of others implies not only automatic reception, but also 
rejection. 
9  N. Lavranos, ‘Towards a Solange-Method Between International Courts and Tribunals’ in 
T. Broude and Y. Shany (eds), The Shifting Allocation of Authority in International Law. Essays 
in Honour of Prof. R. Lapidoth (2008).
10  A.-M. Slaughter, ‘A Typology of Transjudicial Communication’ (1994) 29 University of 
Richmond Law Review 99. In the same vein, see G. Davies, ‘Constitutional Disagreement in 
Europe and the Search of Pluralism’, Eric Stein Working Paper 1/2010. 
11  E.-U. Petersmann, ‘Do Judges Meet Their Constitutional Obligation to Settle Disputes 
in Conformity with “Principles of Justice and International Law”?’ 1(2) European Journal of 
Legal Studies.
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II. The comity of constitutional courts. What is in a name?
It is the contention of the present analysis that refocusing the consti-
tutional debate is of utmost significance. The emphasis must be shifted 
towards the comity of courts transcending the now established and uni-
versally recognised “community of courts”.12 Such comity acts as a de-
centralised sovereign within a new kind of polity – a cosmopolitan legal 
order characterised by legal pluralism. The comity of constitutional courts 
is premised on an important shift in emphasis. “Judges asking judges”, as 
an EU paradigm for relations between the CJ and lower national courts, is 
complemented in the context of constitutional courts by “judges monitor-
ing judges”. The latter plays to the sensitivities and egos of constitutional 
courts, ensuring their active role in the deliberative process. This shift is 
crucial for three reasons. Firstly, it brings vital rationalisation of the dis-
cretionary powers of the courts and provides control of the constitutional 
disagreement by delineating the parameters within which the actors are 
free to roam. National courts are acting not on their own national author-
ity and are not cast as agents defending an idiosyncratic national tradition 
against the EU. They are instead trying to give meaning to the principles 
of their national constitutions in the light of a common European consti-
tutional practice. Secondly, it allows a margin for discretion and divergence 
by accepting that not all values are shared, and that the system might be 
better-off by playing up to the pride of the actors, and allowing them 
go their own ways. Thirdly, it vindicates the role of constitutional courts, 
while reinventing their vocation in a plural and constitutionally competi-
tive world and making them a catalyst for change and adaptation at the EU 
level. Without a postulated shift from an internal focus (inward perspective 
of the constitution) towards an external one by opening up and absorb-
ing a European constitution, a change in the language (finding common 
ground and linking nodes of the network, instead of separating and under-
lining divergences), new logic (not only ever-present “either … or” but also 
“both … and”) and readiness to problematise reality, constitutional courts 
12  A. D’Alterio, ‘From Judicial Comity to Legal Comity: A Judicial Solution to Global Dis-
order?’ Jean Monnet Working Paper 13/10. 
57
Koncewicz, The European Comity of Circumspect Constitutional Courts...
risk marginalisation and loss of influence on the way in which European 
law enters and penetrates their constitutional orders.
A starting premise is the willingness of all the actors to recalibrate their 
original positions in the light of others’ arguments. The comity points to-
wards new opportunities and methods of seeing and understanding the world 
of European constitutionalism. It is constitutionalism that is free of dogma-
tism. Rather, the comity is pragmatic in that it both allows and frames a con-
frontation and a dispute. It brings to the fore a fundamental challenge for 
judges accustomed to the traditional conception of the legal system as a pyr-
amid with the result that lower laws always conform to the higher-ranking 
norm(s). It provides a framework to reconcile the contradictory claims and 
pretensions of the CJ and national courts, since it caters to the pride and rele-
vance of each actor. This must be so, for building a European Constitution is 
a collective, dynamic and pluralistic enterprise. It calls for never-ending feed-
back and communication from national courts and their traditions. Its main 
rationale is to anticipate a dispute and fend it off immediately, rather than 
to face the uncertainty of a fully-fledged disagreement and its consequences. 
That is why the comity starts from a different assumption: EU law and na-
tional laws are distinct, yet closely interwoven, bodies of laws. Each system 
must learn from the other, change, engage in a meaningful dialogue and 
accept otherness. Checks and balances between non-hierarchical legal orders 
build a whole based on mutual trust and control. Therefore, the comity is 
built on judicial dialogue and understanding going beyond mere pro-Euro-
pean interpretation and citation of others’ decisions. Dialogue acts as a legit-
imating power and, when properly understood, backs up courts’ claims to 
their visions. Dialogue involving all the interested parties has the potential 
to arrive at better-reasoned interpretative results, and rewards participants 
since each has prima facie an equal right to succeed. Nothing is set in stone. 
On the contrary, the equilibrium never ceases to change, move and surprise 
both onlookers and actors. It is the power of better arguments (imperio ra-
tionis), and not the argument of power (ratione imperii), that counts and 
dictates the outcomes.13 As a result of this discursive premise, the comity 
13  M. Cogen-Eliya, I. Porrat, ‘Proportionality and the Culture of Justification’, available at: 
<http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1623397>. 
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embraces the responsibility not only to engage in a dialogue but also to 
frame it in universal terms. EU law touches constitutional law on so many 
aspects that it is no longer tenable for constitutional courts to maintain their 
serene aloofness.14 The comity pits constitutional courts against the full force 
of constitutional debate which will be either joined or ignored. To join, how-
ever, means to voice one’s concerns critically and constructively so as to allow 
for true migration of constitutional ideas. The main challenge is then in 
the sphere of language, making it clear that separation as a legal technique is 
not just outdated, but is alienating and may result in isolation.15 It requires 
that legal actors, in their scholarly writings (the role of the doctrine) and case 
law (the role of the courts), display flexibility and receptiveness to the chang-
ing nature of law. Being part of the comity imposes on constitutional courts 
a responsibility for linking the nodes and connecting the dots within the le-
gal net, by deconstructing overlapping structures and managing consensus 
among participants of the unique emergent comity of mutual impact and 
influence. This would allow each autonomous order to evolve in reaction to 
the other. As a result, changes would always be a by-product of outside reali-
ty and its demands. Such comity recognises the systemic functions of consti-
tutional courts,16 with constitutional courts and the CJ acting in a relational 
– although not always cooperative – way. 
III.  The relevance of the “argument from a domestic 
constitution” 
Constructive constitutional criticism might benefit EU law, provid-
ed that it takes place in a structured and principled fashion and is argu-
ment-based. This approach is pragmatic and it recognises that the legal 
world is no longer black or white (current “solving the conflict logic”) but 
14  For a comprehensive analysis, see J. Komárek, ‘The Place of Constitutional Courts in the 
EU’ (2013) 9 European Constitutional Law Review 420. 
15  On a legitimising force of dialogue in EU law, see A. T. Pérez, Conflicts of Rights in the Eu-
ropean Union. A Theory of Supranational Adjudication (Oxford 2009). 
16  See classic A. S. Sweet, Governing with Judges. Constitutional Politics in Europe (Oxford 
University Press 2000). 
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rather grey (with the emphasis on conflict management).17 The constitu-
tional argument enjoys its own claim to validity and is taken into account 
as an integral part of the systemic constitutional conversation. It is not 
simply waved aside as parochial and old-fashioned, but must be considered 
seriously by the CJ as the part and parcel of this emerging constitutional 
equilibrium in Europe. The risk in waiting for the EU’s impact on Mem-
ber States’ constitutional structures is too uncertain and, in the end, might 
be too high. Constructive participation in the dialogue is always better 
than passively waiting for results which are beyond anyone else’s individual 
control. Constitutional courts thus become agents of the common project 
without renouncing completely their internal constitutional allegiances, 
since these allegiances are reconstructed in a European context. 
Every constitutional court of a Member State has a crucial message to 
convey for European constitutionalism. As already shown above, respect 
and communication are hallmarks of the judicial comity of courts, and 
conflict is seen as a sign that the system is working. The more national 
experiences are missing, the more the CJ runs the risk of imposing a spe-
cific cultural tradition on the whole of European society, as if it were part 
of the common constitutional background. A constitutional court which 
sits on the fence is condemned either to accept a cultural homologation 
established by the strongest voices or to fight a sterile battle of defence, en-
trenched behind the counter-limits and national sovereignty. All this makes 
it easier to understand why today the preliminary reference procedure (see 
below) is on the verge of constitutionalisation and provides a legal avenue 
for presenting rich and diverse points of view before the CJ and channelling 
constitutional concerns.18 The answer by the CJ must strike a reasonable 
balance between the requirements of both legal orders. For a constitutional 
court, it is of utmost importance to understand that a preliminary ruling 
is not the end of sovereignty but rather, and more correctly, the beginning 
of something new: constructing a discursive constitution of the European 
legal order which straddles national constitutional law and EU law. In 
17  See J. R. Bengoetxea, N. MacCormick, L. M. Soriano, ‘Integration and Integrity in the 
Legal Reasoning of the European Court of Justice’ in G. de Burca and J. H. H. Weiler (eds), 
The European Court of Justice. Collected Courses of the Academy of European Law (Oxford 2001). 
18  See J.H.H. Weiler, ‘Judicial Ego’ (2011) 9(1-4) ICON 1-2.  
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this process, constitutional courts become agents of the common project. 
The dispute about constitutional essentials recognises that each court has 
an equal right to win only if it comes to the negotiating table with better 
and credible arguments in favour of national specificity and diversity. The 
importance of this discourse goes beyond a concrete dispute: rather, it is 
about building trust with every participant of the constitutional exchange 
so that next time today’s losers will come out on top. A discursive approach 
to constitutionalism puts constitutional courts in the systemic spotlight, 
as it calls on those courts to detect and monitor “structural deficiencies” 
of EU law as well as to manage such deficiencies discursively and bring 
them to the attention of the CJ. This role bestows on these courts an ad-
ditional sense of purpose, relevancy, recognition and, last but not least, 
responsibility. The narrative focused on structural deficiencies presupposes 
a clash between EU and national law, and this shows why dialogue must 
be constructive and should be nothing short of a nice conversation. How-
ever, this is the only way to make sure that national courts do not lapse 
into a nationalistic reading of structural deficiencies. Allowing such a lapse 
would be tantamount to the abuse of the dialogue and would put a defen-
sive mask on the dialogue. In this sense, playing within the community, 
not outside, requires – as a condition sine qua non – conceptual tolerance 
which precedes constitutional pluralism. 
European constitutionalism operates within the coordinate judicial 
web in which constitutional courts and the CJ (also the ECtHR) agree to 
defer to one another’s decisions as long as these decisions respect mutually 
agreed upon essentials. It alludes to the analysis of Sabel and Gerstenberg, 
who claim that an overlapping consensus on fundamental commitments 
of principle which each order requires the other to respect does not rest 
on one single doctrine and understanding of what is good, moral, etc. 
Quite the contrary, all actors agree and acknowledge their differences and 
their influence on the interpretation of shared commitments, and accord 
such a possibility to others. As long as others respect jointly agreed essen-
tials, an overlapping consensus is being articulated and adjusted. In this 
way, our comity extends beyond national territory by means of jurispru-
dence of mutual respect, peer review and supervision, without pretence 
to bringing into existence a new overarching entity. Actors build on this 
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overlapping consensus and at the same time check that others respect es-
sential principles and commitments. Each court reserves the right to assert 
its residual jurisdiction if it is convinced that there is a violation of shared 
principles. Sabel and Gerstenberg state the following: 
Decision making is horizontal rather than vertical, in the sense that ad-
judication by one court of the boundaries of shared fundamental prin-
ciples is contingent on the acceptance of overall outcomes by the oth-
ers. The commitment to principles shared by all and the possibility 
that other orders, if convinced that fundamental rights on their under-
standing are imperiled, will assert their jurisdiction, induce each court 
to consider its decisions in light of reasons acceptable to all the others.19 
This judicial monitoring of the overlapping consensus takes place with-
in the more general structure provided by the comity, as discussed above, 
which sets up an argumentative, institutional and procedural framework 
for voicing constitutional concerns and managing overlap inherent in 
the European coordinate constitutional order. Such rationalisation of dis-
cretionary powers granted to each and every court within the comity is 
crucial if the system is to function properly. “Constitutional override” re-
sulting from the disregard for the essentials must be seen as the last resort, 
as an exception rather than a rule, since the comity’s primary concern is 
about reconstructing circles of coherence, building understanding and 
finding common ground among reasonable and acceptable divergences. In 
this sense, the EU’s and the comity’s legal vocation in the years to come is 
not only “united in diversity” but equally “united from diversity”.20 
19  Ch. Sabel, O. Gerstenberg, ‘Constitutionalising an Overlapping Consensus: The ECJ and the 
Emergence of a Coordinate Constitutional Order’ (2010) 16 European Law Journal 511, 546. 
20  Today the relevance of the “argument from the constitution” goes well beyond “Omega 
– Sayn-Wittgenstein case law”. For various constellations, see N. de Boer, ‘Addressing Rights 
Divergences Under the Charter: Melloni’ (2013) 50 Common Market Law Review 1083, in 
particular pp. 1097-1103.
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All this takes on a special importance when one considers the change 
of internal dynamics in a constitutional litigation.21 It also explains why 
we are not only talking about “comity”, but we are also adding the modi-
fier “circumspect”. Courts act as political actors wielding persuasion rather 
than compulsion, engaged in a common enterprise, and redrawing lines 
between the courts and political institutions.22 The constitutional debate is 
shifting dramatically from who has the final say to what the limits of law are. 
European constitutionalism worthy of the name calls for much more than 
simplistic and antagonistic arguments from hierarchy. It requires modesty, 
self-limitation, awareness of the other and, last but not least, readiness to 
defer to one another’s decisions. Legal systems are linked and the juris-
prudence of their courts is the most important tool to make this work. 
Actors speaking for each order acknowledge not only their differences and 
understandings but also mutual influence on their decisions. The Euro-
pean legal space is polyarchic because it lacks a final decider! Such a legal 
order must resolve disputes by exchanges among coordinate bodies, each 
with a contingent claim to competence, and the parties are bound in these 
exchanges to re-examine their interpretations of shared principles, also in 
the light of arguments presented by the others.23 Legal orders are so inter-
dependent that one cannot be read and fully understood without regard to 
21  The constraints of space preclude any detailed analysis. Suffice to say that the Court of Jus-
tice has come a long way from being merely “a court of integration” to becoming “a court of 
rights”. See, among others, M. Cartabia, ‘“Taking Dialogue Seriously”. The Renewed Need 
for a Judicial Dialogue at the Time of Constitutional Activism in the European Union’ Jean 
Monnet Working Paper 12/2007. On the legitimising consequences of the CJ’s shift from be-
ing merely “a competence court” to becoming “a court of rights”, see an excellent analysis by 
M. Shapiro, ‘The European Court of Justice: Of Institutions and Democracy’ (1998) 32 Isra-
el Law Review 3. Furthermore, the introduction by the Lisbon Treaty of the national identity 
clause added a new constitutional layer to the case law of the Court. S. Schill, ‘Overcoming 
Absolute Primacy: Respect for National Identity Under the Lisbon Treaty’ (2011) 48 Common 
Market Law Review 147. See in this vein: L.F.M. Besselink, ‘National and Constitutional 
Identity Before and After Lisbon’ (2010) 6(3) Utrecht Law Review; as well as L.F.M. Besse-
link, ‘Respecting Constitutional Identity in the European Union: An Essay on ECJ (Second 
Chamber), Case C 208/09, 22 December 2010, Ilonka Sayn-Wittgenstein v. Landeshauptmann 
von Wien’ (2012) 49 Common Market Law Review 671. 
22  Also: ‘Les juges constituants’ (2010) 6 European Constitutional Law Review 171-174.  
23  Ch. Sabel, O. Gerstenberg, ‘Constitutionalising an Overlapping Consensus…’, op. cit. 
513-514. 
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the other. Novel and challenging questions concern inter alia the extent to 
which the conflict can be decided and interpreted by the courts, as well as 
the proper role of other actors in this constitutional enterprise, rather than 
sterile disputes of “the court which has the last word”.
IV. The comity and the art of “constitutional bargaining”
It is no coincidence that the analysis opens with the excerpt from 
Ryszard Kapuściński’s novel The Other, as the comity offers an opportunity 
for constitutional rediscovery and understanding of a single court’s voca-
tion through the lenses of other and equal courts. The courts not only have 
a voice, but also ears. The role of any constitutional court should be seen 
as a function of constitutional constraint, self-critique and self-correction. 
The constitutional reconciliation, however, hinges on necessary accommo-
dations to be made by both sides of the process: the Court of Justice and 
national courts.24 For the sake of argument, we might assume that two 
propositions are possible concerning a solution to competing jurisdictions. 
On the one hand, an interpretation is superior as a result of the court’s 
place in the hierarchy, since the court placed higher in the hierarchy enjoys 
superiority. On the other hand, the argumentative school of thought is 
more ambitious, since it rejects the hierarchy and adopts the quality and 
strength of reasoning as a counter-argument for the hierarchy. What counts 
is not “who says” but “how it is said”. The force of arguments prevails over 
strict hierarchies. The landscape is characterised by the diversity of legal 
sources, various sites of new governance as a by-product of Europeanisa-
tion, privatisation and bureaucratisation, the plurality of the sites of legal 
expression and the prima facie equality of authority claims; the relationship 
24  G. Davies, ‘Constitutional Disagreement …’, op. cit. For the negative and unfortunate ex-
ample of adding fuel to the fire by constitutional courts, see the comment on the judgment of 
the Czech Constitutional Court following the Court of Justice’s ruling in Landtovà : A. Dyevre, 
‘The Czech Ultra Vires Revolution: Isolated Accident or Omen of Judicial Armageddon?’, 
(available at <http://www.verfassungsblog.de/the-czech-ultra-vires-revolution-isolated-acci-
dent-or-omen-of-judicial-armageddon/>).
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between legal orders is already more horizontal than vertical, heterarchical 
than hierarchical.25
The interpretive result should never close the door on the interpretation 
by the other, but rather should leave enough room and options to invite 
the other and turn the monologue into a dialogue. Judicial review is always 
a matter of interaction between deference and defiance, and the challenge 
is to combine the two without falling into the trap of extremism of either 
attitude. As a result, constitutional judges put on a mantle of political the-
orists and this recalibrates the discourse on their legitimacy and vocation. 
Such a denomination helps avoid denouncing judgments as mere political 
statements rather than legal ones. It liberates the doctrine from analysing 
what the courts are really saying, since we assume in advance that what 
they are saying does belong in the courtroom anyway. It is no longer true 
that only politicians bargain while judges merely argue. Constitutional 
judges are powerful political institutions, building alliances, speaking for 
their legal systems and impacting on the political process.26 They do bar-
gain to an ever-increasing extent, even though they pretend that they are 
only deciding cases.27
Constitutional absolutism has no reason to exist, for it is the defer-
ence, mutual respect and learning that define rules of the game. The Court 
of Justice not only teaches constitutional courts, but it also learns from its 
constitutional counterparts, who put forward their own vision of the Eu-
ropean constitutionalism. These courts must balance constitutional argu-
ments against European integration on a case-by-case basis, avoiding gen-
eral and abstract principles which might tie their hands in the future and 
deprive them of breathing room in their interactions with the Court of Jus-
tice. It is only under those circumstances that one has a chance to arrive 
at a true “constitutional synthesis”. All this takes on a special importance 
when one considers the change of internal dynamics in a constitutional 
25  D. Halberstam, ‘Systems Pluralism and Institutional Pluralism in Constitutional Law: 
National, Supranational, and Global Governance’ University of Michigan Law School Public 
Law and Legal Theory Working Paper 229/2011.  
26  On this, see most recently D. Robertson, The Judge as a Political Theorist. Contemporary 
Constitutional Review (Princeton, NJ, Princeton University Press 2010) with further references. 
27  M. Shapiro, ‘Judges as Liars’ (1994) 17 Harvard Law Review 155. 
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litigation. Firstly, the Court of Justice gains confidence as a fully-fledged 
“court of rights”, and not merely as the “court of integration”. Expand-
ing and nuancing its fundamental rights jurisprudence, the Court enters 
the stage of rights litigation with confidence and its own claim to respect. 
Secondly, and more importantly, to support our contention, EU law itself 
undergoes subtle changes in its internal structure. With the introduction 
of Article 4(2) TEU, which obliges the Union to respect national identity 
inherent in the political and constitutional structure of Member States, 
and the recent case law of the Court (cases like Michaniki and, more sig-
nificantly, Sayn-Wittgenstein), free movement rights might be restricted on 
the basis of a national measure which is the expression of national identi-
ty.28 The traditional, first-generation constitutional dispute between com-
peting rights and interests turns into the second-generation conflict that 
goes beyond fundamental rights. Constitutional rules and principles (oth-
er than fundamental rights), pertaining to the political and constitutional 
identity of Member States, become a valid counter-argument for the full 
operation of Community law. For example, in Sayn-Wittgenstein, it was 
the republican nature of the state which was a relevant restriction on EU 
rights – the situation hardly conceivable in the early years of the Court’s 
jurisprudence on the independent nature of law “stemming from the Trea-
ty, that cannot be overridden by rules of national law, however framed”.29 
It is submitted that we are witnessing a fascinating process of shifting 
from an absolute autonomy of a European legal order (external sourc-
es of human rights were translated/interpolated into the EU legal order 
28  For a thorough analysis of Art. 4(2) of the Treaty and the jurisprudence of the Court of 
Justice, see A. von Bogdandy, S. Schill, ‘Overcoming Absolute Primacy: Respect for Nation-
al Identity Under the Lisbon Treaty’ (2011) 48 Common Market Law Review 147, as well as 
B. Guastafferro, ‘Beyond the Exceptionalism of Constitutional Conflicts: The Ordinary Func-
tions of the Identity Clause’ Jean Monnet Working Paper 1/12. 
29  In this vein: L.F.M. Besselink, ‘National and Constitutional Identity Before and After Lis-
bon’ (2010) 6(3) Utrecht Law Review; as well as L.F.M. Besselink, ‘Respecting Constitutional 
Identity in the European Union: An Essay on ECJ (Second Chamber), Case C 208/09, 22 De-
cember 2010, Ilonka Sayn-Wittgenstein v. Landeshauptmann von Wien’ (2012) 49 Common 
Market Law Review 671. On possible ramifications of the “Sayn-Wittgenstein jurisprudence”, 
see also D. Ritleng, ‘Le droit au respect de l’identité constitutionelle nationale’ in J.-Ch. Bar-
bato and J.-D. Mouton (eds), Vers la reconnaissance de droits fondamentaux aux etats members de 
l’Union europénne. Réflexions à partir des notions d’identité et de solidarité (Bruxelles 2010) 21-47. 
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by the intermediary of general principles of Community law and thus 
the Community law pretended to keep its independence from national 
laws) to heteronomy, where the EU is obliged to respect sources that reside 
outside its hallowed catalogue of fundamental rights. There is no place 
for reading constitutional traditions into the EU, as it would have been 
the case in accordance with the classic “Costa-Simmenthal case law”. In-
stead, the EU is under an obligation to respect sources that are external to 
its own legal system. In that sense, Article 4(2) TEU is nothing short of be-
ing revolutionary, for it consists of the classic tenets of a traditional Euro-
pean supranationalism, leading to a truly constitutional supranationalism. 
Thirdly, for the very first time in the history of integration, there exists 
a situation of a jurisdictional overlap where one set of norms is integrated 
into another by way of a direct referral from one legal order to another. 
Article 4(2) TEU belongs to such a category, as it postulates that the con-
stitutional norms of a Member State, which form part of its identity, are to 
be respected and protected by the institutions of the EU. The CJ must not 
simply continue the “business as usual” of vetting every argument derived 
from national law (as was the case in the past when autonomy reigned), 
since it is the Treaty itself that mandates respect for outside sources of law 
in the form of constitutional traditions. The CJ must learn to act in unison 
as it must look towards constitutional courts to learn about their traditions 
and invite them to join it in working out the meaning of European law 
in the light of those traditions. The big question is then how to reconcile 
the possible overlap of competences, how to mediate between the expec-
tations of national laws and the exigencies of the EU legal order, and what 
role the respective (EU and national) courts should play in the process. 
There is no doubt that the Court must lead the way, and execute, at 
least, a rudimentary check of what the constitutional courts present to it 
by way of constitutional traditions. That is an extremely delicate task as 
the Court partly treads on the national turf, even though it appears to 
be ascertaining the meaning of EU law. As a result, vetting a piece of na-
tional constitutional legislation must be carried out with great caution 
and a sense of appropriateness, all being hallmarks of the comity of equal 
courts, where each court knows its limits and recognises “the other”. The 
case law of the CJ is still in its infancy, and it would be interesting to see 
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how it evolves and builds on the basis of the Sayn-Wittgenstein precedent.30 
One might tentatively argue that the Court is in the process of carving out 
room for its minimal correcting intervention, should any doubts arise as 
to a true categorisation of a constitutional rule/principle as the expression 
of the constitutional identity. There are two strands of case law that seem 
to be taking shape now. And so, on the one hand, in Michaniki, the Court 
found an incompatibility between the Greek national law and EU law, 
despite the fact that the national law was of the constitutional status. In 
Sayn-Wittgenstein, on the other hand, the Court accepted, at face value, 
the argument that the invoked constitutional principle was a valid and 
proportionate counter-argument to EU law norms, and, as a result, had 
a good claim to prevail over the latter. Thus, it seems that it is the power 
of an argument and of particular significance of the constitutional norm 
for the overall scheme of the constitutional system that will be of primor-
dial importance, and not the mere constitutional rank of the norm. Not 
all constitutional norms enjoy an argumentative force within the meaning 
of Sayn-Wittgenstein and make up the identity of the constitution, but 
only those that are argued properly, established in the case law of constitu-
tional courts and put before the Court.31 Constitutional identities should 
be about constitutional essentials, and not constitutional peculiarities. 
The EU factors in national expressions as important values but refuses 
to assign these expressions with the status of constitutional trump cards. 
A constitutional disagreement is not ruled out altogether, but is made less 
likely and its internal dynamics are changed.32 Shared constitutional space 
is inclusive and is inhabited by various actors with competing (and often 
30  For possible “routes” and directions, see interesting reflections by M. Safjan, ‘Between 
Mangold and Omega: Fundamental Rights Versus Constitutional Identity’ (2012) 3 Il’Dirit-
to dell’Unione Europea 437. 
31  See in detail: L.F.M. Besselink, ‘National and Constitutional Identity Before and After 
Lisbon’ (2010) 6(3) Utrecht Law Review; as well as L.F.M. Besselink, ‘Respecting Constitu-
tional Identity in the European Union: An Essay on ECJ (Second Chamber), Case C 208/09, 
22 December 2010, Ilonka Sayn-Wittgenstein v. Landeshauptmann von Wien’ (2012) 49 Com-
mon Market Law Review 671. 
32  G. Davies, ‘Constitutional Disagreement In Europe and the Search for Pluralism’ Eric 
Stein Working Paper 1/2010. 
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clashing) pretensions. EU law is not qualified by the constitutional iden-
tity but rather the process becomes more diversified and proceduralised. 
Constitutions must assert their voice and join the debate, and constitu-
tional scholarship must enter and navigate the uncharted waters of trans-
lation from one vocabulary into the other with Article 4(2) TEU serving 
as an important signpost. As a result, one gets a vigilant constitutionalism 
and a strategic dialogue in their purest form, both centred around a discur-
sive model of law and a dispute regarding the law’s meaning. This case law 
shows that a new equilibrium among the constitutional courts of Europe 
is marked by an overlap, interconnectedness, inclusion and tolerance as 
opposed to a once-dominant and unproblematic logic of hierarchy, auton-
omy and separateness. It remains to be seen how the Court of Justice will 
construe the proportionality test in future cases, for those will ultimately 
determine the scope of constitutional discretion left to the national con-
stitutional courts.33
V.  The Polish Constitutional Court and the comity. A dream, 
forlorn hope or … reality?
The pertinent question then arises as to why and how this should all 
matter to the Polish Constitutional Court (also referred to as: the Consti-
tutional Tribunal of the Republic of Poland).34
33  What is crucial is the search for an accommodation in a shared constitutional space, ex-
change, tolerance and acceptance of the other. It seems that, while the expression of the con-
stitutional identity and the question of substance (what properties can be ascribed to national 
identity in order for the state’s expression to be recognised as such identity) should be a mat-
ter for Member States (here Member States are understood not only as constitutional courts 
but also legislative organs), the final legal categorisation of the constitutional identity within, 
and its consequences for, the legal order of the EU, should be left to the Court of Justice as the 
ultimate interpreter of EU law. For more on the division of work in the reconstructing of the 
constitutional identity, see: G. van der Schyff, ‘The Constitutional Relationship Between the 
European Union and Its Member States: The Role of National Identity in Article 4(2) TEU’ 
(2013) 37 European Law Review 563, in particular pp. 572-577. 
34  For an in-depth presentation of the argument, see T.T. Koncewicz ‘Trybunał Konstytu-
cyjny wobec prawa europejskiego’ (part I) – (2012) 2 Przegląd Sejmowy, available at <http://
orka.sejm.gov.pl/przeglad.nsf/0/E4C185D6BFB8423BC1257A0C00395202/%24File/ps109.
pdf>, and part II – (2012) 3 Przegląd Sejmowy, available at <http://orka.sejm.gov.pl/przeglad.
nsf/0/39E3A68D109C139EC1257A3F00477C06/%24File/ps110.pdf>. 
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Every constitutional court has always been, and will be, a political ac-
tor with ambitions, self-understanding and preferences.35 However, it is 
crucial to understand that today a constitutional power play and struggle 
are also taking place on the European stage. It is of fundamental impor-
tance for constitutional courts to shift discourse from grand strategies and 
constitutional rhetoric to actual application. The real world of EU con-
stitutionalism is defined by the latter. Constitutional dialogue in the era 
of post-national law must put a premium not on what the courts say, but 
on what they do, how they play and argue out their differences. For our 
analysis to be meaningful, the consideration of both of these worlds is 
essential, since EU law is more about action than words. Law never func-
tions on its own but through the actors’ actions.36 The Court marked its 
arrival on the European stage with a few strong judgments in which it 
laid out its views on EU law, its place within the Polish legal system and 
the relationship between Polish and EU law.37 Its case law thus far stands 
for a classic manifesto of defensive constitutionalism marked by an in-
ward-looking approach and disengagement. Only occasionally is it inter-
spersed with conciliatory gestures which are relegated to mere decorum 
at crunch time when the Court’s role as the guardian of the Polish Con-
stitution and the “inalienable national core” (the term introduced obiter 
35  The constituent power of the courts raises fascinating questions of the relationship between 
the courts and the political institutions. See Editorial, (2010) 6 European Constitutional Law 
Review 174, and an analysis from the institutional perspective, J. Komárek, ‘Institutional Di-
mension of Constitutional Pluralism’ Eric Stein Working Paper 3/2010.  
36  A. Kozak, ‘Niedoceniona wspólnota – prawnicy a integracja europejska’ in J. Kaczor (ed), 
Teoria prawa europejskiego (Wrocław 2005). 
37  For a general and worthwhile overview, see: B. Banaszkiewicz, ‘Prawo polskie a prawo 
Unii Europejskiej w orzecznictwie Trybunału Konstytucyjnego’(2005) 12 Europejski Przegląd 
Sądowy 49, and a more recent monograph by K. Wójtowicz, Sądy konstytucyjne wobec prawa 
Unii Europejskiej (Warszawa 2012). A useful recapitulation of the case law is provided by the 
Office of the Polish Constitutional Tribunal in its Summaries of Selected Judgments of the Pol-
ish Constitutional Tribunal Concerning EU Law (Trybunał Konstytucyjny, Warszawa 2006), 
as well as in the annual information on the case law published by the said Office (see: Infor-
macja o istotnych problemach wynikających z działalności i orzecznictwa Trybunału Konstytucyj-
nego w 2006 r., (Trybunał Konstytucyjny, Warszawa 2007), pp. 48-51; Informacja o istotnych 
problemach wynikających z działalności i orzecznictwa Trybunału Konstytucyjnego w 2009 r., 
(Trybunał Konstytucyjny, Warszawa 2010), pp. 80-81. The information is also available at 
<www.trybunal.gov.pl>)
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dicta in the “Lisbon judgment”) are at stake. For most part, European law 
is seen as a source of constitutional disempowerment.38 Hence, the pri-
macy of EU law, in the Court’s view, applies only to sub-constitutional 
law, and not to the Constitution – the supreme law of the land both in 
the sphere of application (the Court speaks of “precedence of application”) 
and the hierarchy of law (the Court speaks of “precedence of binding 
force”). Supranationalism is a concept alien to the Polish Constitution and 
finds no basis therein. As a result, any such attempt to categorise the in-
stitutions of the EU is rejected flatly. Upon accession, EU Member States 
remain sovereign entities.39 The Polish Constitution does not authorise 
delegation of competences to the EU to such an extent as to render the Re-
public of Poland unable to function as a sovereign and democratic State. 
Sovereignty is the guarantor of democracy, and the Polish Constitutional 
Court sees itself as the guardian of both.40 The primacy of European law is 
scoffed at and seen at most as a Court-of-Justice-invented principle lacking 
a Treaty basis.  
Seen from this perspective, the Court is a good constitutional court 
when understood in the traditional parlance. However, in doing so, it turns 
a blind eye to the evolution which constitutional courts undergo. Most 
38  For publications in Polish urging the Court to radically rethink its methods and reasoning, 
see: T.T. Koncewicz, ‘W poszukiwaniu “europejskiej wyobraźni konstytucyjnej”’, Rzeczpospo-
lita (Warszawa, 13 November 2012), available at <http://prawo.rp.pl/artykul/951217.html>; 
and more recently ‘Trybunał Konstytucyjny w Europie’, Rzeczpospolita (Warszawa, 10 March 
2014), available at <www.prawo.rp.pl/artykul/757643,1092817-Koncewicz--Trybunal-Kon-
stytucyjny-w-Europie.html>.  
39  For a critical overview of the understanding of EU law by the Polish Constitutional Court, 
see T.T. Koncewicz, ‘Trybunał Konstytucyjny wobec prawa europejskiego …’, op. cit.
40  For a more in-depth analysis, see D. Piqani, ‘Constitutional Courts in Central and Eastern 
Europe and Their Attitude Towards European Integration’, 2 European Journal of Legal Stud-
ies available at <www.ejls.com>; W. Sadurski, ‘Judicial Review in Central and Eastern Europe: 
Rationales or Rationalizations?’ The Hebrew University of Jerusalem Faculty of Law Research 
Paper 7/10; ‘Constitutional Courts in Transition Processes: Legitimacy and Democratization’, 
Sydney Law School Legal Studies Research Paper 53/2011 and ‘European Constitutional Iden-
tity?’ Sydney Law School Legal Studies Research Paper 37/2006; K. Kowalik-Banczyk, ‘Should 
We Polish It Up? The Polish Constitutional Tribunal and the Idea of Supremacy of EU Law’ 
(2005) German Law Journal 1360; D. Leczykiewicz, ‘Case Note on the Judgment of 27 April 
2005 of the Polish Constitutional Tribunal’, (2006) Common Market Law Review 1187. 
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recent rulings on the constitutional review of EU law,41 and in particular 
the one on the Lisbon Treaty,42 show that the Court is becoming more and 
more the constitutional “Odd Man Out”. The situation is further aggra-
vated by a noticeable imbalance between the writings of Western authors 
and Polish literature on the subject. The scope and breadth of the former is 
almost beyond comprehension. They keep up with the demands of time, 
analyse constitutional changes accordingly and subject them to multidi-
mensional reconstruction. Diversity, deference, a post-national perspec-
tive, the decline of sovereignty discourse, accommodation, the power 
of dialogue, a shift away from constitutional absolutism and classic su-
pranationalism are all keywords shaping the current debate. On the other 
side of the spectrum lies the Polish constitutional doctrine which is marred 
by conceptual blindness, dominated by all-powerful arguments from con-
stitutional uniqueness, hierarchy, and sovereignty. It lacks the tools and 
resolve to tackle the problems and reality as they really are. There is not 
even an attempt to put the Constitutional Court and its EU-related case 
law in the context of the European-wide debate. Polish constitutional-
ists choose the comfortable world of the Constitution and want to stay 
within it.43 This is important since the Court should be able to feed off 
the doctrine. A pro-European interpretation is as far as we can go. Case law 
is analysed in an extremely dogmatic fashion with certain axioms which 
are non-negotiable. Constitutional theory is state-centred and sovereign-
ty-dominated. Such academic exercise is fruitless, since it is not ready to go 
beyond limits, break new ground, or at least consider going beyond hollow 
presuppositions and confront them with alternatives, whether better or 
worse. Without such attempts we are condemned to passivity and the text 
of the Constitution interpreted from the inside, never outside. 
41  Case SK 45/09 (English translation available at <http://trybunal.gov.pl/en/news/judg-
ments/>). For an analysis, see T.T. Koncewicz, ‘Invalidity of EU Law Before the Polish Consti-
tutional Tribunal: Court of Old Closure(s) or/and New Opening(s)’ in M. Bobek (ed), Central 
European Judges Under the European Influence (London 2015). 
42  Case K 32/09 (English translation available at <http://trybunal.gov.pl/en/news/judg-
ments/>). 
43  The word “constitutional” is like an anathema when used in conjunction with “Europe-
an law”. 
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The uneasiness of the Court faced with claims about the primacy of EU 
law is best demonstrated in the telling and subtle interaction between re-
sult and reasoning.44 To alleviate fears of its European partners, the Court 
plays constitutional rhetoric. There are conciliatory gestures (pro-Euro-
pean integration as a constitutional requirement, friendliness of Polish 
law-makers towards EU law, acceptance of the idea of cosmopolitan and 
multi-centric character of Polish law and of the common axiology of EU 
and Polish law). Yet, all this cannot mask the fact that the Court abandons 
these gestures at crunch times, and its role as the guardian of the Polish 
Constitution is at stake. The danger of conflict is, therefore, always there, 
since the Court is afraid of giving too much ground. Yet, the dominant su-
preme-source-of-law approach translates then into the image and self-con-
ception of the Court: inflexibility and (a clear-cut, once-and-for-all defi-
nition of relationships between the courts. This approach precludes an 
argumentative approach to the normative conflict as the interpreter is left 
with no choice but to give effect to the higher-ranking norm. The consti-
tutional landscape is dominated by the domestic point of reference always 
provided by the text of the Constitution which, when all is said and done, 
reigns supreme, notwithstanding all the nice words and gestures. 
While every constitutional court in EU Member States has a crucial 
message to convey for European constitutionalism, the Polish Constitu-
tional Court is not at present able to convey this message, since only a con-
stitutional court which can play at “European constitutionalism”, while at 
the same time managing its own constitutional ego and ambitions, will 
be a “good court”. The Court’s imperative is to take part in this process 
offensively and proactively, instead of shielding behind the Constitution. 
It is evident on the basis of its EU-related case law that the Polish Consti-
tutional Court is actively seeking to retain its influence and relevance as 
a meaningful actor in European affairs. To do so, however, it must speak 
and not remain silent, argue and break new ground, not just protect its 
home turf. The Court must also understand that it has a crucial role to 
play in supervising the integration together and in collaboration with 
44  For an in-depth and crisp analysis, see W. Sadurski, ‘“So Lange Chapter 3”: Constitution-
al Courts in Central Europe – Democracy – European Union’, EUI Working Paper 40/2006.  
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the Court of Justice. When its voice is heard, the Court will act accord-
ingly and shape its jurisprudence so as to take into account the concerns. 
In the end, these concerns might be upheld (nod to diversity) or discarded 
(nod to uniformity) but never will they be ignored. There is no zero-sum 
game; every actor, be it a constitutional actor or the Court of Justice, is 
positioned to win in this never-ending constitutional disagreement. Every 
court should rest assured that its voice was heard and given due consid-
eration, even though the end result did not go the way the constitutional 
court desired it would. The importance of this discourse lies elsewhere: 
in building trust with every participant of the constitutional exchange so 
that next time today’s losers will come out on top and that no result is ever 
prejudged. 
The Polish Constitutional Court must learn to defer, step back and 
show confidence in the developments taking place in European law. A good 
constitutional court should not only criticise and supervise but admit that 
there are better-placed venues for protecting certain interests. This has 
nothing to do with the judicial ego (a way of thinking typical for defen-
sive constitutionalism) and everything to do with the common sense and 
reason of judges. Restraint becomes a virtue just as much as activism. The 
latter played a fundamental role in putting the Union Court on its funda-
mental rights case-law track, the former might acknowledge that the Union 
Court is ready to take centre stage. This process works both ways though, 
and the Court of Justice defers at times to the constitutional courts and 
acknowledges their claims and concerns. Pushing the limits of European 
integration against the constitution is like building castles on sand. Only 
working hand in hand will prove effective. Therefore, the Court of Jus-
tice must see constitutional courts as partners and interlocutors. Raising 
doubts from the perspective of the constitution does not have to be passé. 
Constitutional courts could teach the Court of Justice useful lessons in 
the protection of rights, the interpretation of proportionality or the shap-
ing of the desirable contours of judicial review. It all boils down to fram-
ing good arguments and putting them forward. From this perspective, 
the Constitutional Court is becoming more and more isolated. The world 
is running away from it. Its European jurisprudence is marked by fear, 
defensiveness, an inward-looking approach and disengagement. Europe is 
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seen as a source of constitutional disempowerment. One can see all of this 
in the traditional understanding of democracy and sovereignty, the latter 
being the guarantee for the former, with the robust so-lange principle and 
the traditional understanding of supremacy as the building blocks. The 
Constitution is above the EU as a non-negotiable paradigm. EU primacy is 
not given a pluralistic reading, which narrows down the scope for dialogue 
in a spirit of pluralism. For the Court there is a Treaty basis for supremacy 
– it is only a case-law based assertion lacking in constitutional founda-
tions. All in all, the Court sets itself clearly on a collision course with its 
Luxembourg counterpart, since it is only a matter of time until these two 
jurisdictions clash. The conflict itself would not be such a bad thing (since, 
as pointed out before, constitutional disagreement is the very heart of vig-
ilant constitutionalism). Rather, it is the lack of a common language and 
a point of reference that will doom this endeavour of courts talking past 
each other, engaged in a monologue rather than a dialogue. The great con-
ceptual challenge for the Polish Court would be then to build its mandate 
and prestige on the basis of dialogue, and craft good arguments aimed at 
new audiences beyond traditional domestic audiences, instead of a safe ha-
ven of hierarchy. The Court falls short of understanding that the more all 
national experiences are taken into consideration, the easier it is for the CJ 
to accomplish the task of adjudicating based on the common European 
values. The Court fails to recognise that at the heart of the vigilant con-
stitutionalism lie trust and a sense of appropriateness. Broekman rightly 
notes that “the issue is then on the trust of performance […] rather than in 
questions of legality” [emphasis in the original].45 The Court does not un-
derstand that a nuanced constitutional power play and struggle are taking 
place on the European stage. The Court’s imperative should be to take part 
in this process actively, instead of shielding behind the Constitution. Its 
case law shows that the Court is actively seeking to retain its influence and 
relevance as a meaningful actor in European affairs. The problem is that 
in the process it misconstrues the tools it chooses. The Court must speak 
45  The remark was with regard to the CJ, but it goes equally for every actor. See, M. Broek-
man A Philosophy of European Union Law. Positions in Legal Space and the Construction of a Ju-
ridical World (Leuven 1999) 266. 
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and not remain silent,46 argue and break new ground, not just protect its 
home turf. When its voice is heard, the CJ will act accordingly and shape 
its jurisprudence so as to take into account these concerns. In the end, they 
might be upheld (nod to diversity) or discarded (nod to uniformity) but 
never will they be ignored. There is no zero-sum game: every actor, be it 
a constitutional actor or the CJ, is positioned to win in this never-ending 
constitutional disagreement. In this way, “vigilant constitutionalism” for 
the Court would be about reconstructing circles of coherence, building 
understanding and finding common ground among reasonable and ac-
ceptable divergences within the coordinate judicial web. All actors agree 
and acknowledge their differences and their influence on the interpreta-
tion of shared commitments, and accord such possibility to others. As a re-
sult, vigilant constitutionalism extends beyond national territory by way 
of jurisprudence of mutual respect, peer review and supervision, without 
pretence to bringing into existence a new overarching entity. 
Comity and vigilant constitutionalism as envisaged here give a chance 
to take the Polish Constitutional Court out of its constitutional comfort 
zone. This calls on the Court to do without simplistic, antagonistic and 
hierarchical concepts along the lines of “primacy – subordination”, and 
opens up possibilities for a more nuanced and less black-and-white vi-
sion of the integration process. The Constitutional Court must under-
stand its function through complementarity and non-exclusiveness. Each 
level of legal protection (national, European or conventional) aims to 
compensate for the deficiencies of the other, and not replace it with its 
own mechanism. It is disturbing that the Court presently has nothing to 
offer to the legal community. It satisfies itself by cross-referencing oth-
er constitutional courts without entering into any meaningful dialogue. 
One is caught thinking whether these references are mere decorum. In 
proceeding this way, the Court misses the most important point about 
46  I would stress here though that dialogue is understood here not as saying something for 
the sake of saying. My point is that the Court should let its voice be heard when it really has 
something important to say. A constructive dialogue can proceed not only by words. Some-
times one can be silent and yet convey one’s message. I am grateful to Professor J.H.H. Weiler 
for highlighting this aspect during the EUI-and NYU seminar entitled ‘Changing Landscape 
of Polish Public Law’, on 28-29 October 2013. 
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comparative constitutionalism, to which it seemingly aspires: comparative 
constitutionalism is not about mere citations to others. It is about readi-
ness to change, absorb, and acknowledge that other courts have something 
important to say. It involves a constructive critique and comparative rea-
soning. Mutual influence of others implies not only automatic reception, 
but also rejection. The said Court is not ready to criticise, object, reformu-
late, and then to present its own vision of European integration, the place 
and role of the state, the importance of citizens or the reconceptualisation 
of national constitutions. The decisions of others should be used as an 
inspiration to contribute to the ongoing constitutional debate, even take 
it to the next discursive level, and should not be a source of simple repeti-
tions and borrowings. Unfortunately, the case law of the Court is devoid 
of any inventiveness. The Court not only devalues its own standing but 
makes a mockery of comparative reasoning and “dialogue”. As a result, its 
current EU-related jurisprudence is conveniently relegated to footnotes, 
while others steal the centre stage for at least trying to be more than just 
witnesses to “what Karlsruhe said”.47 
The future of European constitutionalism is a future in which con-
structive and strategic negotiation and bargaining over constitutional disa-
greements will be an integral part. It does not augur well for any court if its 
jurisprudence is commented in the footnotes as repetitive, old-fashioned or 
unable to provide an impetus to reinvent itself. This is the case of the said 
Court, whose recent EU-related jurisprudence was noted only for the fact 
that a member of the Polish Parliament stormed out of the courtroom. 
Automatic “constitutional borrowing” is the norm. The Court poses as 
the younger brother of its German counterpart, mimicking what others 
said and lacking any fraction of inventiveness and courage to speak in its 
own voice. With regard to the three lines of potential conflict described in 
47  M. Wendel, ‘Lisbon Before the Courts’ (2011) 7 European Constitutional Law Review 
108. His comparative analysis is instructive to show how the Polish Constitutional Court los-
es touch with the world and is relegated to the footnotes. The only point of note in the Lisbon 
ruling was the procedural treatment of the absence of one of the petitioners, who was said to 
have “stormed out of the auditorium” during the hearing (footnote 70; available at: < http://
www.idee.ceu.es/Portals/0/Publicaciones/Lisbon-before-the-Courts.pdf>). Unfortunately, in 
all other aspects it “was all Kalrsruhe”. Compare this with the constructive contribution made 
by the Czech Constitutional Court in its “Lisbon rulings”. 
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the introduction, I have suggested the following. Firstly, there is no more 
space for national courts to insist on jurisdiction with regard to subjecting 
EU law to fundamental rights review. The level of protection of rights at 
the EU level is equivalent to that granted to them at the domestic level. Sec-
ondly, there are grounds to believe that the Constitutional Treaty is likely 
to provide sufficient protection against EU acts that are ultra vires. If future 
practice turns out to support that assessment, national courts should re-
frain from asserting a subsidiary role in policing the jurisdictional bound-
aries between the EU and its Member States. Thirdly, with the democratic 
deficit remaining – perhaps inevitably – intact, national courts may have 
legitimate reasons to set aside EU law when it collides with specific national 
constitutional rules that form an essential part of a Member State’s consti-
tutional identity. The constitutional legislator (but not national courts as 
interpreters of abstract principles) should in the present state of European 
constitutionalism continue to be able to override EU law. 
Unfortunately, all this remains for the time being in the sphere of con-
stitutional conjectures. The Polish Constitutional Court shies away from 
constitutional debate and places itself on the side of constitutional absolut-
ists. The Court is alien to the idea that the post-national law sees constitu-
tional courts as true ambassadors of their legal orders. It is for those courts 
to preserve their integrity but also, and in addition, to develop it with due 
regard to the outside world which is becoming more and more internal-
ised. It is as much a challenge of changing minds as it is of adapting laws. 
The mind is becoming more and more externally-oriented, calling into 
question the long-standing habit of looking inward for legitimacy. Today 
legitimacy for judicial power comes not only from within systems but is 
also a consequence of systems interacting, learning and changing. Judges 
usually see their legal order above all the others and consider themselves at 
the centre of the legal universe. They are solely to protect their own legal 
systems from outside encroachments. EU law questions this state of affairs 
rather dramatically and demands that account be taken of perspectives 
different from one’s own. Comparative constitutionalism as the hallmark 
of the vigilant building of a European constitution goes beyond simple 
references to others. To join, however, means to give up the passive spec-
tatorship, and voice one’s concerns critically and constructively as an actor 
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so as to allow for true migration of constitutional ideas.48 A constitution-
al court that is vigilantly-oriented is not satisfied with simple borrowing 
from others, but feels compelled to build on these outside influences and 
learn from them. It is a true sign of constitutional tolerance to be ready 
for both: holding a difficult dialogue and stepping back when necessary. 
The landscape is characterised by the diversity of legal sources, various sites 
of new governance as a by-product of Europeanisation, privatisation and 
bureaucratisation, the plurality of the sites of legal expression and the pri-
ma facie equality of authority claims; the relationship between legal orders 
is already more horizontal than vertical, heterarchical than hierarchical.49 
The challenge facing the Polish Constitutional Court going forward 
would be to find the right balance between the domestic perspective 
of constitutional distinctiveness and the European perspective (and to 
make bridges between the two). The Court should be ready to recognise its 
political function and build on its “political jurisprudence” to find compro-
mise solutions that go beyond simply declaring one party to be the win-
ner.50 By way of (hopefully tentative!) conclusion then: “Polish constitution-
al chain novel to be continued”... 
48  In this vein, see T.T. Koncewicz, ‘The Polish Constitutional Court and European Law. Ac-
tor or Spectator?’, available at <http://britishlawcentre.co.uk/wp-content/uploads/2014/04/
WARSAW-POLISH-Constitutional-Court-in-Europe-PLAYER-or-Spectator-Koncewicz.pdf>. 
49  D. Halberstam, ‘Systems Pluralism and Institutional Pluralism in Constitutional Law: 
National, Supranational, and Global Governance’ University of Michigan Law School Public 
Law and Legal Theory Working Paper 229/2011.  
50  I argue here that the concept of ‘political jurisprudence’ as elaborated by M. Shapiro could help the 
 Polish Constitutional Court better understand, and come to terms, with its role as a political 
player which both shapes the contours of European constitutionalism and keeps it under con-
stitutional check. Of special explanatory relevance here would be M. Shapiro’s understanding 
of courts as institutions engaged in a process of incremental policy change that is in his own 
words: “lines of precedent that do not reflect fluctuations around a locus of principle, but as 
the record of series of marginal adjustments designed to meet changing circumstances” [em-
phasis added]. This is exactly what we should expect of the Polish Court moving forward. See 
M. Shapiro, ‘Stability and Change in Judicial Decision-Making: Incrementalism or Stare De-
cisis?’ (1965) 2 Law in Transition Quarterly 134, 142; and his ground-breaking Politics in the 
Supreme Court: New Approaches to Political Jurisprudence (New York 1964).
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VI. Roadmap: constitutional identity – dialogue – imagination 
What is the next step(s) then on this constitutional road? There is not 
one easy answer to this question. 
In the past, the argument from the constitution was seen as a danger to 
the very foundations of EU law. This fear of heteronomy was at the cen-
tre of the Simmenthal-Internationale Handellsgesellschaft case law. Today’s 
European constitutional disagreement is no longer about the recognition 
of national constitutional elements but, first and foremost, also about giv-
ing constitutional mandate to them. The result is never set in advance but 
is always subject to negotiation, and each court must always be ready to 
step back.51 The EU recognises the relevance of the constitutional law of its 
Member States. National constitutional claims are elevated to valid consti-
tutional claims in the realm of EU law. National law does not simply op-
erate next to EU law but within it. The comity of circumspect courts calls 
on constitutional courts to open up and absorb a novel kind of reformative 
interpretation of a legal system, in response to changing social conceptions 
of justice, and a new set of judicial virtues. 
What is desperately needed for discourse on European constitutional-
ism to move forward is not only a predictable and formally correct analysis 
but also a legal interpretation that imbues European dialogue with con-
stitutional imagination. Such an interpretation should be about consti-
tutional imagination understood as a “bundle of impression and images, 
which can be found, not merely in statutes and cases, but in a myriad texts 
and treatises”.52 Constitutional imagination in the comity is not about 
good adjudication here and now, but demands from constitutional courts 
the art of anticipation, reconciliation of divergent interests and a true con-
stitutional synthesis in the days to come. Only such constitutional recon-
struction can respond to the exigencies of today’s world. It is in this sense 
that EU and domestic law, interconnected now more than ever, must set 
themselves on the road towards a new version of “Van Gend en Loos 2”, this 
51  G. Martinico, ‘A Matter of Coherence in a Multilevel Legal System: Are the “Lions” Still 
“Under the Throne”?’, Jean Monnet Working Paper 16/08. 
52  The term borrowed from I. Ward, ‘A Charmed Spectacle: England and Its Constitutional 
Imagination’, (2000) 2-3 Liverpool Law Review Volume 235. 
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time bringing together vigilant constitutional courts. At the very least this 
constitutional journey should continue with one crucial caveat in mind: 
tolerance for “the other” and “otherness” coupled with a constant catering 
for the other’s constitutional relevance. At its very core, European consti-
tutionalism accepts that not all values are shared and such disagreement 
forms its part and parcel. The conflict seen from a hierarchical perspective 
is unsolvable. The comity recognises thus that EU law is different from 
national laws. It recalibrates the constitutional conflict and frames it in 
discursive terms. Each system must learn from the other, change, and com-
pete. It cannot hide behind a simplistic argument, dictated by hierarchy, 
but, rather, it must engage in a meaningful dialogue that accepts otherness 
and is ready to retreat. Constitutional pluralism becomes a framework for 
a reconciliation of the contradictory claims and pretensions of the Court 
of Justice, on the one hand, and a platform for vindicating the constitu-
tional courts of EU Member States, on the other. In this way, it caters to 
the pride and relevance of each actor.53 
Discursive constitutionalism has two faces – external and internal. They 
form two sides of the same coin but should nonetheless be distinguished 
for the sake of clarity. The former includes the dialogue and constitutional 
disagreement at the EU level. Of equal importance is the latter aspect. The 
capacity of national courts to affect the uniform enforcement of EU law is 
limited. A national court may disagree with the way the CJ has interpreted 
an abstract right or principle, but it cannot impose its own interpretation 
in the name of national constitutional law. The decision of the court should 
be merely declaratory. Its effect would be to signal to the political branches 
53  That does not mean that hierarchical models and reasoning are matters of the past. The 
evolving European Constitution is a collective, dynamic and pluralistic enterprise. It calls for 
never-ending feedback from, and communication with, national courts and their traditions. 
The EU is a new legal order, and yet, at the same time, it is not self-sufficient. Instead, it de-
pends on national traditions from which it has grown, and on whose basis it strives to build. 
It is not in opposition to national systems, but rather at an intersection of those systems that 
the EU has a chance to prosper. Without a contribution from national traditions, the EU 
would be cut off from its very source of inspiration and guidance. The national enrichment 
of the EU must not stop. Therefore, it remains imperative that national legal systems and tra-
ditions speak up and spread their message. It is incumbent on the respective constitutional 
courts to be a mouth-piece for those national systems and a catalyst for change and adapta-
tion at the EU level. 
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that a constitutional value is negatively affected. The burden would be 
then on those branches (if they agree with the national court) to amend 
the constitution to support that interpretation, against the CJ, and only 
after that successful amendment would the national interpretation over-
ride that of the CJ. There would thus be an internal dialogue in the Mem-
ber State, triggered by the domestic court’s decision, about the extent to 
which there is truly an aspect of national identity at stake that requires 
the introduction of a constitutional exception to the application of EU law 
(as interpreted by the CJ). The effective and uniform enforcement of EU 
law is at stake in these situations, but we should not exaggerate this con-
cern. Apart from the fact that these situations are exceptional, we should 
bear in mind that the uniform and effective application of EU law is not 
the only principle to be taken into account. Trade-offs between the ideal 
of effectively establishing a supranational rule of law and the principles 
of democratic governance may be necessary.54 Any potential loss along 
the dimension of effective and uniform enforcement of EU law is likely to 
be insignificant when seen in the context of European constitutional prac-
tice as a whole. The EU Treaties contain a whole range of opt-out clauses 
that allow national actors, under narrowly circumscribed substantive and/
or procedural conditions, to deviate from EU law. As a matter of EU law, 
the uniform application of the same standard is not paramount and is 
easily overridden in many core areas of the Common Market. Every court 
should rest assured that its voice was heard and given due consideration, 
even though the end result did not go the way the constitutional court 
desired it would. The importance of this discourse would lie elsewhere: in 
building trust and confidence with every participant of the constitutional 
exchange so that next time today’s losers will come out on top and that no 
result is ever prejudged. 
At the heart of the novel concepts of constitutionalism and comity 
lie trust and a sense of appropriateness. It is worth recalling in extenso 
one of very few philosophical interpretations of the rivalry between 
54  A powerful argument in favour of the constitutional voice at the level of Member States 
was presented by A. Albi, ‘From the Banana Saga to a Sugar Saga and Beyond: Could the 
Post-Communist Constitutional Courts Teach the EU a Lesson in the Rule of Law’, (2010) 
47 Common Market Law Review 791.  
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the constitutional courts, on the one hand, and the Court of Justice, on 
the other. M. Broekman precipitously writes that:
the main issue is the question whether the ECJ or the highest courts 
of the Member States have final determination. The political issue is 
whether the Union depends on Nation State legal systems or is a legal 
entity in its own right. Concerns about the quality of performance 
of the ECJ if that Court were the decisive instance for the Member 
States are at the background. The issue is then on the trust of perfor-
mance of the ECJ rather than in questions of legality. 55 [emphasis in 
the original]
What becomes the thorny issue is, indeed, the trust in performance 
of the CJ rather than simple questions of legality. European Constitution-
alism and the comity, as conceived in my analysis, are about a nuanced 
constitutional power play. Each court’s imperative should be to take part 
in this process actively, instead of shielding behind its constitution. All 
national constitutional experiences are necessary to shape common values 
shared throughout Europe. It is only through careful examination of all 
the historical experiences of the European countries that a common her-
itage can emerge. These considerations are important because the defen-
sively-minded Polish Constitutional Court does not seem to appreciate at 
present that the more all national experiences are taken into consideration, 
the easier it would be for the CJ to accomplish the task of adjudicating 
based on the common European values; whereas the more national ex-
periences are missing in this process, the more the Court runs the risk 
of imposing a specific cultural tradition on the whole of European so-
ciety as if it were part of the common constitutional background. How 
could the Court of Justice determine issues of common human rights 
without taking into account the traditions of all Member States? If one 
or more experiences are missing, the Court’s work is more difficult and 
potentially misleading. For these reasons, much as the CJ may not allow 
55  M. Broekman, A Philosophy of European Union Law. Positions in Legal Space and the Con-
struction of a Juridical World (Leuven 1999) 266. 
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the constitutional conversation to die down, for this to happen, it needs 
critical and active partners – constitutional courts. 
This brings me to the final part of my argument. The constitutional 
court aspiring to be “good” in the 21st century should not only criticise 
and supervise but also admit that there are better-placed fora for protect-
ing certain interests. This has nothing to do with the judicial ego (way 
of thinking typical for defensive constitutionalism) and everything to do 
with the common sense and reason of judges operating within the novel 
judicial comity. A great conceptual challenge for European constitutional 
courts lies exactly here: in building their mandate and prestige on the basis 
of dialogue and in crafting good arguments aimed at new audiences beyond 
traditional domestic audiences, instead of a safe hierarchy. A hierarchy is 
good from an internal perspective but legal systems have long outgrown it. 
The “hierarchy talk” is highly divisive from the external perspective of plu-
ralistic systems which look for ways to coexist and cooperate, and not 
simply cancel each other out. Each system stakes its own claim to con-
stitutional distinctiveness and restraint becomes a virtue just as much as 
activism. This works both ways though, and the Court of Justice defers at 
times to the constitutional courts and acknowledges their valid claims and 
concerns. Pushing the limits of European integration against the constitu-
tion would be like building castles on sand. Only working hand in hand 
will prove effective. Therefore, the Union Court must see constitutional 
courts as partners and interlocutors. Raising doubts from the perspective 
of the constitution does not have to be passé. Constitutional courts could 
teach the Court of Justice useful lessons in the protection of rights, the in-
terpretation of proportionality or the shaping of the desirable contours 
of judicial review. It all boils down to framing good arguments and putting 
them forward. The conflict itself would not be such a bad thing. Rather, it 
is the lack of a common language and a point of reference that will doom 
our ambitious endeavour. Instead of a constructive dialogue, we would 
have courts talking past each other, engaged in a monologue. 
A constitutional court engaged in a dialogue aimed at diffusing con-
flicts-to-be, rather than solving them, can be said to be a good constitu-
tional court in the world marked by interdependence, learning, and respect 
for “otherness”. Such a court understands that defensive constitutionalism 
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and a strict state-centred approach are all matters of the past. A good con-
stitutional court must understand that being faithful to its own constitu-
tion is no longer a decisive factor in the overall assessment of its mandate 
and performance. European constitutionalism is not an enemy of national 
constitutionalism, but it is rather its constructive and critical interlocutor, 
and vice versa, and the disagreement takes place within an unprecedented 
judicial comity. It would be the ultimate sign of constitutional tolerance 
to be ready for both: holding a difficult dialogue and stepping back when 
necessary. The parameters of this “dialogic game” must be set down clearly 
and all actors must know in advance how far they can take their respec-
tive jurisprudence and systemic claims, without breaking down the fragile 
equilibrium of European constitutional space in statu nascendi. By consti-
tutional threats and promises that make up constitutional politics, each 
actor of the comity disciplines the European project and takes it further, 
since it elaborates on respective foundational documents as a credible 
barrier for others. As a result, there will be a legitimate expectation that 
the lines thus drawn will be noticed and respected by all parties involved. 
This process constitutes a sort of two-way traffic, since the lines and barri-
ers accepted by others are always the result of bargaining between equals, 
and never the result of high-handed defensive constitutionalism in which, 
for example, a constitutional court speaks to the world, but never listens 
to what kind of message the world might have for the constitutional court. 
European constitutionalism in the 21st century sees constitutional 
courts as true ambassadors of their respective legal orders, and as institutions 
involved – to a greater extent than has ever been the case – in “mega-pol-
itics”, understood as core political controversies that define (and often di-
vide) whole polities.56 Such recalibration is as much a challenge of chang-
ing minds as it is of adapting laws. It is here that constitutional identity as 
a Treaty concept poses a formidable challenge for the constitutional and 
56  The term ‘mega-politics’ is taken from: R. Hirschl, ‘The Judicialization of Politics’ in 
K. E. Whittington, R.D. Keleman and G.A. Caldeira (eds), The Oxford Handbook of Law and 
Politics (London 2008) 123. He points out that the judicialisation of “mega-politics” includes 
the very definition – or raison d’être – of the polity as such and notes the growing reliance on 
courts for contemplating, for example, the definition of the polity as such vis-à-vis European 
supranational polity (p. 128). I would argue that the reconstruction of national identity falls 
squarely into this category.  
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supranational courts of the EU. To tackle this challenge head-on, these 
courts desperately need a legal interpretation that imbues European dia-
logue with constitutional imagination. New keywords should be the fol-
lowing: adaptation, instead of subjugation; learning, rather than imposing; 
and incorporation, in lieu of “one-way traffic”. All this becomes imperative 
with the advent of a kind of constitutional litigation that is centred not 
so much around fundamental rights but rather around constitutional fea-
tures of domestic legal systems.57 Constitutional imagination is not about 
solving cases “here and now”, but about anticipating the next step, build-
ing strategies for the future and accommodating itself within the broader 
community in the days to come. Constitutional imagination is never de-
cided by a single decision but rather is built over time. Only such con-
stitutional reconstruction can respond to the exigencies of today’s world 
and ensure that the translation of constitutional identity from a national 
register into EU vocabulary will be an enriching process for both. Taking 
its cue from the opening quotation from Kapuściński’s novel, the emerg-
ing comity of courts must work on the assumption that courts learn from 
each other’s decisions, and not only see others (as was the case in the past) 
as sources of inspiration. The perspective of “the Other” should help us 
contribute to the ongoing constitutional debate, learn from it and, last but 
not least, change one’s ways and methods of thinking. Only then will we 
have a chance of truly, and not merely mythically, embracing “the Other”, 
adjusting as this constitutional journey goes on, and – as Thor Heyerdahl, 
the true champion of The Other, wisely advised us – of grasping the strings 
ourselves, rather than waiting idly for someone else to grasp them for us! 
57  G. van der Schyff, ‘The Constitutional Relationship …’, op. cit. 

87
Maria kruk 1
fédéralisme, identité communautaire  
et Justice distributive. 
QuelQues remarQues sur les problèmes choisis
L’atelier 17 porte sur la question de savoir comment les communau-
tés de différents types réalisent l’objectif de la solidarité sociale et de la 
justice distributive. Cette problématique est liée avec l’idée de solidarité 
dans la philosophie juridique et politique, l’idée qui, en commençant par 
la thèse que le devoir de la solidarité est naturel pour un homme (Samuel 
Puffendorf ), jette un pont vers la solidarité des communautés sociales 
aussi bien spontanées qu’organisées d’après les formes légales, devient de 
plus en plus présente en droit positif, y compris constitutionnel, et dans 
la jurisprudence. Et sur ce fond on a posé la question sur le rôle du droit 
constitutionnel. 
1. Le droit constitutionnel peut y jouer le rôle essentiel (sous réserves 
dont on parle plus loin): d’une part, comme la base légale de ces commu-
nautés et les relations entre elles et d’autre part, aussi comme inspiration 
pour des différentes formes de la réalisation de l’esprit de solidarité ainsi 
que la création de ses garanties sur tous les plans d’organisation de la so-
ciété. Presque dans toutes les constitutions démocratiques on peut trouver 
des principes montrant la solidarité et la justice parce que ces deux notions 
sont fortement liées entre elles. La solidarité sociale a pour but d’accomplir 
la justice et dans les sociétés contemporaines – surtout de la justice so-
ciale comprise non seulement comme « justice qui donne a chacun la part 
équitable qui lui revient » mais aussi assurant les conditions respectables 
(dignes) de l’existence. 
1 Professeur, La Faculté de Droit et d’Administration de l’Université Łazarski; prof. em. de 
l’Institut d’Etudes Juridiques de l’Academie Polonaise des Sciences, Varsovie, docteur honoris 
causa de l’Institut Juridique de Saint - Petersbourg.
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Quand à l’époque du début de la transformation démocratique en 
Pologne on a introduit, en 1989, à l’ancienne Constitution de période 
communiste, un nouveau principe de l’Etat de droit2 c’est avec sa partie 
inséparable de définition qui est devenu la justice sociale : « La République 
de Pologne est un Etat démocratique de droit mettant en œuvre les prin-
cipes de la justice sociale ». Et le même principe a formé le fondement de 
la nouvelle Constitution de 1997. 
L’objectif de la solidarité et de la justice est exprimé par des Constitu-
tions de différents moyens. Dans la Constitution polonaise il y a recours 
au principe suivant: « La République est le bien commun de tous les ci-
toyens » et plus loin « L’économie sociale de marché fondée sur la liberté 
de l’activité économique, sur la propriété privé et la solidarité, le dialogue 
et la coopération entre les partenaires sociaux, constitue le fondement du 
système économique de la République de la Pologne » etc. 
La Constitution française se réfère au principe universel largement 
connu: Déclaration de droit de l’homme et des citoyens du 27 octobre 1789: 
« Les hommes naissent et demeurent libres et égaux en droit. Les distinc-
tions sociales ne peuvent être fondées que sur l’utilité commune » ainsi 
qu’à Préambule de la Constitution du 27 octobre 1946 qui déclare: « La 
Nation proclame la solidarité et l’égalité de tous les Français devant les 
charges qui résultent des calamités nationales  » et elle introduit tout le 
catalogue des droits sociaux sur lesquels basent la solidarité sociale et la 
justice distributive. Ce qui en suit, la Constitution de 1958 dans art. 1 
définit l’Etat en tant que social (« La France est une République indivisible, 
laïque, démocratique et sociale ») et en plus elle présente le quintessence de 
ses valeurs en forme de la devise: « Liberté, Egalité, Fraternité ». 
La Loi fondamentale de la République Fédérale Allemande indique 
que la RFA est « …ein demokratischer und sozialer Bundesstaat » (une Répu-
blique démocratique et sociale) où « la dignité est inviolable » et « l’ordre 
2  L’interprétation de ce principe a permis au Tribunal Constitutionnel polonais d’approuver 
que les éléments (principes) de l’Etat de droit se trouvent dans la Constitution et les considé-
rant comme les normes constitutionnelles en vigueur, Tribunal en vertu de la clause de l’Etat 
de droit a jugé dans le cas d’inconstitutionnalité des lois, bien que la Constitution elle-même 
n’ait pas compris expressis verbis de ces normes, (voir : M. Kruk, Progres et limites de l’Etat de 
droit, la Pologne, Pouvoires 118-2006)
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constitutionnel dans chaque Land doit correspondre aux principes de 
l’Etat de droit républicain, démocratique et social ». 
Dans les premières paroles de la Préambule la Constitution de l’Espagne 
déclare: « La Nation espagnole en se dirigeant par le désir de statuer la jus-
tice, la liberté et la sécurité ainsi que la multiplication des biens de ceux 
qui le constituent (…) annonce sa volonté (…) de vie commune confor-
mément au juste ordre économique et social » et dans l’art.1 confirme que 
« l’Espagne se constitue sous la forme de l’Etat de droit social et démocra-
tique qui protège comme les valeurs suprêmes de son ordre légal la liberté, 
la justice, l’égalité et la pluralité politique ».
De cette manière on peut citer des Constitutions suivantes parce que 
dans chacune on trouve plus ou moins directes références à la solidarité et 
la justice. Et dans certaines Constitutions actuelles, comme exemple ci-
tons la Constitution actuelle polonaise où le rôle particulier dans ce cadre 
jouent aussi les droits de l’Homme. Ils sont traités comme une catégorie 
particulière de droit qui se distinguent des droits du citoyen traités comme 
ceux qui sont propres à l’individu en sa relation avec l’Etat pendant que 
les droits de l’Homme servent à l’individu à seul titre d’être Homme. Le 
catalogue des droits de l’Homme contient l’ensemble de droits et libertés 
dont la partie importante est formée aussi par des droits sociaux basés 
sur le principe de la justice distributive. Le signe caractéristique de cette 
approche est devenu l’accès de ce principe dans la Déclaration de Confé-
rence du Droit de l’Homme (Vienne 1993), celui où la pauvreté est traitée 
comme manquement (infraction, offence) du droit de l’Homme.
Mais la déclaration constitutionnelle de ces principes généreux de so-
lidarité et de justice ne peut pas cacher le réalisme politique. Il ne doit pas 
nous satisfaire que l’affaire est résolue de la manière positive par la seule 
proclamation, parce que l’essentiel, le noyau du problème est toujours l’ef-
ficacité de ces principes.
La jurisprudence qui interprète les principes constitutionnels et parti-
culièrement la jurisprudence constitutionnelle peut donner de la significa-
tion réelle aux toutes les garanties constitutionnelles. Cette jurisprudence 
qui est exécutée surtout pendant le contrôle abstrait dû à sa valeur générale 
et pas limitée aux affaires concrètes et individuelles mais éliminant le droit 
opposé contre ces principes. Un bon exemple propose la jurisprudence du 
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Tribunal Constitutionnel polonais relatif à la relation entre l’économie so-
ciale de marché et le principe de la solidarité qui – d’après le Tribunal – de-
vra en effet créer le modèle économique fondant la base de l’ordre social3.
Mais une question se pose: cet ordre social respectant la solidarité et la 
justice peut-il être assuré suffisamment par le droit constitutionnel (méme 
si les tribunaux gardent la Constitution)? Dans la littérature et pendant les 
débats politiques qui sont dernièrement fréquents en Europe on indique 
« les ennemis » de la solidarité et de la justice distributive qui étaient (sont?) 
surtout l’individualisme et le libéralisme (ou bien néolibéralisme compris 
surtout dans le contexte économique). Ce n’est pas une bonne place dans 
cette petite esquisse pour chercher les considérations philosophiques de 
l’antinomie de la solidarité et du libéralisme et proprement dit des effets 
du libéral laisser faire pour la solidarité sociale. La crise économique qui 
pendant ces dernières années a touché les Etats européens et a causé la 
situation plus difficile pour une grande partie de la société (stratification 
des couches sociales, le chômage, la pauvreté, la manque de chances), elle 
a incité aussi la discussion sur la justice distributive, la fonction sociale de 
l’Etat, des devoirs auprès des personnes plus faibles économiquement, du 
modèle économique surtout néolibéral. Dans le journalisme polonais on 
trouve récemment un texte très engagé et émotionnel de l’historien d’idée 
connu et du philosophe Marcin Król qui vérifie l’opinion d’il y a plusieurs 
année sur la prépondérance du libéralisme politique et du néolibéralisme 
économique après cette époque de « l’économie socialiste ». L’auteur qui au 
début de la transformation démocratique avait participé à l’introduction 
de l’économie du marché, a intitulé sa confession actuelle d’une façon très 
expressive: « Nous étions vraiment stupides »4. Il écrit donc: « Dans les an-
nées 80 l’idéologie du néolibéralisme nous a infecté et j’en ai bien mérité 
(…) Mais cet enthousiasme s’est éteint très vite en moi. J’ai remarqué que 
dans le libéralisme commençait à dominer un facteur de l’individualisme 
qui tour à tour repousse les autres valeurs importantes et il tue la commu-
nauté ». L’auteur constate définitivement: « la chute de la solidarité sociale 
est dramatique ». Le diagnostic de Marcin Król n’a pas été accepté sans 
3  K 17/00, OTK du 20.01.2001.
4  Gazeta Wyborcza, le 8-9 .02.2014, p. 12. 
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critique, mais il a commencé le débat public sur la solidarité, la justice et 
la communauté.
Pourtant cette discussion dans le milieu polonais n’a pas été unique. 
Dans les textes publiés dans Le Monde Diplomatique entre 2006 et 2013 
on a consacré beaucoup de remarques surtout dans le contexte de l’Union 
européenne en accusant « le marché commun (unique) » tellement avancé 
par l’Union pour faire pousser «  le néolibéralisme européen » qui a fait 
tomber dans l’oubli l’Europe sociale5. Cette façon de voir la politique de 
l’Union européenne n’est pas unique et même fréquente de percevoir la 
politique communautaire mais elle attire l’attention à la possibilité poten-
tielle de la parution des menaces contre la forme réelle de solidarité aussi 
bien dans le cadre d’un seul Etat que dans la communauté supranationale.
En conséquence, les enjeux du droit constitutionnel deviennent plus 
difficile parce que dans les déclarations de l’égalité, fraternité, justice et 
solidarité comprises dans les Constitutions (et Traités) peuvent paraitre 
des reproches qui indiquent que la politique réelle se dirige dans le sens 
contraire et elle facilite la chute de ces valeurs. Et il faudrait en résulter 
la conclusion que le droit constitutionnel devrait agir sur deux dimen-
sions – d’une part, formuler les principes correspondant directement aux 
questions dont on parle, et d’autre part, définir les traits généraux du sys-
tème (juridique, politique et économique) qui créent les conditions pour 
le fonctionnement réel de ces principes. Il ne suffit pas de répéter dans les 
configurations suivantes les déclarations de la justice sociale ou de l’Etat 
social mais il faut introduire des standards, des procédures et des garanties 
de la politique sociale convenable réalisée sous le contrôle judiciaire.
2. En ce qui concerne l’harmonisation de l’identité des acteurs formant 
une communauté politique, le droit constitutionnel peut agir de diffé-
rentes manières, en fonction du caractère de la communauté et des objec-
tifs qu’elle réalise. 
Pour ce qui est des communautés organisées selon le critère du fédé-
ralisme ou régionalisme, ce sont des Etats (fédérations, Etats régionalisés 
5  Le recueil de textes choisis a été publie en édition polonaise, série Le Monde diplomatique 
recommande, a voir P.Wielgosz, Koniec Europy jaką znamy, Instytut Wydawniczy Książka i Pra-
sa, Warszawa 2013.
92
IX World Congress of Constitutional Law (Oslo, 16‑20 June 2014) Contributions by Polish Scholars
ou Etat à entités autonomiques), qui disposent d’une Constitution unique 
(fédérale), d’une monnaie unique – et qui ont en conséquence la possibi-
lité de mener une politique économique contribuant à atténuer les dispa-
rités du niveau de vie. Ces Etats ont en surplus une souveraineté, et donc 
une « identité » étatique (qui souvent s’apparente à une identité nationale). 
Cela ne garantit pas l’idéale réalisation des objectifs, mais les instruments 
juridiques et politiques sont plus efficaces et plus faciles à mettre en œuvre. 
Dans beaucoup d’Etats fédéraux pourtant pas dans tous, on a pu distin-
guer, surtout dans l’histoire de leur étatisme, une différence entre les parts 
(sujets de fédération) pauvres et riches ou bien d’une autre manière claire-
ment distinctive par l’aspect économique, politique ou au niveau du déve-
loppement etc. (la distinction symbolique « Nord – Sud » mais on pourrait 
aussi accepter « Est – Ouest » ou bien un autre) et même ayant des régions 
avec des nationalités mélangés, non homogènes. L’Etat commun s’est di-
rigé vers niveler ces différences par la politique centrale qui demandait la 
dislocation des moyens matériels ou d’autres démarches égalisant le niveau 
de ces territoires. Ces démarches n’ont pas demandé de la solidarité parti-
culière « des riches » et « des pauvres » parce qu’elles avaient été exécutées 
grâce aux actions du pouvoir central dans le cadre de sa compétence pour 
mener la politique générale de l’Etat (et en même temps pour respecter les 
particularités d’après d’autres critères, par exemple ceux de nationalités, de 
religions ou de cultures).
Il en suffit que cette situation ne soit pas toujours stable et la struc-
ture fédérale malgré toutes les facilités qui en résultent ne résout pas le 
problème. On peut y donner l’exemple de l’Europe centrale, celui de la 
Tchécoslovaquie. Cet Etat est né à nouveau en 1919 en tant que l’Etat 
unitaire de deux nations: Thèques et Slovaques (et avec d’autres natio-
nalités). La Tchéquie – pays bien développé de point de vue politique et 
économique sous l’influence de l’Autriche et la Slovaquie – sous l’influence 
de la Hongrie, avec son économie des matières premières presque féodale, 
sans propres traditions politiques. Dans la période d’entre-deux-guerres la 
Première République unitaire, bien que démocratique, n’a pas satisfait les 
aspirations nationale de la Slovaquie parce qu’elle n’a pas reconnu sa dif-
férence nationale et son identité. Et après 1945 l’Etat socialiste ne l’a pas 
respecté non plus et les prétentions des Slovaques n’ont pas été accomplies 
93
Kruk, Fédéralisme, identité communautaire et justice distributive...
surtout dans le cadre de nationalité et d’étatisme bien que cet Etat leur ait 
donné une identité nationale et même une certaine autonomie. Mais sans 
liberté de décider de soi-même et sans compétences authentiques. Dans 
la période du « Printemps de Prague » en 1968 la Tchécoslovaquie s’est 
transformée en fédération de deux souveraines Républiques jouissantes des 
mêmes droits. Et en même temps un nouveau problème est apparu, d’un 
côté – payer un surplus à l’économie slovaque et de l’autre – cette aspi-
ration non-accomplie de la Slovaquie vers son propre, véritable étatisme. 
Bien que la Constitution fédérale ait prévu toutes les garanties formelles 
de l’identité nationale et solidarité, en 1992 la République Tchèque et 
la République Slovaque se sont séparées. Cette action s’était accomplie 
parce que tout le système politique précédent n’a pas été démocratique, 
malgré toutes les «  conjurations  » sur la solidarité et l’identité et même 
la souveraineté nationale placées dans la Constitution non démocratique. 
Cet exemple montre une certaine perplexité du droit constitutionnel dans 
la situation où la signification considérable, décisive ont d’autres aspects 
tels que régime politique, intérêts économiques ou égoïsmes nationaux. 
En 2004 les deux Etats ont accédé en Union européenne et cet acte peut 
ouvrir tout un nouveau chapitre.
Cette histoire y citée ne signifie pas que là où le système politique est 
démocratique et il n’y a pas de ressentiments obstinés nationaux, les diffi-
cultés semblables doivent apparaitre. Contrairement, pour un Etat fédéral 
il est plus facile de réaliser la politique de solidarité et de justice sociale 
aussi bien auprès des régions particulières qu’aux citoyens. Mais dans ce 
contexte, la même conclusion se répète que la proclamation des principes 
n’est pas suffisante, il est nécessaire d’assurer ces mécanismes qui les incor-
porent dans la vie. 
3. En comparaison, les communautés politiques dont la structure est 
plus «  souple  », comme l’Union européenne, n’ayant pas de caractéris-
tiques d’un Etat, non seulement disposent de moyens juridiquement et 
politiquement plus faibles, mais en plus doivent encore forger leur iden-
tité communautaire, souvent dans un certain conflit avec l’identité natio-
nale et les intérêts spécifiques de leurs Etats membres, ainsi qu’avec leurs 
contraintes politiques internes (élections, opposition etc.). Ici, plus que 
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les mesures contraignantes directes, ce sont les principes fondateurs de la 
communauté reconnus en droit constitutionnel interne des sujets de la 
communauté, qui jouent un rôle prépondérant (ces principes s’appliquent 
d’ailleurs, également aux Etats fédéraux).
L’Union européenne – pour donner comme exemple des communautés 
d’Etats et nations différenciés – a été fondé après des siècles de l’idée uto-
pique de la fédération européenne (« Etats Unis de l’Europe ») ou d’autre 
forme de l’union paneuropéenne6. Quand on a enfin réussi à réaliser cette 
idée, elle s’est apparue en forme de différentes communautés économiques: 
CECA, CEE (CE), CEEA (Euratom). Et conformément à cette forme, 
on a organisé leurs pouvoirs, composés principalement de représentants 
d’exécutifs nationaux et leur principal acte normatif a eu le caractère d’un 
acte du type gouvernemental – règlement. Les Constitutions nationales à 
l’époque « n’ont pas participé » en principe dans la réalisation de ce projet. 
Et c’est la construction de l’Europe politique qui a engagé plus large-
ment non seulement le droit constitutionnel des Etats membres mais aussi 
leurs citoyens (citoyenneté européenne, élection universelle et directe pour 
le Parlement européen, croissance de ses droits, subsidiarité) pour enfin 
essayer de créer « la Constitution de l’Europe ». Ratée. On a écrit beau-
coup sur la Constitution européenne et les plus intéressantes paraissent ces 
considérations qui expliquent pourquoi cette essai n’a pas réussi. Il parait, 
ne faisant pas ici d’analyses trop profondes, qu’en réponse il faut citer un 
élément dont on parle au sujet proposé dans l’atelier 17: les problèmes de 
l’identité. D’un côté, l’identité de l’Union dont « la Constitution », même 
si elle était essentiellement le Traité international, a attribuée le caractère 
de « l’entité constitutionnelle » réservé jusqu’à maintenant aux sujets sou-
verains et dans la plupart appartenant à l’Etat; et d’autre côté, l’identité des 
Etats membres, leurs sens de l’identité nationale, souveraineté, indépen-
dance et peut-être … une pincée d’égoïsmes nationaux? La Constitution 
européenne pouvait menacer ces valeurs ?
6  Dans la littérature on indique les noms de célèbres écrivains, politiciens, poètes – auteurs de 
cette idee : Jiri z Podiebrand, Wiliam Penn, Leibnitz, Kant, Saint-Simon, Prudhon, Montes-
quieu, Wolter, Lamartine, Heine, Hugo, Coudenhove-Kalergi, Briande, Churchil, De Gasperi, 
Monnet, Schuman, Adenauer ... a voir L.Cartou L’Union européenne (Traités de Paris – Rome 
– Maastricht), Dalloz, p. 3-38.
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Toutefois, presque parallèlement un grand groupe de nouveaux Etats 
membres a accédé dans l’Union (2004) y compris la majorité décisive des 
Etats postsocialistes qui viennent de sortir du pouvoir autoritaire et diffici-
lement transformant leur système juridique et économique en l’adaptant à 
l’acquis communautaire, ils ont vraiment eu besoin d’aide solidaire de toute 
Europe. Et surtout cette aide matérielle. Leurs citoyens ont eu aussi besoin 
de cette aide solidaire. Le scepticisme envers la Constitution européenne 
n’a pas résulté uniquement – comme on pourrait le croire – des égoïsmes 
nationaux peu ouverts aux partages solidaires des biens sociaux avec les 
partenaires plus faibles, mais des causes de nature plutôt différente (il faut 
négliger les suggestions que ce n’étaient que les intérêts économiques du 
capital qui a cherché des marchés de vente). Quoique la Constitution eu-
ropéenne n’ait pas créé expressis verbis l’Etat fédéral (on a rejeté la sugges-
tion de lui donner le nom des Etats Unis de l’Europe comparé avec une 
certaine moquerie par Marine Le Pen à l’Union Soviétique Européenne7) elle 
a renforcé la structure politique de l’Union, entre autres par lui donner des 
attributs traditionnels et des symboles traditionnels d’Etat (Constitution, 
loi, ministre des affaires étrangères etc.) ce qui a été d’abord rejeté et après 
quelques corrections surtout dans ce domaine, accepté dans le Traité de 
Lisbonne. 
Pour les traits les plus fortement accentués de l’organisation de l’Union 
qui forment ses principes fondamentaux, soulignés dans le Traité, il faut 
énumérer la conservation de l’identité nationale et constitutionnelle des 
Etats membres et en même temps la construction de sa propre identité 
politique basée sur les principes de liberté, démocratie, droits de l’Homme 
et Etat de droit, solidarité, droits et intérêt sociaux des citoyens, justice, 
subsidiarité, progrès économique et social, en un mot – tout le catalogue 
des principes et valeurs qui devraient favoriser les garanties de l’identité et 
de différence nationale mais aussi la solidarité entre les Etats membres et 
la justice entre les citoyens. Et bien sûr, la réalisation des buts de l’Union 
conformes à sa propre identité politique.
Ces principes, surtout la solidarité, ont été exposés deux fois der-
nièrement aux différentes épreuves. Premièrement, à la suite de la crise 
7  Le Monde, 26.01.2012, l’Europe, p. XV. 
96
IX World Congress of Constitutional Law (Oslo, 16‑20 June 2014) Contributions by Polish Scholars
économique, cette crise dans le cadre de la monnaie commune euro, et 
deuxièmement dans la situation de la crise ukrainienne. Dans les deux cas 
on a pu remarquer en cherchant des moyens de solution8 un croisement 
(pour ne pas dire – lutte) de différents comportements et intérêts: ceux 
des Etats membres particuliers ou leurs groupes contre l’intérêt commu-
nautaire ou l’intérêt d’autres Etats membres ou leurs groupes, les intérêts 
communautaires contre l’intérêt de l’un des sujets de communauté ou du 
sujet extérieur, les intérêts du business contre l’intérêt social, les intérêts 
des partis particuliers ou des gouvernements contre l’intérêt commun etc.
Le sens ou le devoir de solidarité n’est pas toujours commun à l’intérêt 
national, politique, économique ou financier des sujets définis. Et l’idée 
de justice sociale ne trouve pas toujours l’appui surtout devant la violation 
des intérêts de quelqu’un ou des possibilités économiques. Cette attitude 
différente est caractéristique au pluralisme des intérêts mais le plus souvent 
elle mène aux compromis qui paraissent meilleurs qu’un manque d’ac-
cord quelconque. Il faut y rappeler le cours de l’introduction des sanctions 
proposées par l’Union auprès de la Russie après l’annexion de la Crimée 
quand ces aspects politico-morales ont concouru avec de différents inté-
rêts économiques9. Enfin, le compromis concernant ces sanctions n’a pas 
satisfait tous mais il n’y avait pas d’opposision à la question de conclusion 
avec l’Ukraine de l’accord préalable politique sur la future association avec 
l’Union10. 
Le Traité de Lisbonne ainsi que les Traités antérieurs aupres l’action uni-
forme des Etats membres, présente aussi une solution différente, celle de 
coopération renforcée ou contrairement – une possibilité de restrictions de 
liaison de l’Etat membre avec des résolutions définies. La première solution 
n’a pas été encore appliquée mais beaucoup d’Etats critiquent fortement 
cette possibilité qu’ils traitent comme instrument de violation du prin-
cipe de l’égalité et solidarité entre les membres de l’Union. La deuxième 
8  Le texte présent est écrit en mars 2014. 
9  Plusieurs pays membres avaient leurs propres raisons pour demander plus rigides ou, au 
contraire, plus souples sanctions et par exemple, Chypre dont les relations avec la Russie ont 
une essentielle signification pour son économie s’est réserve une éventuelle récompense des 
pertes par l’Union.
10  Signée le 22.03.2014.
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solution présente comme exemple la restriction de la Grande Bretagne et 
la Pologne pour l’application une partie de la Charte des Droits Fonda-
mentaux (en Pologne cette restriction est critiquée mais pas par toutes les 
options politiques).
Ces remarques peuvent-elles servir pour la conclusion à l’adresse du 
droit constitutionnel ? Il parait qu’on peut répondre positivement à cette 
question bien que les Constitutions des Etats particuliers déclarent la poli-
tique de solidarité et de justice sociale, elles la ferment en principe dans le 
cadre des relations internes. Elles n’obligent pas les Etats au devoir de soli-
darité dans la communauté internationale. A vrai dire, il y a des Constitu-
tions européennes qui – indépendamment de la déclaration de respecter le 
droit international – suite à leur appartenance à l’Union comprennent des 
clauses interprétées comme un sentiment particulier à la solidarité dans le 
cadre de l’intégration européenne. Par exemple, la Constitution de la RFA 
indique que « pour réaliser les principes de l’Europe unie la République 
Fédérale interagit au développement de l’UE », la Constitution de la Bul-
garie statue que l’Etat « participe à la construction et au développement 
de l’UE », la Constitution de la France appelle à « l’exécution commune » 
des compétences définies, la Constitution de la Grèce mentionne « la coo-
pération avec d’autres Etats », la Constitution des Pays Bas confirme que 
« le gouvernement soutient le développement international de l’ordre ju-
ridique », la Constitution du Portugal se rapporte entre autres à assurer 
réciproquement « l’espace de la liberté, de la sécurité et de la justice ». Les 
plus larges principes se trouvent dans la Constitution d’Irlande où l’on 
confirme « l’engagement en l’Union européenne dans laquelle les Etats tra-
vaillent en commun au nom de promouvoir la paix, les valeurs communes 
et la prospérité de leurs Nations » et dans la Constitution de la Lituanie 
qui exprime sa conviction que «  sa dignité de membre de l’UE contri-
bue à affirmer effectivement les droits et libertés de l’homme » et l’Union 
« apprécie l’identité nationale et les traditions constitutionnelles des Etats 
membres ».
La plupart des Constitutions des Etats membres consacrent d’attention 
surtout à la forme d’exprimer l’accord de transférer la partie de compé-
tences ainsi que régler les questions organisationnelles liées à leur apparte-
nance à l’UE. L’élargissement des principes constitutionnels par les devoirs 
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ou les engagements de l’Etat membre à l’Union dans le but de promouvoir 
et réaliser la solidarité et justice pourrait peut-être avoir la signification 
« didactique » à la politique présentée au sein de la Communauté. Il serait 
aussi une sorte de réponse des Constitutions nationales au principe TUE 
selon lequel «  les Etats membres agissent en harmonie pour renforcer et 
développer la solidarité politique mutuelle » (art.13 point 2) qui peut être 
compris plus largement, non seulement pour la politique extérieure11.
4. S’agissant de la réalisation de l’objectif de justice distributive, mais 
également de l’élimination des nationalismes et égoïsmes nationaux en 
préservant le sentiment de souveraineté, ce sont (peuvent être) les prin-
cipes constitutionnels suivants : 
1) Le principe d’égalité entre entités constituant la communauté. Le 
principe d’égalité est une des conditions fondamentales des rela-
tions interpersonnelles  ; elle est connue et déclarée dans tous les 
documents constitutionnels et les déclarations internationales des 
droits de l’Homme. L’égalité est la condition de toute justice so-
ciale au niveau universel. Pourtant elle parait comme un principe 
méconnu dans les relations entre les sujets de différentes commu-
nautés, surtout entre les Etats membres de l’Union européenne. On 
rencontre les opinions disant que par égard du nombre des diffé-
rences procédurales (vote par majeur, participation financière iné-
gale des Etats (apport et partage), nombre inégal de représentants 
dans le Parlement européen etc.) on ne respecte pas le principe de 
l’égalité des Etats membres dans l’Union. Il est difficile de trouver 
ce principe exprimé expressis verbis dans les Traités et pourtant il 
parait que ce devrait être un des principes fondamentaux.
2) Le principe de l’exercice commun des compétences attribuées à la 
communauté et donc de la définition commune des objectifs et 
moyens de les atteindre. Ce principe de «  l’exercice commun des 
11  Cette situation ne devra pas empêcher le fait qu’en ratifiant le Traité chaque Etat membre 
s’engage à le respecter parce que l’emplacement du principe convenable dans la Constitution 
possède non seulement la signification juridique mais aussi morale et dans les pays qui recon-
naissent la position suprême de leurs Constitutions auprès du droit européen possède aussi 
une signification essentielle juridique.
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compétences » exprime clairement la Constitution de la France  : 
«  La République participe…à l’Union européenne, constituée 
d’Etats qui ont choisi librement… d’exercer en commun certaines 
de leurs compétences ». Cette formule permet de croire que les Etats 
membres ne transfèrent pas la souveraineté à un sujet tiers mais ils 
l’exercent ensemble. Cette exécution commune des compétences 
définies ne signifie pas l’envie d’abandon de la souveraineté mais 
plutôt un genre de « communautarisation » de la partie de droits 
souverains exercée avec d’autres Etats en basant sur le principe de 
mutualité.
3) Le principe de l’Etat démocratique de droit (dont le principe de 
la justice sociale) qui est le fondement des standards uniques d’un 
ordre juridique démocratique. Il concerne aussi bien les Etats uni-
taires, fédéraux et ceux de l’Union européenne à laquelle le Traité le 
répète à plusieurs reprises. 
4) Le principe du respect des droits de l’Homme qui exige de toute la 
communauté de respecter les droits de tous les citoyens.
5. Le principe de subsidiarité à chaque niveau de la communauté. Par 
exemple, la Constitution de la Pologne de 1997 déclare déjà expressis verbis 
dans la Préambule «  le principe de subsidiarité renforçant les droits des 
citoyens et de leurs collectivités ». Ce principe respecte et proclame le droit 
de l’Union européenne statuant dans le Traité de Lisbonne ses garanties 
sous la formes des compétences respectives des parlements nationaux.
1) Le principe de solidarité, de plus en plus souvent présent comme 
un des critères d’analyse judiciaire qui s’applique tant aux particu-
liers qu’aux communautés politiques : nationales, supranationales, 
sociales, territoriales et autres.
2) Le principe du dialogue social s’adressant aux partenaires sociaux, 
par exemple : Etat – employeurs – employés.
3) Les autres principes constitutionnels déjà mentionnés dans diffé-
rents contextes comme le bien commun, la dignité naturelle de 
l’Homme, l’autonomie de l’individu, la société civique – ces prin-
cipes-là devraient être traités comme directives dans la formation des 
autres règles juridiques et montrer la direction de fonctionnement 
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des institutions de l’Etat et sa politique. Et cette règle concerne aus-
si les autres formes de s’organiser pour les communautés civiques.
Ces principes (et encore d’autres) forment un certain modus vivendi de 
la vie sociale dans la communauté, exigeant le respect mutuel de l’égalité 
(dont l’égalité des chances) et de solidarité. Tous ces principes sont connus 
de droit constitutionnel et leur caractère juridique est fortifié par la juris-
prudence, en particulier des juridictions constitutionnelles. C’est cette ju-
risprudence qui, dans nombreux pays, permet auxdits principes d’acquérir 
une signification concrète dans les relations avec les règles de droit plus 
détaillées qui concrétisent et développent ces principes. Comme une des 
plus essentielles conditions d’efficacité les principes constitutionnelles est 
le réel milieu social et politique dans lequel elles sont appliquées.
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constitutional mechanisms that may serve 
establishing a fiscal policy and settling  
its execution
I. Introduction
1. Fiscal policy is the use of government revenue collection and ex-
penditure aimed at attaining social and economic objectives laid down by 
relevant public authorities. In practice, this is not always realised, since 
the electorate prefers politicians who promote increasing expenses or 
reducing tax burdens. Voters are not always aware of the existence and 
role of budget limitations. They are subject to the so-called fiscal illusion, 
i.e. they invent a false idea of possible choice scenarios. Additionally, on 
the level of individual citizens, we may observe a lack of co-responsibility 
for the state of the country’s budget. Therefore, a rise or increase in budget 
deficit and – in consequence – a financial crisis, may become the results 
of a democratic choice.2
2. The literature on the causes and consequences of the recent global 
financial crisis is vast. The aim of the paper is not a theoretical analysis, but 
an attempt to present concrete legal constructions. It constitutes a review 
of selected constitutions and – sometimes – opinions expressed in the lit-
erature on the subject of mechanisms that may serve establishing a rational 
fiscal policy and settling its execution, in order to prevent and/or overcome 
financial crises:
1  PhD, Adviser to the President of the Supreme Audit Office (Poland) [in the English trans-
lation of the Constitution of the Republic of Poland, the said Office is also referred to as the 
Supreme Chamber of Control: <http://www.sejm.gov.pl/prawo/konst/angielski/kon1.htm>]; 
<Jacek.Mazur@nik.gov.pl>. 
2  “Financial crisis” is used here as an umbrella concept which covers the crisis in financial 
markets that erupted in autumn 2008 after the collapse of Lehman Brothers.
Mazur, constitutional MechanisMs that May serve estaBlishinG a fiscal policy and 
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• prudential and remedial procedures regarding the public debt and 
state budget deficit;
• estimating macroeconomic consequences of election manifestos;
• fiscal councils; 
• National Statistical Institutes;
• Supreme Audit Institutions;
• granting the government a vote of acceptance for the execution 
of the state budget.
The description is not limited to provisions of constitutions, since it 
appeared – when drafting my paper – that some important regulations 
are included in ordinary laws only, while their potential recognition in 
the constitution may only be by a demand. 
I hope that the workshop participants will provide more information on 
how these mechanisms function in the countries where they come from.
3. The paper concerns particular mechanisms, however it does not 
analyse constitutions of individual states as such. Maybe it is worth men-
tioning that in one country – in Iceland – the financial crisis has become 
the direct reason for the taking up of work on the developing of a new 
constitution.3
II. Mechanisms that serve the establishment and execution 
of a fiscal policy
1. Establishing prudential and remedial procedures regarding the pub-
lic debt and state budget deficit
1.1. As Carmen Reinhart and Kenneth Rogoff put it, the phenome-
non of financial crises – in particular a state’s insolvency in the external 
3  Re. the concept of the (still to be adopted) draft of the constitution of Iceland. – see e.g. 
Thorvaldur Gylfason: ‘Constitutions: Financial Crisis Can Lead to Change’, 19 July 2012 
<https://notendur.hi.is/gylfason/Iceland%20constitution%20Challenge%204%20Final.pdf>.
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aspect, as well as towards its own citizens – had been known for ages.4 
However, only recently in individual countries have formal mechanisms 
limiting the level of maximum public debt and budget deficit begun to 
be established. A fiscal rule popularly named “debt brake” is defined in 
the constitutions and laws of several countries. It can be introduced under 
different procedures: 
• by amending the constitution; 
• by enacting a separate constitutional law (organic law);
• by enacting an ordinary law.5
In Brazil, the Constitution of 1988 provides for a possibility to regu-
late the issues of public debt and sets down a procedure under which this 
might take place.6
4  C.M. Reinhart, K.S. Rogoff This time is Different. Eight Centuries of Financial Folly (Prince-
ton University Press 2009).
5  A great deal of information on EU Member States is provided in the working paper by Heiko 
T. Burret and Jan Schnellenbach (both Walter Eucken Institute, Freiburg) entitled ‘Imple-
mentation of the Fiscal Compact in the Euro Area Member States’, November 2013 <http://
www.sachverstaendigenrat-wirtschaft.de/fileadmin/dateiablage/download/publikationen/ar-
beitspapier_08_2013_engl.pdf>.
6  Items II and XIV of Article 48 of the Constitution of Brazil (<http://bd.camara.gov.br/bd/bit-
stream/handle/bdcamara/1344/constituicao_ingles_3ed.pdf?sequence=3>) set that the National 
Congress, with the endorsement of the President of the Republic, is responsible for the regulation 
of the credit and public debt transactions, and specially the amount of the federal public debt re-
lated to government bonds. And Article 52, item VI, sets forth that it is the exclusive responsibil-
ity of the Federal Senate to set, as proposed by the President of the Republic, the global limits for 
the consolidated debt amount of the Federal State, states, Federal District, and municipalities. 
Simultaneously, the Fiscal Responsibility Law of 2000 (<http://www1.worldbank.org/pub-
licsector/pe/Budget Laws/BRLRFEnglish.pdf>) foresaw, in its Article 30, items I and II that, 
within ninety days after the publication of the mentioned supplementary law, the President 
of the Republic would submit global limit proposals to the Federal Senate and the National 
Congress respectively: (i) for the amount of the consolidated debt of the Federal State, states 
and city councils; and (ii) for the public debt amount related to government bonds.
Once the global limit proposals were sent to the three governmental branches, the text that 
mentions the Federal State was separated, having been approved only in the part concerning 
the indebtedness controls for states, Federal District, and municipalities, under the terms of 
the Federal Senate Resolution 40/2001. Yet, the limit proposal for the public debt regarding 
government bonds is still in process in the Federal Senate as a Bill initiated in the Chamber of 
Representatives (Bill 54/2009). Therefore, currently there is no indebtedness limit set forth for 
the Federal State. As for the states and the Federal District, the limit for the net consolidated 
debt is 2 (two) times the net current revenue. For municipalities, this limit is 1.2 (one point 
two) times the net current revenue.
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In Poland, the Constitution of 1997 has established a ban on incurring 
loans and granting financial guarantees which would cause public debt to 
exceed 60% of GDP, and a ban on financing budget deficit by the central 
bank; further rules are specified by the Public Finance Act.7
In Switzerland, the Federal Constitution of 1999 was amended in De-
cember 2001 in order to introduce the debt brake.8
In Germany, the Constitution of 1949, usually referred to as the Basic 
Law, was amended in July 2009 to add the balanced budget provision. This 
will apply to both the federal government and the Länder (states). From 
2016 onwards the federal government will be forbidden to run a structural 
deficit of more than 0.35% of GDP. From 2020, the states will not be 
permitted to run any structural deficit at all. The Basic Law permits an 
7  The Polish Public Finance Act of 2009 includes:
•  detailed prudential and remedial procedures regarding the state budget, local governments’ 
budgets and also granting sureties and guarantees if public debt to GDP ratio exceeds 50%, 
55% and 60%;
•  obligation by the Minister of Finance to present a 4-year strategy for debt management in 
the public finance sector.
The above-mentioned strategy is prepared each year by the Minister of Finance, then submit-
ted for approval by the Council of Ministers and finally presented to the Parliament togeth-
er with the justification of the draft Budget Act. It includes, among others, items such as: the 
objectives and tasks of public debt management; the forecasts of macroeconomic indicators 
for Poland and international considerations in the time horizon covered by the strategy; an 
analysis of risk factors connected with public debt; the expected effects of implementing the 
strategy; and threats to the strategy implementation.
8  New Article 126 of the Federal Constitution of the Swiss Confederation <http://www.ad-
min.ch/ch/e/rs/1/ 101.en.pdf> stipulates that:
1.  The Confederation shall maintain its income and expenditure in balance over time. 
2.  The ceiling for total expenditure that is to be approved in the budget is based on the expect-
ed income after taking account of the economic situation.
3.  Exceptional financial requirements may justify an appropriate increase in the ceiling in terms 
of paragraph 2. The Federal Assembly shall decide on any increase in accordance with Ar-
ticle 159 paragraph 3 letter c.
4.  If the total expenditure in the federal accounts exceeds the ceiling in terms of paragraphs 
2 or 3, compensation for this additional expenditure must be made in subsequent years.
5.  The details are regulated by law.
See also ‘The Swiss debt brake: experiences and perspectives. Report of the Federal Council in response 
to the postulates of Graber Jean-Pierre (10.4022), Landolt (11.3547) and Fischer (12.3552)’, 
Bern, 29 November 2013 <http://www.efv.admin.ch/e/downloads/finanzpolitik_grundlagen/
schuldenbremse/Bericht_SB _e.pdf>.
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exception to be made for emergencies such as a natural disaster or severe 
economic crisis.9
In Italy, the Constitution of 1947 was amended in April 2012 in order 
to introduce a balanced budget provision.10 New constitutional rules con-
cerning public debt and budget deficit have recently been also adopted in 
Spain (September 2011) and Slovenia (May 2013).11
In several countries those the issues have been regulated in the consti-
tutional (organic) law (France – December 201212, Portugal – September 
201113, Slovakia – December 2011).
Another method is to regulate issues of public debt and budget deficit 
in ordinary law (Austria – 2011, Cyprus – 2012, Finland – 2012, Ireland 
– 2012, Latvia – 2013, the Netherlands – 2013).
9  See Article 109 (Budget management in the Federation and the Länder), Article 115 (Limits 
of borrowing) and Article 143d (Transitional provisions relating to consolidation assistance) 
of the amended German Basic Law <https://www.btg-bestellservice.de/pdf/80201000.pdf>; 
the Act promulgated on 13 September 2012 concerning the Implementation of the Treaty on 
Stability, Coordination and Governance in the Economic and Monetary Union of 2 March 
2012; the Fiscal Compact (National Implementation) Act of 15 July 2013. See also F. Fabbrini, 
‘The Fiscal Compact, the “Golden Rule”, and the Paradox of European Federalism’ (2003) 36 
B.C. Int’l & Comp. L. Rev. 1 <http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/iclr/vol36/iss1/1/>.
10  See Article 81 (the fiscal rules of the central government), Article 97 (the general govern-
ment) and Article 119 (the regional and local jurisdictions) <http://www.senato.it/documen-
ti/repository/relazioni/libreria/novita/%20constitution_2012.pdf>. The details are stipulated 
in: ‘Law 243 of 24 December 2012: Provisions for the application of the balanced budget 
principle pursuant to Article 81.6 of the Constitution’ <http://www.pbo-dpb.gc.ca/files/files/
Italy%20-%20Legge%20n%20243%202012_eng.pdf>. See also T. Groppi: ‘The Impact of the 
Financial Crisis on the Italian Written Constitution’ (2012) 4(1) Italian Journal of Public Law.
11  The revised Article 148 of the Slovenian Constitution (<http://www.us-rs.si/media/con-
stitution.-en.14.11.%202013.pdf/>) stipulates that revenues and expenditures of the general 
government have to be balanced over the medium-term or generate a surplus, respectively. The 
public budgets have to be gradually adjusted such that the new budget rule is met from 2015 
onwards. Further details shall be specified in an implementation law.
12  Loi organique n° 2012-1403 du 17 décembre 2012 relative à la programmation et à la gou-
vernance des finances publiques <http://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/affichTexte.do?cidTexte=JORF-
TEXT000026785259&dateTexte=&categorieLien=id>.
13 Fiscal Framework Law (Law 91/2001) <http://www.cfp.pt/wp-content/uploads/2012/ 
10/1351707749.pdf>. 
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2. The possibility of introducing official estimation and making 
the macroeconomic effects of election manifestos publicly known
2.1. In many countries, the election manifestos of political parties in-
fluence the state’s fiscal policy. Those programmes may include general 
demands (such as joining or exiting international economic organisations, 
changing percentage rates, changing customs tariffs or introducing/abol-
ishing limitations on the import/export of goods, the nationalisation/pri-
vatisation of some sectors of the economy or certain enterprises), as well 
as – specific ones (e.g. a reduction of / an increase in taxes for selected 
groups of taxpayers, the increasing limitation of social benefits for specific 
groups, etc.). Sometimes it may be presumed that some promises may be 
formulated mostly with the intention to attract specific groups of voters. 
Election manifestos are not always clear and cohesive, which may impede 
estimations, nevertheless their introduction leads to important macroeco-
nomic effects. 
Due to the fact that complicated, multi-faceted social processes are 
involved, it is difficult to draw simple conclusions; however, it seems that, 
generally, an appropriate action in elections is when political parties and 
their candidates present clear and understandable election manifestos, 
which enable voters to actually compare and make a choice that is consist-
ent with their preferences.
Lately in several countries (in the Netherlands and Great Britain, and 
somewhat differently in the United States), practice has been developed 
which consists in making estimations of expected macroeconomic effects 
of election manifestos before national elections (parliamentary or pres-
idential elections). These valuations are conducted on a voluntary basis 
by independent institutions specialising in assessing economic and fiscal 
policies. As Frits Bos and Coen Teulings put it, particularly in the peri-
od of financial crisis and the instability of public finance, the assessment 
of election manifestos may constitute a tool for verifying unrealistic or 
incoherent promises made by politicians. It may help political parties 
not only in informing voters of the possible consequences of their pro-
grammes, but also – in formulating them better, taking into account ob-
jective budget restrictions, and after the election – in easing cross-party 
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discussion with regard to the forming of a government. It should also be 
taken into consideration that there may appear a risk of negative effects 
of such an assessment – should it turn out that alternative options are 
presented in a biased manner and the mode of assessment leaves too much 
space for games and subjective opinions.14
Have the workshop participants encountered the above-mentioned prac-
tice in other countries?
2.2. In the Netherlands, since 1986, for a few months before parlia-
mentary elections, the Bureau for Economic Policy Analysis (CPB), a gov-
ernmental agency for economic forecasts and analyses,15 performs – at 
the request of interested political parties – an assessment of expected effects 
of their election manifestos, e.g. what are the consequences of the platforms 
for the government budget, economic growth, employment, the purchas-
ing power of the various types of households and the environment? CPB 
only evaluates a programme on request of a political party. Hence, parties 
can refuse to participate in the evaluation. Nevertheless, nearly all political 
parties request participation, as they do not want to give voters the negative 
signal that they have something to hide or that they fear such evaluation.16
14  F. Bos, C. Teulings: ‘Evaluating election platforms: a task for fiscal councils? Scope and 
rules of the game in view of 25 years of Dutch practice’(2011) CPB Netherlands Bureau for 
Economic Policy Analysis (MPRA Paper No. 31536, posted on 14 June 2011; <http://mpra.
ub.uni-muenchen.de/31536/>).
15  CPB was founded in 1945. It is fully independent in its work. It is publicly funded and 
constitutes part of the Ministry for Economic Affairs, Agriculture and Innovation. CPB pro-
vides (i) a macroeconomic forecast underlying the annual budget, (ii) a midterm review of the 
state of public finance at the start of each election cycle, (iii) cost-benefit analyses of all kinds 
of policy proposals (from education to infrastructure), and (iv) an assessment of the economic 
impact of the platforms of political parties before an election. In addition, research is carried 
out on CPB’s own initiative, or at the request of the government, parliament, trade unions 
or employers’ federations. See F. Bos, C. Teulings: ‘The world’s oldest fiscal watchdog: CPB’s 
analyses foster consensus on economic policy’ in G. Kopits (ed), Restoring Public Debt Sustain-
ability: the Role of Independent Fiscal Institutions (Oxford University Press 2012). The scope 
and organisation of CPB are generally regulated by the Act of 21 April 1947 (Wet voorbereid-
ing van de vaststelling van een Centraal Economisch Plan).
16  For a detailed description and analysis of the Dutch experience, see F. Bos, C. Teulings, 
Evaluating election platforms …, op.cit. and the bibliography therein. 
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In the UK, since the election of 1997, the Institute for Fiscal Studies 
(IFS)17 has run research projects and produced a range of publications 
and observations including a specific focus on each general election. In 
the lead up to the last UK election (2010),18 this included briefing notes 
on the three main parties’ proposals for dealing with the fiscal deficit19 as 
well as specific policy areas such as families and children,20 pensions and 
retirement policy21 and more.
Practice in the United States is somewhat different: the Congressional 
Budget Office (CBO)22 does not directly assess election manifestos, how-
ever its estimates of budgetary costs and savings of some major policy 
proposals, e.g. of healthcare reform, play a major role in presidential and 
congressional elections.
2.3. The above-presented cases concern political practice and not 
the legal system. They have a major influence on the political and election 
systems; however, they are not legally regulated. Although in the Nether-
lands the assessment of expected effects of election manifestos is performed 
by a government agency, such activity is not defined in the law of 1947 but 
forms part of the generally defined scope of activity of the agency; the same 
goes for the US CBO, whereas the British IFS is not a government agency. 
The above-mentioned cases would, therefore, be difficult to analyse from 
the point of view of constitutional provisions or ordinary legislation. 
The situation may change soon: in Belgium work is in progress to adopt 
a law which would introduce the assessment of expected effects of election 
manifestos by a designated state authority. A bill was adopted unanimously 
17  The IFS is an independent economic research institute launched in 1971, funded by pub-
lic and private grants. It produces academic and policy related findings on UK taxation and 
public policy (see <http://www.ifs.org.uk>).
18  <http://www.ifs.org.uk/%20projects/323>
19  <http://www.ifs.org.uk/publications/4848>
20  <http://www.ifs.org.uk/publications/4858>
21  <http://www.ifs.org.uk/publications/4861>
22  The CBO is a federal agency within the legislative branch of the United States government 
and provides economic data to Congress. It was created by the Congressional Budget and Im-
poundment Control Act of 1974 <http://www.cbo.gov/>.
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in April 2014 by the joined committees of the Belgian House of Repre-
sentatives. The bill assumes that every political party represented in any 
of the chambers of the state or regional parliament would be obliged to 
present the main lines of its programme no later than 100 days before 
elections; parties which have no seats in parliament could only do so on 
a voluntary basis. These documents would be examined by the Federal 
Planning Bureau,23 which should estimate the short- and medium-term 
impact of introducing the proposals of political parties on: public finance, 
the purchasing power and employment of groups with different incomes, 
as well as the environment. A final version of the estimation would be 
published no later than 15 days before the election date.24
In that context, it is worth raising the following issues, which are im-
portant from the point of view of constitutional law:
• The Belgian Constitution of 1831 does not specify the status 
of political parties, or their role in the mechanisms of representa-
tive democracy; therefore, the adoption of a law which would im-
pose certain obligations on political parties seems to be acceptable; 
the same applies to those countries whose constitutions clearly state 
that the mode of conduct of political parties is regulated by law.25 
Apart from that, there are, however, constitutions which underline 
the freedom of activity of political parties.26 Therefore, one may sug-
gest opening a discussion on how the introduction of the statutory 
23  Le Bureau fédéral du Plan (Federal Planning Bureau – FPB) is an independent public agen-
cy. It carries out analyses and provides forecasts regarding economic, social and environmental 
policy issues as well as the integration of these policies in the context of sustainable develop-
ment <http://www.plan.be/index.php?lang=en>.
24  “Proposition de loi relative au chiffrage par le Bureau fédéral du Plan des programmes élec-
toraux présentés par les partis politiques lors de l’élection pour la Chambre des représentants” 
(DOC 53 0576/008). For the course of legislative work with links to documents (in French), 
<http://www.dekamer.be/kvvcr/showpage. cfm?section=/flwb&language=fr&cfm=/site/ww-
wcfm/flwb/flwbn.cfm?lang=N&legislat=53&dossierID=0576>.
25  E.g. Article 11(3) of the Constitution of Bulgaria of 1991; Article VIII(4) of the Constitu-
tion of Hungary of 2011; Article 35(3) of the Constitution of Lithuania of 1992; Article 8(2) 
of the Constitution of Romania of 1991.
26  E.g. Article 4(2) of the Constitution of France of 1958; Article 11(1) of the Constitution 
of Poland of 1997; Article 29(4) of the Constitution of Slovakia of 1992.
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obligation to submit and evaluate election manifestos can influence 
the understanding of the place and role of political parties. 
• A question arises regarding the risks connected with government bod-
ies getting involved in delicate assessment processes that may influ-
ence election results. In this context, it is worth mentioning the judg-
ment of the German Federal Constitutional Court of 2 March 1977, 
in which the Court decided against any engagement of the govern-
ment in the election campaigns of political parties.27
3. Fiscal councils
“The term Fiscal Council is generally used to describe an institution, 
funded by but independent of government, which provides public ad-
vice on fiscal issues”.28 Although fiscal councils are generally not vested 
with the power to directly intervene in national fiscal policies, they might 
have considerable impact on fiscal outcomes through their influence on 
27  According to the case law of the German Federal Constitutional Court, the closer the pub-
lications come to the beginning of a heated campaign season, the less it is possible to rule out 
their impact on the election result. Therefore, the Government’s task and duty to objectively 
inform citizens also about past political facts, developments and achievements has to be over-
ridden by the principle that, prior to elections, the formation of the will of the people should 
– as much as possible – be kept free from the exertion of influence by the Government. The 
obligation of the Federal Government to refrain from exerting any influence on election re-
sults, implied by the requirement of utter self-restraint and the prohibition of any public re-
lations activities financed from public funds, e.g. in the form of performance reports, benefit 
or achievement reports. This is so because, in the heated campaign season, such publications 
usually have the character of campaign advertising material of a given political party; in other 
words, this is an exertion of influence by the Government, which is prohibited by constitu-
tional law. However, this does not refer to neutral and informative publications that are nec-
essary because of an urgent situation that has arisen (for more, see: 2 cf. BVerfGE (rulings of 
the Federal Constitutional Court) 44, 125, p. 153; 3 BVerfGE 44, 125, pp. 152 & 153). It is 
understood that in the heated campaign season (starting 5 months before the election) the fed-
eral government is not permitted to spend any budget funds on publications or performance 
reports serving electoral purposes.
28  Definition by Professor Simon Wren-Lewis of Oxford University, quoted from his intro-
duction entitled ‘What are Fiscal Councils?’, available at his website:< https://sites.google.com/
site/sjqwrenlewis/fiscal-councils>. 
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the public debate.29 A few countries have had such institutions for many 
decades. In recent years, in view of the global financial crisis and the dete-
riorating financial conditions and prospects of individual countries, such 
bodies have been established in other countries. They were established in 
particular in the EU Member States which had been burdened with supra-
national criteria regarding the fulfilment of annual relations of deficit and 
debt and the obligation to implement the directive on requirements for 
Member States’ budgetary frameworks.30
“These institutions are often described as ‘independent’”.31 Their inde-
pendence, apart from professionalism and related freedom of expressing 
opinions, is considerably affected by their place in the system of state bod-
ies and by specific legislation.
Some fiscal councils have been established pursuant to a constitu-
tion, for instance in Hungary (2011), or constitutional (organic) law, as 
in: France (2012), Portugal (2012), and Slovakia (2012); in Estonia and 
Finland, the functions of the fiscal councils are performed by supreme 
audit institutions, which are constitutional bodies. Most fiscal councils 
have been established on the basis of ordinary law: Australia (2011), Aus-
tria (2013), Germany (2010), Greece (2010), Ireland (2011), Italy (2012), 
Latvia (2013), the Netherlands (1947), Spain (2013), the UK (2011), and 
the United States (1974). 
29  L. Calmfors (‘The Role of Independent Fiscal Policy Institutions’, CESIfo Working Pa-
per Series No. 3367, pp. 14-15) distinguishes the following tasks for fiscal councils: 1) pro-
vision of ‘objective’ macroeconomic forecasts on which government budget proposals can be 
based; 2) estimating the cost of various government policy initiatives; 3) ex ante evaluation of 
whether fiscal policy is likely to meet its medium-term targets; 4) ex post evaluation of wheth-
er fiscal policy has met its targets; 5) analysis of the long-run sustainability of fiscal policy; 
6) normative recommendations on fiscal policy <http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?ab-
stract_id=1775797>. See also OECD Recommendation on Principles for Independent Fis-
cal Institutions, 13 February 2014 – C(2014)17/CORR1 <http://acts.oecd.org/Instruments/
ShowInstrumentView.aspx?InstrumentID=301&Instrum%20entPID=316&Lang%20=en&-
Book=False>.
30  Council Directive 2011/85/EU of 8 November 2011 on requirements for budgetary frame-
works of the Member States, OJ L 306/41 23.11.2011.
31  S. Wren-Lewis ‘What are Fiscal Councils?’<https://sites.google.com/site/sjqwrenlewis/fis-
cal-councils>. 
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In Hungary, the Budget Council is an organ examining the feasibility 
of the state budget. It stems from introducing – into the constitution – rules 
aimed at limiting the public debt: apart from an extraordinary situation, 
the Parliament may not adopt a State Budget Act which allows the state 
debt to exceed half of the GDP. In addition, as long as the state debt ex-
ceeds half of the GDP, the Parliament may only adopt a State Budget Act 
which contains state debt reduction in proportion to the GDP. The main 
task of the Council is to examine the government budgetary bill from 
the point of view of those criteria and the adoption of the State Budget 
Act shall be subject to the prior consent of the Budget Council in order to 
meet the requirements set out in Article 36(4)-(5) of the Constitution.32 
Another task is to make a periodical evaluation of macroeconomic perfor-
mance: at least once in six months, the Budget Council should present its 
opinion on the planning and executing of the state budget and on the use 
of public funds; apart from that, at any time it may submit additional 
opinions on those issues and on the condition of the public finance.
4. National Statistical Institutes
National Statistical Institutes (NSIs) function in almost all countries 
of the world. They collect, gather, store and process statistical data, as well 
as announce, make available and disseminate the results of their research 
as official data which serve the purpose of informing the general public, 
state authorities and business entities about the economic, demographic 
and social situation as well as the natural environment.
Due to the fact that the results of statistical data constitute bases for 
further decisions, it is important to ensure an appropriate level of inde-
pendence for NSIs, so that they are not subject to external influences.33 
32  Fundamental Law of Hungary of 2011 <http://www.mfa.gov.hu/NR/rdonlyres/8204FB28-
BF22-481A-9426D2761D10EC7C/0/FUNDAMENTALLAWOFHUNGARYmostrecent-
version01102013.pdf>.
33  In Greece in 2005-2009, data on the size of the country’s budget deficit were deliberately 
falsified. Having forecast a budget deficit of 3.7 percent for 2009, the Greek government was 
eventually forced to reveal the deficit of 15.4 percent. It was also condemned for fabricating 
and manipulating economic statistics (Report on Greek government deficit and debt statistics, 
European Commission; COM(2010) 1 final, 8.1.2010).
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In this context, in 2012 the European Commission presented a draft reg-
ulation which gives the executives of NSIs in the Member States the free-
dom to decide on processes, statistical methods, standards and procedures, 
at the same time banning them from seeking and giving protection against 
receiving instructions from national governments and other bodies. The 
Heads of NSIs also should be granted considerable autonomy in deciding 
on the internal management of the statistical office. Furthermore, there 
must exist transparent rules for the appointment, transfer and dismissal 
of the Heads of NSIs, based solely on professional criteria.34
Considering the growing importance of statistical data in the process 
of taking decisions on the fiscal policy, we could ask if it were not appro-
priate to mention the role of NSIs in the constitutions of particular states.
III.  Mechanisms which serve the settling of the execution 
of fiscal policy
5. Supreme Audit Institutions
5.1. Supreme Audit Institutions (SAIs) operate in almost every coun-
try.35 They are usually constitutional bodies. Their main aim is to conduct 
independent external audit of public administration’s activities, finance, 
property and, primarily, implementation of the state budget. Through 
these activities, state bodies can be held accountable and parliaments can 
oversee governments. There are a handful of countries that have no SAIs, 
but these reflect a specific political situation or the process of the transfor-
mation of a political system (e.g. the Ukraine in the 1990s had no SAI for 
34  Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Regula-
tion (EC) No 223/2009 on European statistics; Brussels, 17.4.2012 COM2012 167 final. The 
European Parliament in the term of 2009-2014 did not adopt the proposal; perhaps the work 
will be continued in its new composition after the elections in May 2014.
35  The following passages draw on J. Mazur: ‘The Polish Supreme Chamber of Control in 
Comparison with Supreme Audit Institutions of Other Countries’ (2007) 61 Iyunim. Studies 
in State Audit (Jerusalem) 143-171.
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several years).36 Thus, the norm is that a democratic country has such an 
institution.
5.2. Apart from judicial rulings (which are only issued by the courts 
of audit), the basic tasks of SAIs are auditing and, in many cases, advis-
ing. Originally, SAIs dealt mainly with audits. The advisory function was 
a consequence of the evolution of state audit in the 20th century. Nowa-
days, advisory elements are present in a majority of SAIs, especially in per-
formance audits. Moreover, in some countries advisory activities may, for 
example, comprise the preparing of opinions for the parliament (rarely for 
the government) on specific bills, especially those concerning accounting 
or other financial matters,37 or the state budget bill (though very rarely), 
or sometimes other acts that involve a rise in public spending (e.g. in Bel-
gium, Germany, Hungary, Italy, and Russia).
The scope of issues subject to audit determines the basic competence 
of an audit institution. SAIs began with audits of the implementation 
of state budgets. In the 1920s a new and constant tendency to broad-
en the scope of audit appeared. More types of entities and areas became 
subject to state audit: state-owned companies, companies operating with 
36  It is worth stressing that in the process of returning to democracy and to the rule of law, in 
the 1990s in a majority of the Central and Eastern European countries, independent audit in-
stitutions were restored or established: Hungary in 1989; Lithuania and Estonia in 1990; Latvia 
and Moldova in 1991; Albania, Belarus, the Czech Republic and Romania in 1992; Croatia 
and Slovakia in 1993; Slovenia in 1994; Bulgaria and Russia in 1995; and the Ukraine in 1997.
37  For example, in the United States, the Comptroller General shall review provisions requiring 
financial audits of non-Federal entities that receive Federal awards that are contained in bills 
and resolutions reported by the committees of the Senate and the House of Representatives. 
If the Comptroller General determines that a bill or resolution contains provisions that are in-
consistent with the requirements of the Single Audit Act, s/he shall, at the earliest practicable 
date, notify in writing (1) the committee that reported such bill or resolution; and (2) (A) the 
Committee on Governmental Affairs of the Senate (in the case of a bill or resolution reported 
by a committee of the Senate); or (B) the Committee on Government Reform and Oversight 
of the House of Representatives (in the case of a bill or resolution reported by a committee 
of the House of Representatives); sec. 2 of the Single Audit Act Amendments of 1996 (Public 
Law 104-156, July 5, 1996; p. 9; <https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/omb/assets/
about_omb/104-156.pdf>).
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the use of public money,38 NGOs financed from the state budget, self-gov-
erning bodies, social insurance institutions, foundations and associations 
(especially public associations). However, only a handful of SAIs are au-
thorised to audit all the types of entities mentioned above.
Originally, SAIs carried out audits within the general meaning 
of the term, without further categorising audits into types. In many coun-
tries (or maybe even in most of them?) it is still so. After World War II, 
together with the appearance of performance audits and with the devel-
opment of audit methodology, some SAIs began to differentiate between 
particular types of audits, especially regularity audits and performance au-
dits.39 This is an ongoing process and the situation varies from one SAI 
to another. Generally, it is possible to conclude that within the last 30 to 
40 years, several SAIs have begun to differentiate between these two types 
of audits as well as have developed audit criteria.
The basic element of a regularity audit is financial audit; hence, these 
two notions are used interchangeably. Some SAIs perform financial audits 
in the form of attestation audits, i.e. they grant formal audit opinions (cer-
tificates). Attestation audits, also known as certification audits, concern 
the credibility of accounting transactions and the compliance of financial 
operations with the law. These audits are performed by examining a sam-
ple of transactions, frequently with the use of statistical methods.40 Attesta-
tion audits are performed only by SAIs in a few countries, such as: the UK, 
the USA, Canada, the Netherlands, Denmark, Slovenia and Sweden.
38  J. Kandutsch: ‘State Audit of Public Enterprises in Austria’ in B. Geist (ed), State Audit: 
Developments in Public Accountability (London 1981); L.T. Kulasingham, ‘Accountability and 
Control of Public Enterprises’ in A. Friedberg, B. Geist, N. Mizrahi, and I. Sharkansky (eds), 
State Audit and Accountability (Jerusalem 1991); H.G. Zavelberg, ‘Reviews of Federal Activi-
ties in Private-law Enterprises by the Federal Court of Audit’ in J. Thesing and W. Hofmeister 
(eds), Financial Control in a Democracy (Sankt Augustin 1995).
39  According to Section 4 of the Lima Declaration of Guidelines on Auditing Precepts, “1. The 
traditional task of Supreme Audit Institutions is to audit the legality and regularity of finan-
cial management and of accounting. 2. In addition to this type of audit, which retains its sig-
nificance, there is another equally important type of audit – performance audit – which is 
oriented towards examining the performance, economy, efficiency and effectiveness of public 
administration (...)” <http://www.issai.org/media/12901/issai_1_e.pdf>.
40  See a description of the types of audits in: R. Allen and D. Tommasi (eds), Managing Public 
Expenditure. A Reference Book for Transition Countries (OECD, Paris 2001) 348-351.
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Performance audits (value-for-money audits) encompass:
• audit of the economy of administrative activities in accordance 
with sound administrative principles and practice, and manage-
ment policies;
• audit of the efficiency of the utilisation of human, financial and 
other resources, including examination of information systems, 
performance measures and monitoring arrangements, and the pro-
cedures for remedying identified deficiencies; 
• audits of the effectiveness of performance in relation to the achieve-
ment of objectives in the audited entity, and audits of the actual 
impact of activities compared with the intended impact. 
5.3. The 2008 global financial crisis had a major influence on the direction 
of the work of many SAIs, especially in the United States and the EU Mem-
ber States. These countries used great means to stabilise financial markets 
and alleviate the negative effects of the crisis, inter alia by directly subsidising 
private units. Some countries tried to counteract a decrease in export and 
internal consumption by increasing public expenses. Also, in the countries 
which were not able to use significant means, special programmes were de-
veloped to prevent mass redundancies. Governments had to react fast to 
the challenges ensuing from the crisis, having little time to develop relevant 
strategies and programmes. Response time was a key factor in the effective-
ness of measures – and has become one of the main criteria for the evalua-
tion thereof – apart from correctness, economy, and efficiency.
The amount of public means spent in connection with the crisis and 
the specific mode in which this occurred, have attracted the attention 
of supreme audit authorities. Many SAIs took quick steps, adjusting audit 
plans to those challenges. The activities of individual SAIs were signifi-
cantly different – depending on the character of the activities of the gov-
ernments and the scope of their own inspection powers. For example, 
the SAIs in France and in the Netherlands inspected state aid for banks, 
the SAI in Great Britain – the entire state aid, the SAI in Denmark – 
the activity of the governmental agency which provides supervision over 
the financial sector; while the SAI in Poland – inspected the anti-crisis 
actions of the government and of the central bank, including efforts to 
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ensure the stability of the banking sector. In a few countries (e.g. in Ger-
many) SAIs were granted additional competences to supervise government 
programmes for counteracting the effects of the crisis, including making 
current inspections, apart from traditional post-audits.41
5.4. From the moment of the crisis, many SAIs have begun to pay par-
ticular attention to the matters of financial stability. I shall present this on 
the example of the Austrian SAI (Rechnungshof). It executes tasks which serve 
financial stability by conducting many performance audits, by formulating 
recommendations and by verifying the closing of federal accounts. While 
choosing the audit topics, attention is paid to those areas which are of im-
portance for financial stability (the pension system, social security, educa-
tion, health care, subsidies); it conducts about 100 performance audits per 
year; in the course of audits, not only does it determine irregularities but it 
also formulates recommendations, therefore it is not only an audit body, but 
also – an advisory one. The inspections focus on matters connected with 
the crossing of financial flows and the comparability of accounting systems, 
with emphasis on the instances of the lack of clarity and accountability and 
on the quality of management and control systems. This way some gaps have 
been disclosed, namely: gaps in accounting systems at all levels (the level 
of the federation, states and communes); the lack of informative value and 
the comparability of those systems; differences in the manner of estimat-
ing property value; the different definitions of debt; the incomplete con-
sideration of liabilities regarding future years; the non-recording of finan-
cial instruments; as well as differences in the period, scope and indicators 
of medium-term planning. The presentation of audit reports to the federal 
parliament, as well as to state and local parliaments, was an important im-
pulse to initiate a discussion on the reform of the accounting system.
The SAI of Austria tries to draw attention to its recommendations re-
garding clarity and accountability, the current financial situation and future 
financial stability. For these purposes, it uses discussions in parliaments, 
press conferences, interviews, presentations for stakeholders, comments 
41  In the case of Germany, the SAI’s mandate has been extended, a special audit team has 
been set up to deal with the audit of the stabilisation of the financial market and numerous 
audits have been carried out.
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provided in the course of its inspections, separate publications devoted to 
the assessment of the situation in individual sectors. This creates a public 
impact which eases the implementation of recommendations (more than 
80% of about 2,500 of those get executed per annum).
According to Article 121 of the Austrian Constitution, the SAI draws 
up final federal budget accounts, which it submits to the Parliament. This is 
based on materials from the Ministry of Finance, verified in the course of an 
audit and supplemented by an analysis of financial planning and the level 
of debt. The document presents the execution of the state budget, indicat-
ing the most important aberrations, including – among others – tenden-
cies regarding the budget amount, balance, budget deficit and debt, evolu-
tion of expenses, realising earlier obligations, execution of goals specified 
in the national stability programme, as well as medium- and long-term 
consequences of budget execution. This enables determining in what scope 
medium-term planning allows to maintain financial stability and whether 
the federal, national and local authorities fulfil obligations in this scope, 
as well as what changes occur in the areas of particular importance for 
the budget, such as pensions, social services, education, and health care.42
5.5. The common character of SAIs and the fact that they are not po-
litical bodies create natural conditions for their cooperation. This cooper-
ation consists mostly in exchanging information and developing recom-
mendations, especially within the International Organization of Supreme 
Audit Institutions (INTOSAI). What has been created this way is a col-
lection of technical standards that comprises the fundamental prerequi-
sites for the orderly functioning and professional conduct of SAIs.43 The 
basic document is “The Lima Declaration of Guidelines on Auditing Pre-
cepts” of 1977 (the Lima Declaration), which characterises, among others, 
the purposes, definitions and types of audits, relations between a given SAI 
and the parliament, the government and other state authorities, the scope 
of competences, the mode of drafting and presenting inspection reports 
(<http://www.issai.org /media/12901/issai_1_e.pdf>).
42  On the basis of information provided by the SAI of Austria.
43  At <http://www.issai.org/>, one will find the updated collection of professional standards 
and best practice guidelines for public sector auditors, endorsed by INTOSAI.
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The Lima Declaration postulates that the constitution of a given state 
shall specify:
• the establishment of a Supreme Audit Institution and the necessary 
degree of its independence, including adequate legal protection by 
a supreme court against any interference with the SAI’s independ-
ence and audit mandate;
• the independence of the head and members of the SAI, and in par-
ticular, procedures for removal from office;
• the relationship between the SAI and the parliament, including 
the guarantee of a very high degree of initiative and autonomy, 
even when the SAI acts as an agent of the parliament and performs 
audits acting on the parliament’s instructions;
• the SAI’s competence to report its findings annually and inde-
pendently to the parliament or any other competent public body; 
this report shall be published;
• the SAI’s basic audit powers.44
The postulates presented above refer to the supreme position of the con-
stitution in the hierarchy of legal acts. If the SAI is to be treated as one 
of important state institutions, then the general assumptions underlying 
its legal status should be contained in the constitution. And vice versa: 
the lack of such provisions, and, what is more, the lack of any constitution-
al regulation legitimise the question whether, in a given country, the SAI 
has the character of an important state institution.
It seems that all new constitutions, adopted during the last 20-30 
years, include provisions on SAIs. In the case of many older constitutions, 
such provisions were added, where necessary. In spite of this, in European 
44  On 22 December 2011, the 66th United Nations (UN) General Assembly adopted Reso-
lution A/66/209, “Promoting the efficiency, accountability, effectiveness and transparency of 
public administration by strengthening Supreme Audit Institutions”, in which it encourages 
Member States to comply with the rules set out in the Lima Declaration. The document rec-
ognises an important role of SAIs in promoting the efficiency, accountability, effectiveness and 
transparency of public administration and emphasises that SAIs may fulfil their tasks objec-
tively and effectively only when they remain independent from the unit subject to inspection 
and they are protected from external influences.
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countries, there are still no regulations concerning SAIs in the constitutions 
of Denmark, Iceland45, Macedonia, Sweden, Switzerland and the UK.46
Apart from that, a significant issue is to regulate, in the constitution, 
the most important matters regarding a Supreme Audit Institution. This 
requirement is met in various ways. For example, an analysis of the consti-
tutions of certain EU Member States indicates that:
• relations between the SAI and the parliament as well as the degree 
and guarantees of its independence are contained in the Constitu-
tions of: Austria, Greece, the Netherlands, Ireland, Poland, Portu-
gal; and partially – Belgium, Spain; and to some extent – France, 
Luxembourg, Germany and Italy;
• the issue of presenting audit reports is regulated in the Constitu-
tions of: Austria, Ireland, the Netherlands, Poland and Spain; and 
partially – Germany, Greece, Italy, Luxembourg and Portugal;
• essential audit authorisations are regulated by the Constitutions of: 
Austria, Belgium, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, 
the Netherlands, Poland, Portugal and Spain.47
6. Granting the government a vote of acceptance for the execution 
of the state budget
6.1. Depending on the general construction of the state system, in 
individual countries there are different forms of ex post examination and, 
sometimes, of the approval of the implementation of the state budget. 
Those mechanisms should be perceived as means of parliamentary control 
over the government: ex post scrutiny of the budget allows parliaments to 
45  The new draft Constitution of Iceland, drawn up in 2011, included an article on a SAI. 
See a proposal for a new constitution for the Republic of Iceland delivered to the Althing by 
the Constitutional Council <http://stjornarskrarfelagid.is/?page_id=2619>.
46  Although Great Britain formally has no Constitution, particularly important Acts are tra-
ditionally treated as components of the material Constitutional Law, which traditionally is 
viewed as more stable. The collection of Constitutional Laws, nevertheless, does not include the 
1866, 1921, and 1983 Acts which establish the position of Comptroller and Auditor General. 
47  See also J. Mazur: ‘Legal Status of the Supreme Audit Institution: Application of Interna-
tional Standards vs. National Traditions’ in Diaphaneia & Anexartesia Ston Elegkho Toy Demo-
sioy Khrematos. Timetikos tomos gia ta 170 khronia toy Elegktikoy Synedrioy, Athena – Komotene 
2004, pp. 559-582.
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hold the executive accountable for the use of public resources and pro-
mote improvements in the management of the resources. This also creates 
favourable conditions for the transparency of the government’s activity.
In a parliamentary system, the scope of auditing the execution of the state 
budget typically involves an examination of the public-sector accounts for 
reliability, accuracy, completeness and conformity with applicable rules/law as 
well as an assessment of the extent to which the budget was used for the pur-
poses indicated when the budget was adopted. Many parliaments strive for 
combining the auditing of accounts with the evaluation of the effectiveness 
and efficiency of public spending, i.e. whether it delivered value for money 
and achieved the intended objectives. Those auditing mechanisms should con-
tribute not only to the detection of irregularities in the execution of the state 
budget, but also to the improvement of the functioning of the state bodies in 
the future. Unlike other control arrangements which are oriented at selected 
(sometimes broad) areas of the government’s activity, the essence of the ex-
amination of the implementation of the state budget is – or at least could be 
– the comprehensive evaluation of the fiscal policy of the state.
6.2. In many countries, ex post budgetary scrutiny also involves approval 
of the implementation of the budget, through approval of the accounts and/
or the granting of discharge. The advantage of such a mechanism is that 
the assessment comes by force of law and therefore it is on a regular basis 
(once a year) and independently from the wish of a parliamentary majority.
The approval of the accounts and/or the granting of discharge may 
have different legal consequences. Putting it simply, we could assume that 
the positive outcome of the voting means that the parliament generally 
approves the execution of the state budget, it means it does not find any 
substantial irregularities. Under some state systems, failure to discharge 
involves the government’s resignation, but this must result from a clear 
legal provision.48 In case of no establishment of such effect, the failure to 
discharge may be examined only on a political or moral level.
48  Such a solution – the government’s obligation to hand in its resignation in the case of failing 
to obtain discharge – was introduced by the Polish Constitutional Act of 1992 on the mutual 
relations between the legislative and executive institutions of the Republic of Poland and on 
local self-government (valid till 16 October 1997).
122
IX World Congress of Constitutional Law (Oslo, 16‑20 June 2014) Contributions by Polish Scholars
6.3. The above solutions concerning the vote of acceptance for the execu-
tion of the state budget are included in the constitutions of many countries, 
e.g. Belgium49, Denmark50, Germany51, Italy52, Poland53 and Portugal54. In 
other countries the approval of the accounts is regulated in ordinary laws.
49  Article 174 of the Constitution of Belgium of 1831: “Each year, the House of Repre-
sentatives passes the law that settles the final accounts and approves the budget. However, 
the House of Representatives and the Senate fix, each for itself, their respective operating al-
lowances annually. All State receipts and expenditure must be included in the budget and in 
the accounts” (quoted from the English translation available at: <https://s3.amazonaws.com/
landesa_production/resource/2657/Belgium_Constitution_2012.pdf?AWSAccessKeyId=A-
KIAICR3ICC22CMP7DPA&Expires=1434992353&Signature=o9XdPjO3SJYYYydTPL-
Ca4UIigdc%3D>).
50  § 47 of the Constitution of Denmark of 1953: “(1) The Public Accounts shall be submit-
ted to the Folketing not later than six months after the expiration of the fiscal year. (2) The 
Folketing shall elect a number of auditors. Such auditors shall examine the annual Public Ac-
counts and ensure that all the revenues of the State have been duly entered therein, and that 
no expenditure has been defrayed unless provided for by the Finance Act or some other Ap-
propriation Act. The auditors shall be entitled to demand all necessary information, and shall 
have right of access to all necessary documents. Rules providing for the number of auditors 
and their duties shall be laid down by statute. (3) The Public Accounts, together with the Au-
ditors’ Report, shall be submitted to the Folketing for its decision” (quoted from the English 
translation available at: <http://www.wipo.int/wipolex/en/text.jsp?file_id=341212>). 
51  Article 114(1) of the Basic Law of Germany of 1949: “For the purpose of discharging the 
Federal Government, the Federal Minister of Finance shall submit annually to the Bundestag 
and to the Bundesrat an account of all revenues and expenditures as well as of assets and debts 
during the preceding fiscal year” (quoted from the English translation available at: <https://
www.btg-bestellservice.de/pdf/80201000.pdf>). 
52  Article 81(4) of the Constitution of Italy of 1947: “Each year the Houses shall pass a law 
approving the budget and the accounts submitted by the Government” (quoted from the Eng-
lish translation available at: <http://www.servat.unibe.ch/icl/it00000_.html>). 
53  Article 226 of the Constitution of Poland of 1997: “(1) The Council of Ministers, within 
the 5-month period following the end of the fiscal year, shall present to the Sejm a report on 
the implementation of the Budget together with information on the condition of the State 
debt. (2) Within 90 days following receipt of the report, the Sejm shall consider the report 
presented to it, and, after seeking the opinion of the Supreme Audit Office, shall pass a res-
olution on whether to grant or refuse to grant approval of the financial accounts submitted 
by the Council of Ministers” (quoted from the English translation available at: <http://www.
sejm.gov.pl/prawo/konst/angielski/kon1.htm>).
54  Article 107 of the Constitution of Portugal of 1976: “The Budget’s execution shall be scru-
tinised by the Audit Court and the Assembly of the Republic. Following receipt of an opinion 
issued by the Audit Court, the Assembly of the Republic shall consider the General State Ac-
counts, including the social security accounts, and shall put them to the vote” (quoted from 
the English translation available at: <http://app.parlamento.pt/site_antigo/ingles/cons_leg/
Constitution_VII_revisao_definitive.pdf>).
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IV. Reflections
The legal constructions presented above do not exhaust mechanisms 
that may serve the purpose of establishing a rational fiscal policy and set-
tling its execution. But even this partial presentation enables me to suggest 
a few theses which may be subject to discussion during the workshop:
• The current financial crisis may change opinions on the role 
of the state in the economy. Perhaps we should agree with the opin-
ion that the idea of the state as the “night guard” was negatively 
verified. It appears that the state should not only care for the legal 
order but it should also be a coordinator of activities in the eco-
nomic-social sphere. This does not mean substituting the market 
mechanism but supplementing it. Therefore, we need adequate le-
gal solutions, including constitutional ones;
• The financial crisis confirmed parliaments’ difficulties in taking on 
the role provided for them by constitutions; in the management 
of the crisis, the parliament’s role was largely confined to a post hoc 
scrutiniser rather than an active “real-time” participant. Particular-
ly strange were situations when the parliament was used simply 
to validate decisions already made, even when a swift decision by 
the parliament was possible;55 
• It appears that the financial crisis stimulates a process of adopting 
similar constitutional regulations in different countries;
• Although it seems that no constitution uses such a term, the key 
constitutional notion may be ‘accountability’. The most concise 
definition of accountability would be: “the obligation to explain 
and justify conduct”.56 In other words, accountability denotes a re-
lationship between a person entrusted with a particular task or cer-
tain powers or resources, on the one hand, and the ‘principal’ on 
55  J. Black ‘Managing the Financial Crisis – The Constitutional Dimension’ (2010) LSE Law, 
Society and Economy Working Papers 12/2010, 30 <http://ssrn.com/abstract=1619784> .
56  C. Pollitt: The Essential Public Manager (Open University Press/McGraw-Hill 2003), 89. 
See also M. Bovens: ‘Analysing and Assessing Accountability: A Conceptual Framework’ (2007) 
13(4) European Law Journal, 447-468; C. Harlow: Accountability in the European Union (OUP 
2002); M. Busuioc: ‘European Agencies: Law and Practices of Accountability’ (2009) 15(5) 
European Law Journal, 599-615.
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whose behalf the task is undertaken, on the other. A duty to be 
accountable can be discharged in different ways, but all accounta-
bility mechanisms operate according to the principles of “transpar-
ency”, “answerability” and “controllability”;57
• It seems that present constitutional changes may induce to broaden 
the scope of the provisions of constitutions, since new areas may re-
quire a bit more casuistic regulation (it is impossible – as in the case 
of classic constitutional areas – to refer to established rules because 
there are still no such rules – they are under development). 
Warsaw, 29 April 2014
57  Definition is at the website of “U4 Anti-Corruption Resource Centre at the Chr. Michels-
en Institute” <http://www.u4.no/glossary>.
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the separation versus the cooperation of 
powers in the contemporary democratic state
Abstract: In this paper, the authors will consider relationships between 
the two concepts: the separation and the cooperation of powers. At the be-
ginning of the article various approaches to the doctrine of the separation 
of powers will be presented. The authors will argue that the understanding 
of this term must undoubtedly be reinterpreted. This is not only because 
the system of state organs goes beyond the classical threefold division but also 
due to a number of interactions emerging between state authorities. The 
authors will express the conviction that the concept of cooperation includes 
many elements of ‘positive’ influences involving a wide scope of instruments 
which lead to the participation of one organ in the activity of others as well 
as to the inspiration of one another. These cooperative instruments consti-
tute an additional mechanism (apart from the checks and balances system) 
which enables to correct the mere separation. 
In this paper, the authors will consider relationships between the two 
concepts: the separation and the cooperation of powers.
The notion of ‘separation of powers’ (division of powers) is defined in 
various ways in the scholarship and disputes on how it should be under-
stood have continued. Among the definitions, M. J. C. Vile formulated 
a definition of the so-called ‘pure’ theory of the division of powers.3 It 
must be noted that in Vile’s monograph it is a notion owing to which it 
is possible to follow the genesis of the theory.4 This ‘pure theory’ means 
1 Prof. Piotr Mikuli, Department of Comparative Constitutional Law, Jagiellonian University 
in Kraków; <p.mikuli@uj.edu.pl>.
2 Dr Grzegorz Kuca, Adjunct Professor, Department of Comparative Constitutional Law, 
Jagiellonian University in Kraków; <g.kuca@uj.edu.pl>.
3  M.J.C. Vile, Constitutionalism and the Separation of Powers (2nd edn, Indianapolis 1998) 14.
4  P. Mikuli, Zasada podziału władz a ustrój brytyjski (Warszawa 2006) 9 ff.
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that, in order to keep political freedom, it is necessary to separate the state 
apparatus into the legislature, the executive and the judiciary, with each 
of these having a separate state function. At the same time, each of these 
branches of government must be restricted to the performance of its own 
function and it may not be authorised to interfere with the function of any 
other. This concept comprises the rule that no person may be a member 
of more than one branch of government. It is important to assign each 
group of state authorities mostly its own legal area of operation with only 
a limited possibility to interfere in the activity of the other groups.
Apart from the ‘pure’ theory of the separation of powers, there exists 
the theory of checks, which is also called the checks and balances system. It is 
rather a technical doctrine and it is used not only in the theories of the divi-
sion of powers but also in the mixed system theory and the balance system.5 
If we choose to adhere only to the ‘pure’ theory of the separation of powers 
and use the historical criterion, the combination of this ‘pure’ theory about 
the division with the system of checks will be regarded as an obvious distor-
tion. In general, it can be said that the checks system means partial separa-
tion of functions, which allows each state authority to have partial control 
over the other authorities by means of the assigned legal instruments.
As a result of the combination of the ‘pure’ theory of the division and 
the checks system, the academic literature sometimes mentions the ‘partial’ 
theory of division after Vile.6 In such an approach, there is no strict sepa-
ration of functions between the three branches of government, but there 
exists a set of rules and principles which protect against the concentration 
of powers in the hands of just one state authority.7 In this way, for example, 
in the United States this partial separation of functions is supplemented by 
a system of checks and balances.
In turn, the theory of mixed government (status mixtus) postulates 
the assurance of social and political balance to the state by mixing three 
forms of government – monarchy, aristocracy and democracy, where 
the state power is shared by the monarch, the nobility and the people, 
and the individual state authorities mutually participate in the fulfilment 
5  ibid. 10.
6  ibid. 38.
7  E. Barendt, ‘Separation of Powers and Constitutional Government’ (1995) Public Law 609.
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of their functions.8 The mixed government theory first appeared in an-
tiquity in the works of Polybius and Aristotle, among others. The mixed 
government system did not provide for each state authority to be limited 
to the performance of competences of one kind of power. In this theory, 
state authorities were supposed to represent class interests, and not sepa-
rate functions, such as legislation or execution.
By contrast, the theory of balanced constitution9 should be understood 
as a connection between the separation of powers and mixed government 
theories. In this system, in order to keep the social and political balance, 
the state power (especially the legislative function) is divided among 
the monarch, the nobility and the people, with the simultaneous, partial 
division of powers in the functional and organisational aspect together 
with a system of checks.10
The balance between the main social forces was the basis of the mixed 
government system and the balanced government system. Therefore, in 
both cases, the ‘social separation of powers’ was the most important. The 
two latter concepts for obvious reasons have a historical significance and 
cannot be related to the contemporary state; however, the social aspects 
of the separation of powers have significance in the description of the con-
temporary state mechanism. In this context, one may point to the polit-
ical division of influences between the ruling party and the opposition. 
This kind of division may, to some extent, compensate the rapprochement 
of legislative and executive organs, which is characteristic for the parlia-
mentary system of government. The ruling party, or a coalition, focuses 
on performing the legislative function by translating their political pro-
gramme into legal acts, while the opposition concentrates on performing 
the control function upon the government.11
Returning to the contemporary doctrine of the separation of powers, it 
must be remembered, however, that the system of checks also has its spec-
ificity and it can be understood in various ways. The separation of powers 
8  R.M. Małajny, Trzy teorie podzielonej władzy (Warszawa 2001) 13.
9  M.C.J. Vile (n. 3) 58ff.
10  R.M. Małajny (n. 8) 14-15.
11  This may be observed, for instance, in the United Kingdom, where the political division 
of influences within the state is strengthened by the system of two dominating parties. 
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doctrine began to diverge from its rigorous prototype as a result of in-
troducing elements of mutual connections between state organs. Follow-
ing the diversity of doctrines, the constitutional content of the principle 
of the separation of powers has been constructed in a variety of ways with 
the differences hinging on the specificity of the constitutional system.12
We are convinced that today it is absolutely necessary to introduce certain 
changes in the method of expressing and interpreting the idea of separation, 
due to the complexity of the contemporary system of various state authori-
ties. Their operations do not fall within the traditional three-plane structure 
and such a standpoint is widely recognised by constitutional scholars.13 We 
especially mean the creation of specific law-protection bodies which cannot 
be regarded as judicial institutions, as well as many administrative agencies 
not subordinated, at least directly, to the government. In particular, a pro-
liferation of the latter constitutes a characteristic feature of the contempo-
rary state. These subjects possess mixed competencies – legislative, distribu-
tive-concessional and quasi-judicial. Their existence is sometimes reconciled 
with the separation of powers formula by stating that not every state insti-
tution must be qualified in the framework of this constitutional principle. 
At the same time, we are of the opinion that the common element 
of the various concepts of the separation of powers is the review of the le-
gal spheres of state operation (i.e. the functions of the state apparatus) 
and the discussion of the allocation of these spheres to various organs 
of the state. In this context, one may maintain that the modern explanations 
of the separation of powers principle must be based on the directive which 
prohibits the concentration of powers into one pair of hands, together 
with the exclusion of the arbitrariness of public power.14 For B. Ackerman, 
12  P. Mikuli (n. 4) 49.
13  See, for instance, M. Tushnet, Advanced Introduction to Comparative Constitutional Law 
(Cheltenham-Northampton 2014) 94-113; Ch. Möllers, The Three Branches. A Comparative 
Model of Separation of Powers (Oxford 2013) 227-232.
14  See E. Carolan, The New Separation of Powers. A Theory of Modern State, especially ch. 5 
(Oxford 2009). This author is convinced that the traditional separation of powers is incoher-
ent and descriptively inadequate. At the same time, he argues that non-arbitrariness “organises 
society in such a way that the individual is normatively acknowledged, structurally advantaged 
and institutionally protected” (p. 205). In his concept of ‘electoral organs’ (i.e. democratically 
legitimised ones), the organs promote first of all social interests and are responsible for effective 
social actions, while individual interests should be protected mainly by the courts.
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for instance, the new dimension of the separation of powers should consist 
of constrained parliamentarism, where various institutions and control au-
thorities (together with constitutional courts) are perceived as the system 
of checks.15 In turn, N. Barber emphasises that the separation of pow-
ers in its modern incarnation is seen as a principle of institutional order-
ing, i.e. “demanding that its supporters consider the point of the state 
and the ways in which the constitution should be structured to achieve 
the state’s objectives”.16
We have already explained that the functional and organisational 
separation of state organs is currently limited by some relations between 
them. However, we have to remember that not all elements of relations 
between divided powers create a system of checks. The system of checks 
requires a partial distribution of functions within the separated branches 
of government so that every state organ can execute a partial control upon 
the remaining ones by means of proper legal instruments. The reciprocal 
restraining of state authorities aims at a relative balance within the state 
apparatus. Apart from checks, elements of ‘positive’ effects occur, which 
are referred to as cooperation elements that allow one state authority to 
influence the activities of another in an ‘inspiring’ (‘initiative-based’) or 
an ‘arranging’ (‘organisational’) manner.17 It must be noted that systemic 
checks comprise immanent features of counteraction (which allows distin-
guishing them from the above-mentioned elements of the cooperation).
One should consider to what extent the cooperative acts of state organs 
entrusted with various powers undermine the concept of their separation 
as such. In other words, the question arises as to whether there are any 
limits of such cooperation, after the encroachment of which talking about 
the separation would not have any sense. It should therefore be empha-
sised that the forms of cooperation between the branches of government 
can be treated as exceptions to the principle of the separation of powers, 
as a result of which they require detailed and unambiguous precision.18 
15  B. Ackerman, ‘The New Separation of Powers’ (2000) 113 Harvard Law Review 633-729.
16  N. Barber, ‘The Separation of Powers and the British Constitution’ (2012) 3 Legal Re-
search Paper Series 18.
17  G. Kuca, Zasada podziału władzy w Konstytucji RP z 1997 r. (Warszawa 2014) 114.
18  ibid. 115.
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This is certainly the reason why it is sometimes maintained in the literature 
that “the postulate of the cooperation was quite unknown in the doctrine 
for three centuries” and that “it does not have anything to do with the idea 
of the division of powers, which can be expressed only by three words: sep-
aration, check, counterbalancing”.19 We are of the opinion that the coop-
eration between the divided powers has several advantages to which some 
authors rightly refer:20
a) it reduces the side effects resulting from the separation of powers;
b) it prevents competition between the powers;
c) it ensures proper operation of the powers;
d) it excludes the possibility of imposing views and ensures participa-
tion in the decision-making process.21
In this context, it seemed entirely rational for the Polish Constitutional 
Tribunal to remark that cooperation between the authorities of the Repub-
lic of Poland implies the obligations of: “mutual respect for the constitu-
tional tasks and competences of state authorities, moreover – respect for 
the dignity of offices and their holders, mutual loyalty, acting in good faith, 
informing each other about initiatives, readiness for cooperation and ar-
rangements, compliance with them and the diligent fulfilment thereof”.22
The cooperation of powers should also be understood as reference to 
certain subjective attitudes of persons acting within particular state author-
ities.23 Yet, the idea of the cooperation of powers may not be understood 
19 A. Pułło, ‘Zasada podziału i równoważenia władz (Podstawowe dylematy debaty konsty-
tucyjnej)’(1998) III Gdańskie Studia Prawnicze 40 (the authors’ translation of the quotes).
20  G. Kuca (n. 17) 116 and the Polish literature quoted there.
21  Some authors in Poland even warn against the limitation or elimination of cooperation 
between the different branches of government, stating that its lack might pose a risk of par-
alysing the state machine (R.M. Małajny, ‘Idea rozdziału władzy państowej i jej interpretac-
je’(2009) 1 Przegląd Sejmowy 104) or undermining the parliamentary system (J. Szymanek, 
Arbitraż polityczny głowy państwa (Warszawa 2009) 96).
22  The decision of the Polish Constitutional Tribunal of 20 May 2009 (no. Kpt 2/08), the 
Official Gazette of the Republic of Poland – Monitor Polski 2009, no. 32, item 478 (the au-
thors’ translation of the quote).
23  P. Sarnecki, ‘Funkcje i struktura parlamentu według nowej Konstytucji’ (1997) 11-12 
Państwo i Prawo 24-35.
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as an absolute obligation to take actions aimed at ‘making approved deci-
sions’ or ‘reaching an agreement ’ by cooperating state authorities.24
As we have mentioned earlier, the cooperation is an exception to 
the principle of the separation of powers and requires an accurate specifi-
cation. The cooperation shapes relations between state authorities assigned 
to one branch of government as well as relations between state authorities 
belonging to different branches. The cooperation is also universal, as it 
pertains to the functional aspect of ‘powers’ (i.e. functions they imply) and 
the organisational aspect of the ‘powers’, i.e. state authorities that exercise 
the functions (including even those situated outside the division). In this 
context, it should be noted that in constitutional texts the cooperation 
occurs relatively rarely in the construction of the separation of powers as 
such, but it does constitute a wider formula. Therefore, constitution-mak-
ers seem to prefer expressing this notion in preambles to constitutions,25 
giving the cooperation a more general dimension, and not limiting it only 
to relations between the three classical, separated kinds of powers.26 
The mechanisms of the cooperation can be characterised in the follow-
ing way: a) they are of varied legal character (they can be considered both 
in the functional and structural aspects, and sometimes also in the person-
al sphere; b) they require the participation (at least indirect or implied) 
of at least two factors – ‘players’ (the action of one authority will not con-
stitute the cooperation but rather a functional element of the division); 
c) sometimes their limits (‘range’) are designated by places, that is where 
system checks “begin”.
They can be classified in the following ways:
1. ‘I FOR YOU’, i.e. cooperation as in helping another authority in 
some activities – this kind of cooperation involves mechanisms for 
inspiring action (initiative) with the least interference in the scope 
24  Z. Witkowski, ‘Dyrektywa “współdziałania władz” jako element ograniczający życie wspól-
noty państwowej w świetle Konstytucji RP z 2 kwietnia 1997 r.’ in J. Wawrzyniak, M. Laskow-
ska (eds) Instytucje prawa konstytucyjnego w dobie integracji europejskiej (Warszawa 2009) 143.
25  See, for instance, the preambles to: the Constitution of Poland of 1997, the Constitution 
of Spain of 1978, the Constitution of Hungary of 2011.
26  For instance, the Constitution of the Republic of Poland of 1997 also uses the term ‘co-
operation’ in Art. 25(3), defining relations between the State and the Church and other reli-
gious organisations. 
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of the substantive activity (the essence) of a given branch of govern-
ment. As an example, one can point to the rights of executive authori-
ties to file draft statutes to parliament, submitting various motions, for-
mulating appeals, etc.). In the context of this kind of cooperation, one 
can also add arranging (organisational) mechanisms – these are, for ex-
ample, the competences of parliament (and – sometimes – of the head 
of state or the judiciary) to elect judges to a constitutional court.
2. ‘I TOGETHER WITH YOU’, i.e. cooperation as an action of one state 
authority together with another state authority. This is a slightly more 
deeply intervening mechanism of participation, allowing for making 
such action dependent on the participation of another authority in ei-
ther an obligatory or optional manner. An example of the obligatory co-
operation is a motion of one authority to appoint an official by another 
state authority. For instance, in Poland, it will be a motion of the Pres-
ident of Poland to the Sejm to appoint the President of the National 
Bank of Poland. What constitutes an example of the optional influence 
is introducing amendments in the parliamentary legislative procedure 
by the government or by the head of state as the proposer of a legislative 
motion.
3. ‘I INSTEAD OF YOU’ – cooperation as an action on behalf of another 
authority. This implies the most considerable interference in the func-
tion of a given branch of government, but it does not have an inhibitory 
nature, so it cannot be treated as a part of the checks system. This may 
include the competences of parliaments to announce the state of war, 
the competences of executive authorities (usually the head of state) to 
issue statutory instruments, and when it comes to particular officials, it 
will be, for example, the replacement of the head of state by the presi-
dent of the parliament or a member/members of the government. This 
kind of cooperation may breach the very principle of the separation 
of powers, therefore its use requires particular care.
Sometimes, a proper institutional designation of the roles 
of all the participants of the cooperation is a necessary measure, including 
the designation of auxiliary roles in the case when the normal functioning 
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of the participants of these relations is disturbed.27 This is extremely im-
portant, especially in order to take action of considerable significance and 
where complex rules of cooperation are supposed to be applied, or when 
a precisely specified form of the cooperation is necessary – for instance in 
the ‘I instead of you’ model. 
Constitutional texts include an extended catalogue of the cooperation 
mechanisms which concern relations between the legislature and the ex-
ecutive, while in relations between these two branches of government and 
the judiciary those mechanisms are less common. Some of the cooperation 
mechanisms may also be derived from the nature of the two basic types of re-
lations between the legislature and the executive, which are, by convention, 
defined as the parliamentary system (the parliamentary cabinet system) and 
the presidential one. Nevertheless, in the latter, which consists in the limita-
tion of the reciprocal relations between all the branches of government, there 
are fewer elements of the cooperation. Some of the cooperation mechanisms 
can also be perceived as instruments of the so-called ‘rationalisation’ of par-
ticular systems while others are inherent elements of them. 
The catalogue of instruments and procedures of cooperation between 
the different branches of government in modern constitutions may be re-
constructed in the following ways:
1. In relations between the legislature and the executive:
a) calling presidential elections by the Parliament (see, for instance, 
Art.  85(7) of the Constitution of the Ukraine) or its Speaker28 
(Art. 128(2) of the Constitution of Poland of 1997);
b) electing the head of state by the Parliament as a reserved elec-
toral procedure (see, for instance, Amendment XIV of the US 
Constitution);
c) authorisations in statutes for executive authorities to issue regulations 
and orders of various kinds (see for instance: Art. 38 of the Consti-
tution of France; Art. 92 of the Constitution of Poland);
27  Z. Ziembiński, Problemy podstawowe prawoznawstwa (Warszawa 1980) 500.
28  In the Polish context, also referred to as ‘the Marshal of the Sejm’ in the English transla-
tion of the Constitution of the Republic of Poland (<http://www.sejm.gov.pl/prawo/konst/
angielski/kon1.htm>).
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d) temporary discharge of the duties of the President of the Republic 
by the Speaker of the Parliament (see for instance: §83 of the Con-
stitution of Estonia; Art.  89 of the Constitution of Lithuania; 
Art. 131 of the Constitution of Poland; Art. 132(1) of the Consti-
tution of Portugal; Art. 57 of the Basic Law of the Federal Republic 
of Germany; Art. 98(1) of the Constitution of Romania).
2. In relations between the legislature and the judiciary:
a) election of all or several judges to the Constitutional Court 
by the Parliament (see for instance: Art.  94(1) of the Basic Law 
of the German Federal Republic of 1949; Art. 135 of the Constitu-
tion of Italy of 1947);
b) election of all or several judges to the Tribunal of State by the Parlia-
ment (see, for instance, Art. 199(1) of the Constitution of Poland).
3. In relations between the executive and the legislature:
a) calling parliamentary elections by the head of state (see for ins-
tance: Art.  98(1) of the Constitution of Bulgaria; Art.  63(1)(f ) 
of the Constitution of the Czech Republic; Art. 62(b) of the Consti-
tution of Spain; Art. 107 of the Constitution of Slovenia);
b) summoning the first sitting of the chambers of the Parliament (see 
for instance: Art. 27(2) and Art. 39(1) of the Constitution of Aus-
tria of 1920; Art. 34(1) of the Constitution of the Czech Republic; 
Art. 109(2) of the Constitution of Poland);
c) summoning an extraordinary sitting of the chambers of the Parlia-
ment by the head of state (Art. 2(3) of the Constitution of the United 
States of America);
d) legislative initiative of the state’s executive authorities (Art. 84(III) 
of the Constitution of Brazil; Art.  41(2) of the Constitution 
of the Czech Republic; Art.  39 of the Constitution of France; 
Art. 118(1) of the Constitution of Poland);
e) the government’s power to introduce amendments to bills conside-
red by the Parliament (see, for instance, Art. 119(2) of the Consti-
tution of Poland);
135
Mikuli/Kuca, The Separation Versus the Cooperation of Powers in the Contemporary...
f ) the government’s power to classify certain bills as urgent (see, for 
instance, Art. 123 of the Constitution of Poland);
g) the right of the head of state to address the chambers of the Parliament 
(see for instance: Art. 98(1) of the Constitution of Bulgaria; Art. 18 
of the Constitution of France of 1958; Art. 87(2) of the Constitution 
of Italy; Art. 1323(1)(d) of the Constitution of Portugal; Art. 84(18) 
of the Constitution of Lithuania; Art.  144(3)(8) of the Constitu-
tion of Poland; Art. 88 of the Constitution of Romania; Art. 2(3) 
of the Constitution of the United States of America);
h) the power of the state’s executive authorities (presidents or govern-
ments) to issue statutory instruments i.e. regulations having the force 
of statute (see for instance: § 109 of the Constitution of Estonia; 
Art. 82(1) of the Constitution of Spain; Art. 234 of the Constitu-
tion of Poland; Art. 198 of the Constitution of Portugal).
4. In relations between the executive and the judiciary:
a) appointing judges by executive bodies at the request of appro-
priate bodies (Art. 102 of the Constitution of Finland) or at the re-
quest of judicial councils (see, for instance, Art. 179 of the Polish 
Constitution);
b) appointing the presidents of courts by the head of state (see for 
instance: Art. 62 (f ) of the Constitution of the Czech Republic; 
Art. 84(11) of the Constitution of Lithuania).
5. In relations between the judiciary and the legislature:
a) confirming the validity of parliamentary elections and challenging 
the validity of those elections by supreme courts or constitutional 
courts (see for instance: Art. 101 of the Constitution of Poland; 
Art. 66 of the Constitution of Bulgaria; Art. 76 of the Constitution 
of Slovakia); 
b) resolving disputes over competence between central constitutional 
state authorities by a constitutional court (Art. 138 of the Consti-
tution of Austria of 1920; Art. 189 of the Constitution of Poland).
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6. In relations between the judiciary and the executive:
a) confirming the validity of presidential elections by supreme courts 
(see, for instance, Art.  129(1) of the Constitution of Poland) or 
constitutional courts (see for instance: Art. 149(1)(6) of the Consti-
tution of Bulgaria; Art. 101(9) of the Constitution of Slovakia);
b) the power of judicial authorities to confirm the incapacity of the Pre-
sident of the Republic to perform his/her duties (see, for instance, 
Art. 131(1) of the Constitution of Poland);
c) settling disputes between central state authorities by the Constitu-
tional Court (see the examples above and Art. 126(1) of the Consti-
tution of Slovakia).
The contemporary cooperation, apart from the separation and 
the checks system, constitutes an important element used to achieve (or 
approach) – as Montesquieu wrote – the political freedom of citizens.29 
The cooperation, like the balance of powers, does not have to undermine 
the substance of the separation; on the contrary, the separation must be 
treated as a prerequisite of the appropriate cooperation and balance. One 
of the ratio legis of the cooperation is the need to secure the minimum 
of reciprocal links as the powers in their functional and structural sense 
constitute the emanation of the sovereign power of the people.30 Howev-
er, it should be remembered that cooperation which is too intensive may 
in practice turn the organisation of the state apparatus into the suprem-
acy of one state authority, and thus create the fusion of powers.31 This 
would contradict the fundamental principles of constitutionalism stated 
by the Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen of 1789, where 
we read that: “A society in which the observance of the law is not assured, 
nor the separation of powers defined, has no constitution at all”.
29  De l’Esprit des Lois (Amsterdam, Chatelain 1749). 
30  P. Sarnecki, ‘Ogólna charakterystyka państwowości w Konstytucji Rzeczypospolitej Pol-
skiej’ in P. Sarnecki (ed), Prawo konstytucyjne RP (Kraków 2002) 41.
31  This was observed in the Polish literature by R.M. Małajny (n. 8) 104.
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the threat of terrorism as a constitutional 
ground for the limitation of individual 
rights and freedoms in poland
(in view of the judgment of the Polish Constitutional Tribunal  
in the case K 44/07 – RENEGADE)
I
In the context of the threat of terrorism as a constitutional ground for 
the limitation of individual rights and freedoms in Poland, probably the most 
striking example of a judgment that addresses the issue is the one delivered 
by the Constitutional Tribunal of the Republic of Poland on 30 September 
2008 (case K 44/07). This judgment concerns Article 122a of the Aviation 
Act of 3 July 2002 – challenged by the First President of the Supreme Court 
– which allows shooting down a passenger aircraft in the event of a threat to 
state security, and where the air defence command has found that the air-
craft has been used for unlawful purposes, in particular as a means of carry-
ing out a terrorist attack (RENEGADE). The said regulation was questiona-
ble due to the principle of specificity of law (Article 2 of the Constitution3), 
as well as the principles of the protection of human dignity (Article 304) and 
1 Dr hab. Sławomir Patyra, Department of Constitutional Law, Maria Curie-Skłodowska 
University, Lublin. 
2 Dr Wojciech Mojski, Department of Constitutional Law, Maria Curie-Skłodowska Uni-
versity, Lublin.
3 “The Republic of Poland shall be a democratic state ruled by law and shall implement the 
principles of social justice” (this and the subsequent quotations from the Constitution of the 
Republic of Poland come from the English translation of the Constitution at: <http://www.
sejm.gov.pl/prawo/konst/angielski/kon1.htm>).
4 “The inherent and inalienable dignity of the person shall constitute a source of freedoms and 
rights of persons and citizens. It shall be inviolable. The respect and protection thereof shall 
be the obligation of public authorities”.
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human life (Article 385), both interpreted in conjunction with the principle 
of proportionality of limitations to rights and freedoms (Article 31(3)6).
The Tribunal ruled that the challenged regulation did not pass the test 
of constitutionality. 
First of all, it was underlined that there is a problem with a common 
legal definition of ‘terrorism’ and that this problem is inevitably linked 
with the principle of proportionality of limitations to rights and freedoms. 
The Tribunal noted that there is no universally accepted definition of ‘ter-
rorism’. The term is generally understood as “unjustified or unlawful use 
of force or violence against persons or property, aiming at intimidation or 
coercion of a government or civil society, and in further perspective – aim-
ing at the promotion of particular political, social or financial objectives”.7 
Despite those definition problems, the Tribunal concluded that the as-
sumption that terrorism and terrorist attacks in general aim at “the depri-
vation of life of the greatest number of people cannot be defended”8, for it 
may not be ruled out that for instance, in a given case, the target of such 
an attack may be property of considerable value, transport or industrial 
infrastructure, cultural treasures, or that the purpose of the attack may be 
to take hostages. The Tribunal also deemed that under the rule of the Pol-
ish Constitution it is impossible to categorise a threat of terrorism as one 
of the constitutional states of emergency. Furthermore, even imposing 
martial law or the state of emergency is not the constitutional basis for 
the limitation of rights laid down in Articles 30 and 38 of the Constitution.
5 “The Republic of Poland shall ensure the legal protection of the life of every human being”.
6  “Any limitation upon the exercise of constitutional freedoms and rights may be imposed only 
by statute, and only when necessary in a democratic state for the protection of its security or 
public order, or to protect the natural environment, health or public morals, or the freedoms and 
rights of other persons. Such limitations shall not violate the essence of freedoms and rights”. 
7  For more information on defining ‘terrorism’, see also the following: 
<http://www.sagepub.com/upm-data/51172_ch_1.pdf>; <http://www.azdema.gov/museum/fa-
mousbattles/pdf/Terrorism%20Definitions%20072809.pdf>; <http://www.transnationalterrorism.
eu/tekst/publications/WP3%20Del%204.pdf>; <https://www.law.upenn.edu/live/files/139-set-
ty33upajintll12011pdf>; <http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/downloads/Codebook.pdf>.
8  Quoted from the English translation of a summary of the judgment of the Constitu-
tional Tribunal (K 44/07), available at: <http://trybunal.gov.pl/fileadmin/content/omowie-
nia/K_44_07_GB.pdf>.
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Then the Tribunal pointed out that the constitutional right to legal 
protection of human life has a double meaning. The legal protection of life 
guaranteed by Article  38 should be interpreted firstly as a prohibition 
on taking lives. Secondly, this principle also creates a positive obligation 
of the state to ensure the protection of life. The Tribunal indicated, how-
ever, that the right to legal protection of life is not – in its nature – an 
absolute right and it may be limited if this is necessary to protect other 
constitutional rights, freedoms or values, but in every case this should also 
comply with the general principle of proportionality. Still, the necessity 
of limitation has to be interpreted, in this case, in strict compliance with 
the criterion of “an absolute necessity”, as it is understood in the jurispru-
dence of the European Court of Human Rights on the basis of Article 2 
of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms. Any limitation to the legal protection of human life must, in 
every case, be treated as the ultima ratio measure. The Tribunal also under-
lined that not every value enumerated in Article 31(3) of the Constitution 
may justify such limitation. In this context, the conclusion is that legal 
limitations to the protection of human life are never acceptable when im-
posed for the purpose of protecting interests which rank lower in the con-
stitutional hierarchy, for example property rights or public morals.
In the above-mentioned context, the Tribunal gave reasons for its judg-
ment, which may be summarised as follows. Firstly, the norm of Arti-
cle 122a of the Aviation Act was not as precise as it should be according to 
Article 2 of the Constitution. Secondly, the mechanism prescribed by Ar-
ticle 122a of the Aviation Act was not adequate for the intended goal. The 
Tribunal stated that because of the duration of flight over Polish territory, 
the response time of military forces might be in many cases too short to 
take and execute a correct decision. Thirdly, it was ruled that the challenged 
regulation was not absolutely necessary to protect other constitutional val-
ues and that the passengers of a plane flying in the airspace of a given 
state enjoy the right to have their lives protected by that state. According 
to the Constitution, there are no legal grounds for any differentiation as 
regards human life. The legal protection of life in its positive aspect means 
that both persons staying on the ground and those on board a plane must 
be equally protected. Fourthly, it was stressed that it would be possible 
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to accept the destruction of an aircraft which has been used to carry out 
a terrorist attack if there were only terrorists on board. This would be unac-
ceptable in the case of a plane hijacked with passengers and crew members 
aboard, because they are not aggressors but victims. Finally, in the opinion 
of the Tribunal, it was not justifiable under the Polish Constitution to 
create special legal theories of “suspension” or “modification” of civil rights 
guarantees in times of “the war on terrorism”. In the context of the rela-
tion between the challenged regulation and Article 30 of the Constitution, 
the Tribunal ruled that the application of the provision of the Aviation Act 
would result in the “depersonification” and “reification” of passengers and 
crew members.
II
The above judgment is strongly linked with the main determinants 
underlying the principle of a democratic state ruled by law (applicable 
in Poland since 1989). That is because this principle is naturally linked 
with a wide range of constitutionally protected human rights and free-
doms. In the Polish Constitution of 1997, there are three axiological prin-
ciples which constitute the fundamental basis of this protection, namely, 
the principle of human dignity, the principle of individual freedom and 
the principle of equality. Those principles are the cornerstones of the Pol-
ish constitutional system, and state authorities are obliged to respect them, 
also by refraining from interfering in the protected realm.
Among the aforementioned triad of principles, the most important 
one – in the context of the protection of all human rights in Poland – is 
the principle of human dignity expressed in Article 30 of the Constitution. 
This principle is especially related to the legal protection of human life. 
Respect for human life and the principle of the protection thereof are two 
of the most essential grounds for the implementation of the human dig-
nity principle.9 Both of those values – human dignity and the protection 
of human life – are permanent elements of the axiology of a democratic 
9  See: the Constitutional Tribunal’s judgment of 23 March 1999, case K 2/98. 
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state ruled by law, because actually the concept of such a state in general 
implies respect for human dignity and the protection of human life.
The problem is that there is no single commonly accepted legal defini-
tion of ‘human dignity’. There is no such definition in international law or in 
the Polish legal system. Nevertheless, the meaning of this term may be inter-
preted – though sometimes in a varied manner – with respect to European 
cultural heritage and philosophy. The classical definition of ‘human dignity’ 
suggests that the term means human subjectivity and autonomy in relation 
to the state and its authorities, as well as other members of society. The dig-
nity of the human being implies the possibility of shaping personality and 
controlling behaviour by means of responsibility and legal accountability. 
Despite the above-mentioned legal and philosophical problems with 
the definition of ‘human dignity’, it is possible to distinguish its sever-
al characteristic elements. First of all, there is no doubt that dignity is 
a transcendent, inherent and inalienable value of every individual by 
the mere virtue of the fact that s/he is human. Human dignity is not im-
parted by a decision of state authorities. Secondly, the consequence of this 
is that dignity is an absolute value and it may never be limited by any state 
(legislative, executive or judicial) authorities. Thirdly, ‘human dignity’ is 
a natural, original value, and must be situated outside of the positive legal 
system or even above it.10
Understanding ‘human dignity’ in that way determines human subjec-
tivity and a substantial role of every individual in society and in the state. It 
is an inalienable right and, in consequence, it is enjoyed by every individ-
ual throughout his/her life and it is not reliant on any situation. Because 
of that, the individual may not be reduced to the category of ‘a useful or 
pleasant commodity’. Nor can public authorities themselves create such 
legal or factual situations that are indeed situations undermining ‘human 
dignity’ or even depriving individuals of it altogether.
The principle of human dignity may also be analysed as a negative 
aspect of public authorities’ obligation. In this context, the problem for 
authorities is to protect the sphere of the activity of every individual, and 
10 The Constitutional Tribunal’s judgments: of 4 April 2001, case K 11/00; and of 5 March 
2003, case K 7/01.
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not to interfere therewith in a way which may be recognised as contrary to 
the real possibility of exercising individual autonomy. Any violation of hu-
man dignity means that the individual is simply the subject of interference 
by state authorities. Such a situation is not permitted in a democratic state 
ruled by law, because in a democratic state ruled by law, the principle 
of inherent and inalienable human dignity occupies the central position in 
the axiological system, both in the individual and social dimension. This 
principle is also the cornerstone of the global and European legal system 
of human rights protection as well as of the constitutions of most Europe-
an states.
III
As mentioned above, the principle of human dignity is expressed in 
Article 30 of the Polish Constitution of 1997, which is currently in force. 
According to its wording, the inherent and inalienable dignity of the per-
son shall constitute a source of freedoms as well as human and civil rights. 
Human dignity shall be inviolable, and respect for and protection of that 
dignity shall be the obligations of public authorities.
An analysis of the wording of Article 30 allows a few fundamental points 
to be made, regarding the construction of the provision and functions it 
can be assigned as a normative principle. First and foremost, the consti-
tutional law-making body has clearly determined the legal and natural 
character of human dignity, indicating that it constitutes an inherent and 
inalienable value. At the same time, human dignity is assigned a particular-
ly significant function of being a source of the individual’s rights and free-
doms, whereby it becomes an axiological foundation for the entire consti-
tutional order, at least as regards establishing the status of the person and 
the citizen.11 What is particularly important is that the principle of human 
dignity in view of Article 30 of the Constitution is a source of all rights 
and freedoms, including the ones that are neither directly mentioned nor 
11  cf. L. Garlicki, Komentarz do art. 30, op. cit. 1. See also the judgments of the Constitutional 
Tribunal: of 27 May 2002, case K 20/01; or of 12 December 2015, case K 32/04.
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specified in particular constitutional provisions.12 Being the axiological 
foundation of the constitutional order, it serves as a directive norm and 
thereby a ground for interpreting and establishing the meaning of other 
constitutional terms in chapter II of the Polish Constitution of 1997.
On the other hand, the wording of Article  30 of the Constitution 
expresses normatively formulated human rights, which the state and its 
institutions are obliged to respect and protect.13 Human dignity is inex-
tricably linked to subjectivity and autonomy, considered as the right to 
freely develop personal values, act accordingly and take responsibility for 
one’s compliance with generally accepted norms and rules of social life. 
It is also understood as the benchmark of the constitutional system and 
a constant point of reference for building a relation between the state and 
the individual. Moreover, the inviolable principle of human dignity sets 
the limits of the state’s interference in specific freedoms as well as human 
and civil rights. Under no circumstances may such interference lead, in 
consequence, to the violation of the ‘inviolable’ dignity of the individual, 
even only in subjective terms. According to the case law of the Constitu-
tional Tribunal, the actions of public authorities may not lead to legal or 
actual situations in which the individual is deprived of his/her dignity.14
The principle of human dignity is strictly related to the legal protection 
of human life. Respect for and the protection of the right to life constitute 
two of the essential conditions for the realisation of the principle of human 
dignity.15 Both of these values are the foundation of European civilisa-
tion and they constantly determine the concept of humanism, not only 
12  The Constitutional Tribunal also draws attention to this aspect of human dignity in its 
judgments: of 25 February 2002, case SK 29/01; and of 7 February 2006, case SK 45/04.
13  In this dimension, the concept of ‘human dignity’ in Article 30 of the Constitution of the 
Republic of Poland refers to the interpretation of human dignity on the basis of the German 
constitutional order, which emphasises the inviolability of human dignity (Article 1(1) of the 
Basic Law for the Federal Republic of Germany (of 23 May 1949), which reads as follows: 
“Die Würde des Menschen ist unantastbar” [“Human dignity shall be inviolable”; quoted from 
the English translation by Professor Christian Tomuschat et al., at: <https://www.btg-bestell-
service.de/pdf/80201000.pdf>] ).
14  Judgment of 4 April 2001, case K 11/00, supra n. 10.
15  cf. A. Preisner, ‘Prawo do ochrony życia i do zachowania naturalnej integralności psy-
chofizycznej człowieka’ in L. Wiśniewski, Wolności i prawa jednostki oraz ich gwarancje w prak-
tyce (Warszawa 2006) 134.
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as to its previous aspects but also in contemporary terms. The doctrine 
of Polish constitutional law and related case law classify the right to life 
as the fundamental right of the individual which conditions the posses-
sion and realisation of other rights and freedoms. According to Article 38 
of the Polish Constitution, the right to life is not only about a prohibition 
on taking lives, but it also encompasses a prohibition on establishing insti-
tutions in ordinary legislation which would allow the state to intentionally 
and purposely take lives.16 The creation of legal constructions with either 
a statutory or broad interpretation that would evaluate human life accord-
ing to, for instance, quantitative criteria or the chance of survival will be 
considered as an indication of the violation of the right to life.
The issue of the legal protection of human life has been raised repeated-
ly in the judicial practice of the Constitutional Tribunal with close relation 
to the principle of a democratic state ruled by law.17 However, unlike 
the principle of human dignity, the right to life is subject neither to abso-
lutisation nor to inviolability. As regards criteria for restricting the individ-
ual’s rights and freedoms in the Polish constitutional system, the case law 
of the Constitutional Tribunal provides premises that justify limitations 
to the right to life and allow deprivation of life to become legal in a few 
instances. The first criterion is strictly formal and requires establishing if 
an interest that is going to be legally violated constitutes a constitutional 
value. The second assessment criterion consists in determining if the legal-
isation of the violation is justified in view of other constitutional values. 
Finally, the last assessment criterion is about establishing if the legisla-
tor, having legalised the violation of a constitutional value, complied with 
the principle of proportionality.
The principle of proportionality regarding limitations to the exercise 
of the individual’s constitutional rights and freedoms is expressed in Arti-
cle 31(3) of the Polish Constitution of 1997. Applying a number of condi-
tions, the constitution-maker set limits for the state’s interference in the range 
of freedoms as well as human and civil rights. Any limitation may be imposed 
16 See P. Sarnecki, ‘Komentarz do art. 38’ in L. Garlicki et al., Konstytucja Rzeczypospolitej Pol-
skiej. Komentarz, tom III (Warszawa 2003) 6.
17 For instance, the judgments: of 28 May 1997, case K 26/96; of 23 March 1999, case K 2/98; 
and of 8 October 2002, case K 36/00.
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only by statute, and only when necessary in a democratic state for the protec-
tion of its security and public order, or to protect the natural environment, 
health or public morals, or the rights and freedoms of other persons. There 
is a particularly important element of the principle of proportionality to be 
found at the end of the aforementioned provision. Namely, such limitations 
may not violate the essence of rights and freedoms. A clear, functional link 
between the necessity to introduce limitations to established rights and free-
doms, on the one hand, and the realisation of constitutional values included 
in Article 31(3) of the Constitution, on the other, is an equally important 
component of the principle, also demonstrated in the case law of the Con-
stitutional Tribunal.18 Interference in the rights and freedoms of the indi-
vidual must be rationally and appropriately proportional to the objectives 
that justify such limitation. The method applied by the legislator to impose 
the limitation must also be evaluated. The definition of ‘necessary limita-
tions’ adopted in Article 31(3) of the Constitution explicitly states that in-
terference in rights and freedoms in every case must be the legislator’s ultima 
ratio measure. Therefore, restrictions of rights and freedoms are possible only 
if other methods, less burdensome from the individual’s point of view, do 
not guarantee the realisation of values and rights mentioned in Article 31(3) 
of the Constitution. The restrictions can be applied only to the extent that is 
indispensable for the protection of the said values and rights. 
Limitations to the individual’s rights and freedoms based on the prin-
ciple of proportionality do not apply to the principle of human dignity 
as a subjective right. Even the most important public interest may not 
be used to justify any limitation imposed by the state on human digni-
ty, regardless of the circumstances under which the state and its institu-
tions function. According to Article 233(1) of the Constitution of 1997, 
a statutory limitation to the rights and freedoms shall not include human 
dignity even in times of martial law and states of emergency.19 The case 
18 For instance, judgments: of 24 March 2003, case P 14/01; of 6 March 2007, case SK 54/06.
19 K. Eckhardt indicates that the freedoms and rights included in this provision may be re-
stricted in a state of emergency on the basis of Article 31(3) of the Constitution, see Stan nad-
zwyczajny jako instytucja polskiego prawa konstytucyjnego (Przemyśl – Rzeszów 2012) 212. Even 
if the opinion is apt as regards other freedoms and rights mentioned there, this rule surely can-
not be applied to human dignity due to its inviolability.
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law of the Constitutional Tribunal reiterates the position that human dig-
nity is the only right which is protected absolutely, i.e. it is not subject to 
the principle of proportionality.20
As far as the right to life is concerned, in the light of the principle 
of proportionality, the right may be restricted but only under special cir-
cumstances. These limitations must be based on premises verified in a par-
ticularly restrictive manner, especially as regards evaluating the necessity 
to introduce them. The interpretation of the admissibility of the state’s 
interference in the legal protection of human life must oscillate around 
the “absolute necessity” developed in the case law of the European Court 
of Human Rights. In the light of Article 2(2) of the Convention, depriva-
tion of life is admissible only if:
it results from the use of force which is no more than absolutely neces-
sary: (a) in defence of any person from unlawful violence; (b) in order 
to effect a lawful arrest or to prevent the escape of a person lawfully 
detained; (c) in action lawfully taken for the purpose of quelling a riot 
or insurrection.21
Any limitation to the right to life shall be considered separately and treated 
as the ultima ratio measure. If the right to life of a particular individual, or 
a group of people, is in conflict with the analogical rights of other people, 
a symmetry of values between a sacrificed and saved life will be a decisive 
factor in resolving each dilemma about the state’s possible interference in 
the individual’s right to life. 
ABSTRACT
The purpose of this paper is to analyse the question of the threat of ter-
rorism as a constitutional ground for the limitation of individual rights 
and freedoms in Poland. 
20 See, for instance, the judgment of 5 March 2003, case K 7/01.
21 The European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Free-
doms, signed in Rome on 4 November 1950, ratified by the Republic of Poland by the Act 
of 2 October 1992.
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The paper is divided into three parts. The first one concerns com-
ments on the judgment of the Polish Constitutional Tribunal of 30 Sep-
tember 2008 (case K 44/07), which is probably the most striking example 
of a judgment that addresses the issue. This judgment concerns the per-
missibility of shooting down a passenger aircraft in the event of a danger 
that it has been used for unlawful acts, and where state security is threat-
ened. In the second part, the paper mainly focuses on interpretations – 
both doctrinal and judicial – of Polish legal norms concerning this matter. 
In particular, the study involves an analysis of Polish constitutional prin-
ciples that impact those interpretations, i.e. the principle of a democratic 
state ruled by law (Article 2 of the Constitution of the Republic of Po-
land), the principles of the protection of human life (Article 38) and hu-
man dignity (Article 30) as well as the principle of proportionality of lim-
itations to rights and freedoms (Article 31(3)). Finally, in the third part 
of the paper, the authors are trying to draw some theoretical and practi-
cal conclusions about the analysed question of the threat of terrorism as 
a constitutional basis of the limitation of individual rights and freedoms 
in the Polish legal system.
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dynamic interpretation of the european 
convention on human rights
1.  Introduction – the paradox of identity and human rights 
adjudication
An important part of all European states’2 self-identification, and in 
many cases one of the factors legitimising the state, is adherence to fun-
damental rights. The guarantee of the state’s right to have the final say 
as to the application of norms which can infringe on fundamental rights 
is also invocated by many states as a crucial element of the preservation 
of their sovereignty in the context of European integration.3 However, 
for the Council of Europe Member States – parties to the European 
Convention on Human Rights (hereinafter: the Convention) – the role 
of the ultimate standard-setter for human rights protection is played 
by the European Court of Human Rights (hereinafter: the ECtHR or 
the Court). Its jurisprudence is often treated as a main point of reference 
1 MA (University of Warsaw), LLM (Central European University, Budapest); currently a Re-
search Assistant in the Department of Constitutional Law and European Research of the In-
stitute of Legal Studies (Polish Academy of Sciences); contact:  <ada.paprocka@inp.pan.pl>. 
The altered version of this article entitled ‘Budowanie tożsamości europejskiej w orzecznictwie 
Europejskiego Trybunału Praw Człowieka’ was published in Polish in Państwo i Prawo (2012), 
no. 12, pp. 20-37. The article takes into account case law up to September 2014.
2 For the sake of the present analysis, I understand the notion of ‘European states’ as the 
Member States of the Council of Europe, which all are also parties to the European Conven-
tion on Human Rights. 
3  See among others, W. Sadurski, ‘“Solange, Chapter 3”: Constitutional Courts in Central 
Europe – Democracy – European Union’ (2008) 14(1) European Law Journal 1-35 and the 
judgments of the Polish Constitutional Tribunal of 24 November 2010, case no. K 32/09 and 
16 November 2011, case no. SK 45/09.
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for national jurisdictions and an impulse for changes in human rights 
standards enforced by national authorities.4 Consequently, this interna-
tional body exerts an important influence on the core element of states’ 
constitutional identity.5
The aim of this paper is to show in what way the ECtHR approaches 
the outlined paradox. In the parts 2 and 3 of the paper, two doctrines 
adopted in the Court’s jurisprudence will be outlined: the doctrine 
of the margin of appreciation and the doctrine of the living instrument. 
It will be shown that, whereas the notion of ‘the margin of appreciation’ 
is used in order to accommodate social, cultural and legal differences be-
tween the Council of Europe Member States, the notion of ‘the living 
instrument’ (and the dynamic/evolutive interpretation of the Convention) 
is aimed at the unification of human rights protection standards even in 
the most sensitive areas of jurisprudence. Then, the examples of changes 
in the Court’s jurisprudence will be presented. The analysis will focus on 
cases concerning gender equality and the rights of sexual minorities. Final-
ly, it will be claimed that the application of the living instrument doctrine 
as a tool for unifying and advancing the standards of human rights pro-
tection under the Convention assumes the existence of a certain dynamic 
identity common to all European states. Such an identity, as a rule, does 
not contradict, but actually complements and influences the constitution-
al identities of national states.
4  For a recent example of a shift in national jurisprudence caused by the ECtHR’s jurisprudence, 
see the decision of the Constitutional Court of Hungary of 19 February 2013, no. 4/2013. 
On the cooperation between national courts and the ECtHR, see also: L. Garlicki, ‘Coop-
eration of courts: The role of supranational jurisdictions in Europe’ (2008) 6(3&4) Interna-
tional Journal of Constitutional Law 509-522; E. Bjorge, ‘National supreme courts and the 
development of ECHR rights’ (2001) 9(1) International Journal of Constitutional Law 5-31 
and (in the context of the Polish Constitutional Tribunal) A. Paprocka, ‘Wpływ orzecznictwa 
ETPCz na rozumienie konstytucyjnych praw i wolności w Polsce – kilka uwag na marginesie 
orzecznictwa Trybunału Konstytucyjnego’ in M. Zubik (ed), XV lat obowiązywania Konstytu-
cji z 1997 r. Księga jubileuszowa dedykowana Zdzisławowi Jaroszowi (Wydawnictwo Sejmowe 
2012) 76-89, and the literature cited therein.
5  On the notion of ‘constitutional identity’ in various contexts, see: M. Rosenfeld, The Identity 
of the Constitutional Subject: Selfhood, Citizenship, Culture, and Community (Routledge 2010).
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2. The doctrine of the margin of appreciation
The doctrine of the margin of appreciation was first fully formulated 
in the ECtHR’s jurisprudence in 19766 and has since then constituted one 
of the main tools with which the Court approaches the problem of social, 
cultural and legal differences between the States Parties to the Conven-
tion.7 It is based on the assumption that although the Convention adopts 
universal standards of protection, it leaves to the states certain latitude as to 
the way in which those standards are applied in particular social, cultural 
and legal circumstances. The scope of this latitude (the scope of the margin 
of appreciation) depends on the matter in question and is always deter-
mined in relation to the circumstances of a given case.8 The Court analyses 
in particular the nature of the right in question and of the duty incumbent 
on the state. The margin of appreciation is wider in the case of rights which 
are more diversely approached by different societies (such as the freedom 
of speech and its permissible limitations in cases involving the protection 
of morals or rights and freedoms of others, the right to respect for family 
life or issues of gender discrimination)9 and much narrower in the case 
6  Judgment of 7 December 1976, Handyside v. the United Kingdom, application no. 5493/72. 
For more on the origins of this concept, see: I. C. Kamiński, Ograniczenia swobody wypowie-
dzi dopuszczalne w Europejskiej Konwencji Praw Człowieka. Analiza krytyczna (Wolters Kluwer 
2010) 63-66.
7  It is worth noting that the doctrine of the margin of appreciation was widely discussed dur-
ing recent work on the reform of the Convention (for instance at the Brighton Conference). As 
a result, the Protocol no. 15 to the Convention (adopted in Strasbourg on 16 June 2013) intro-
duced the notion of ‘the margin of appreciation’ (so far used only in jurisprudence and scholarly 
literature) into the Preamble of the Convention. According to its Article 7, the Protocol will 
enter into force three months after being ratified by all the States Parties to the Convention.
8  L. Garlicki, ‘Wartości lokalne a orzecznictwo ponadnarodowe – “kulturowy margines oce-
ny” w orzecznictwie strasburskim’ (2008) 4 Europejski Przegląd Sądowy 5.
9  For numerous examples of the application of this doctrine, see e.g.: E. Brems, ‘The Margin 
of Appreciation Doctrine in the Case-Law of the European Court of Human Rights’ (1996) 56 
Heidelberg Journal of International Law 243-256; R. St. J. Macdonald, ‘The Margin of Appre-
ciation’ in R. St. J. Macdonald, F. Matscher, H. Petzold (eds), The European System for the Protec-
tion of Human Rights (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers 1993) 85-122; S.C. Prebensen, ‘The Margin 
of Appreciation and Articles 9, 10 and 11 of the Convention’(1998) 19(1) Human Rights Law 
Journal 13-17; P. Lambert, ‘Les restrictions à la liberté de la presse et la marge d’appréciation 
des Etats au sens de la jurisprudence de Strasbourg’ (1996) 26 Revue trimestrielle des droits de 
l’homme 143-156; as well as A. Wiśniewski, Koncepcja marginesu oceny w orzecznictwie Europej-
skiego Trybunału Praw Człowieka (Fundacja Rozwoju Uniwersytetu Gdańskiego 2008).
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of rights involving absolute prohibitions against certain actions (such as 
the prohibition of torture or slavery).10 It is also wider when the Court 
assesses the way in which the states fulfil their positive obligations in com-
parison with the situations in which the states are obliged not to interfere 
with individuals’ liberty.11 
In relation particularly to the rights as to which a variety of approach-
es exists in different societies, the ECtHR often justifies the application 
of the margin of appreciation doctrine by the lack of a common European 
approach to certain matters. For instance, with regard to cases involving 
restrictions of free speech, the Court emphasised that:
it is not possible to find in the legal and social orders of the Contract-
ing States a uniform European conception of morals. The view taken 
of the requirements of morals varies from time to time and from place 
to place, especially in our era, characterised as it is by a far-reaching 
evolution of opinions on the subject.12
It also pointed out that:
it is not possible to discern throughout Europe a uniform conception 
of the significance of religion in society (…); even within a single coun-
try such conceptions may vary. For that reason it is not possible to ar-
rive at a comprehensive definition of what constitutes a permissible in-
terference with the exercise of the right to freedom of expression where 
such expression is directed against the religious feelings of others.13
The Court then decided that national authorities are in principle better 
placed to determine whether given interference with the freedom of speech 
10  P. Mahoney, ‘Marvellous Richness of Diversity or Invidious Cultural Relativism?’(1998) 
19(1) Human Rights Law Review 5. 
11  P. Mahoney, ‘Marvellous Richness…’, p. 5.
12  Judgment of 24 May 1988, Müller and Others v. Switzerland, application no. 10737/84, 
para 35.
13  Judgment of 20  September 1994, Otto-Preminger-Institut v. Austria, application 
no. 13470/87, para 50.
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is justified by the necessity to protect public morals14 or religious sensitiv-
ities of certain groups of population.15 However, the further the consen-
sus of the European States16 develops on the understanding of the scope 
of a given right and its possible limitations, the narrower the margin of ap-
preciation becomes. Nonetheless, as long as the national authorities’ ac-
tions stay within the said scope, the Court would not consider them as 
violating the Convention.
The doctrine of the margin of appreciation is considered a useful tool 
for the Court to accommodate differences between the Council of Eu-
rope Member States, eliminate tensions between national and suprana-
tional jurisdictions, and assure needed flexibility to the Court’s jurispru-
dence.17 It is, however, also widely criticised for the same features. It is 
claimed that the application of this doctrine erodes the universal character 
of human rights protection,18 undermines the certainty of the ECtHR’s 
jurisprudence19 and allows the Court to avoid taking a stand on sensitive 
issues.20 It may be claimed that this criticism arises partly due to the way 
in which the doctrine of the margin of appreciation is applied in practice. 
Its convincing application should be based on identifying differences be-
14  In Müller and Others v. Switzerland, cited above.
15  In Otto-Preminger-Institut v. Austria, cited above. See also: the judgment of 13 September 
2005, İ.A. v. Turkey, application no. 42571/98, para 25. Compare: the judgment of 26 April 
1979, Sunday Times v. the United Kingdom, application no. 6538/74 para 59, where the Court 
stated that the “authority and impartiality of the judiciary” is a far more objective notion with 
regard to the application of which more extensive European supervision corresponds to a less 
discretionary power of appreciation by the state. 
16  For more on the notion of ‘European Consensus’, see section 3 of this paper. 
17  E. Brems, ‘The Margin of Appreciation…’, pp. 312-313; R. St. J. Macdonald, ‘The Mar-
gin…’, p. 122.
18  E. Benvenisti, ‘Margin of Appreciation, Consensus and Universal Standards’ (1999) 31 New 
York University Journal of International Law and Politics 844. In this text, the author makes 
also an interesting argument to the point that the application of the margin of appreciation 
doctrine in cases in which the conflict between a majority and minorities is highly inappropri-
ate as it leads to failure to protect minority rights (p. 847). See also G. Letsas, A Theory of Inter-
pretation of the European Convention on Human Rights (Oxford University Press 2009) 120ff.
19  O. Bakircioglu, ‘The Application of the Margin of Appreciation Doctrine in Freedom of 
Expression and Public Morality Cases’ (2007) 8(7) German Law Journal 731-732.
20  B. Pastre-Belda, ‘La Cour européenne des droits de l’homme – Entre promotion de la sub-
sidiarité et protection effective des droits’ (2013) 94 Revue trimestrielle des droits de l’homme 
270-271.
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tween the states, assessing their significance and deciding whether they are 
sufficiently important to justify the conclusion that there is no common 
standard of human rights protection in a given matter. However, the cur-
rent case law of the ECtHR does not always provide sufficient clarity on 
the way in which the Court decides on the importance of differences be-
tween the states in various fields.21 
3. The living instrument doctrine
The living instrument doctrine was first introduced by the ECtHR 
in 1978, in Tyrer v. the United Kingdom.22 Deciding on whether the cor-
poral punishment of juveniles constitutes inhuman treatment or punish-
ment prohibited by Article 3 of the Convention, the Court stated that: 
“the Convention is a living instrument which (…) must be interpreted 
in the light of present-day conditions”.23 It then noted that in the case 
before it, the Court could not “but be influenced by the developments and 
commonly accepted standards in the penal policy of the member States 
of the Council of Europe”.24 
It then established the principle of evolutive (or dynamic)25 interpre-
tation of the Convention and indicated the main source of inspiration 
for establishing that such an interpretation is appropriate in a given case 
– the development of common standards between the States Parties to 
the Convention. Already at this stage of the development of its jurispru-
dence, the ECtHR indicated that the living instrument doctrine is aimed 
at the unification of standards even when it is contrary to local traditions 
and beliefs as to the appropriate application of the Convention.26
In its later jurisprudence, the Court indicated that the principle of evolu-
tive interpretation is legitimised by the provisions of the Vienna Convention 
on the Law of Treaties, which provides that a treaty should be interpreted 
21  For more, see: A. Wiśniewski, Koncepcja marginesu oceny…, pp. 413-433.
22  Judgment of 25 April 1978, Tyrer v. the United Kingdom, application no. 5856/72. 
23  Tyrer v. the United Kingdom, cited above, para 31.
24  ibid.
25  When referring to the European Convention on Human Rights, those notions are used 
interchangeably. 
26  See especially Tyrer v. the United Kingdom, cited above, para 38.
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in accordance with the ordinary meaning given to the terms of the treaty in 
their context and in the light of its object and purpose, and which indicates 
that when interpreting the treaty, one should also take into account any 
subsequent practice in the application of the treaty and any relevant inter-
national norms applicable between its parties.27 The Court also emphasised 
that the evolutive interpretation of the Convention is necessary to ensure 
that the protection guaranteed therein is practical and effective.28 
The discussed doctrine applies not only to the substantive provisions 
of the Convention (declaring particular rights and freedoms) but also to 
those provisions which govern the operation of the Convention’s enforce-
ment machinery (such as Articles 25 and 46).29
The doctrine of the living instrument can be used in two types of sit-
uations.30 First of all, the need to interpret the Convention in the light 
of present-day conditions arises when, due to institutional or technical 
changes, a new (not envisaged at the time when the Convention was adopt-
ed) situation occurs and the Court is faced with the need to assess whether 
particular provisions of the Convention are applicable to this situation and 
27  Article 31(1) and Article 31(3) of the Vienna Convention of 23 May 1969 on the Law of 
Treaties. On the application of the Vienna Convention by the ECtHR, see e.g. L. Wildhaber, 
‘The European Convention on Human Rights and International Law’ (2007) 56 Internation-
al and Comparative Law Quarterly 217-232.
28  See e.g. the judgment of 28 May 2002, Stafford v. the United Kingdom, application no. 46295/99, 
para 68. For more on the “practical and effective” doctrine, see: A. Mowbray, ‘The Creativity of 
the European Court of Human Rights’ (2005) 5(1) Human Rights Law Review 72-78.
29  Judgment of 23 March 1995, Loizidou v. Turkey (preliminary objections), application 
no. 15318/89, para 71. See also the judgment of 4 February 2005, Mamatkulov and Askarov 
v. Turkey, applications nos. 46827/99 and 46951/99, para 121 – in which the Court applied 
the doctrine of the living instrument to the binding force of interim measures issued under 
Rule 39 of the Rules of Court. However, the cases of its application to determine the scope 
of and possible limitations to rights are much more frequent (for numerous examples, see: 
A. Mowbray, ‘The Creativity…’, pp. 60-72). 
30  R. Bernhardt, ‘Evolutive Treaty Interpretation, Especially of the European Convention on 
Human Rights’, (1999) 42 German Yearbook of International Law 20.
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with what effect.31 Secondly, the doctrine of the living instrument is used 
when the ECtHR is confronted with the type of situations which occurred 
also at the time of the adoption of the Convention or even were assessed 
in the Court’s previous judgments, but the Court finds it appropriate to 
revise its previous opinion because of the social, cultural or legal changes 
that have taken place since then.32 In further parts of this paper, the latter 
type of situations will be analysed, as those situations are of crucial impor-
tance for the development of jurisprudence and the unification of stand-
ards binding on the states. 
The application of the living instrument doctrine, resulting in the change 
of approach towards a certain problem, requires establishing that a signif-
icant development has occurred as to its social, cultural or legal context. 
This raises the question of methods that should be applied by the ECtHR 
to decide when to resort to the evolutive interpretation of the Convention. 
Although the Court incidentally mentions social and cultural changes 
which took place in the approach to certain social issues, such as mar-
riage or homosexuality,33 it does not, as a rule, refer to social or scientific 
studies,34 but focuses mainly on a comparative analysis of the legislation 
31  For instance, the creation of the European Union and the institutions thereof necessitated 
the change in the Court’s approach towards the definition of bodies of power falling within 
the scope of the Convention (see the judgment of 18 February 1999, Matthews v. the United 
Kingdom, application no. 24833/94, para 39). An analogous situation can take place when 
new technical means are employed to enjoy or limit the rights guaranteed by the Convention 
(see e.g. the judgment of 28 March 1990, Groppera Radio AG and Others v. Switzerland, ap-
plication no. 10890/84, para 60).
32  For instance, the shift of social attitudes towards the family and the respect for private life, 
followed by the relevant changes in domestic legislations, can persuade the Court to revise its 
jurisprudence on the content and possible limitations of the rights associated with private and 
family life. (see jurisprudence analysed in the next section of this paper). Similarly, a change in 
the approach of the states and international bodies to the problem of conscientious objectors 
resulted in deciding – contrary to the previous opinion of the European Commission on Hu-
man Rights – that the refusal to serve in the army falls within the scope of Article 9 of the Con-
vention (judgment of 7 July 2011, Bayatyan v. Armenia, application no. 23459/03, para 41).
33  See e.g. the judgment of 24 June 2010, Schalk and Kopf v. Austria, application no. 30141/04, 
paras 52 and 93.
34  For an exception to this rule, see: the judgment of 11 July 2002, Goodwin v. the United 
Kingdom, application no. 28957/95, para 81.
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of the Council of Europe Member States and international law.35 The 
Court analyses changes that take place in the legal systems of the European 
states and developments in international law. It refers to both the adoption 
of international documents36 and the development of the jurisprudence 
of other international bodies.37
The analysis of the relevant legal developments is aimed at proving 
that in a certain domain there has emerged a European consensus38 as to 
the required standard of protection. Such a consensus constitutes a basis 
for the Court to declare that the matter can no longer be left to the ap-
preciation of the Contracting States, but becomes part of the standard 
required by the Convention. Contrary to the literal reading, in order to 
claim that the consensus has indeed emerged, the Court does not require 
unanimity between the states. In some cases, it is satisfied with stating that 
a majority of the European states have adopted certain solutions;39 in oth-
ers, it does not even require a simple majority of the states, but notes that 
the crucial element of establishing that the consensus emerges is a visible 
tendency towards new solutions.40 
Although the comparative method and the principle of evolutive in-
terpretation could theoretically lead to both the heightening of the stand-
ard of human rights protection or the lowering thereof (in the case 
35  For more on the usage of comparative law by the ECtHR, see: Ch. J. Rozakis, ‘The Euro-
pean Judge as Comparatist’ (2005-2006) 80 Tulane Law Review 257-279.
36  See e.g. the judgment of 13 June 1979, Marckx v. Belgium, application no. 6833/74, para 41.
37  See e.g. Mamatkulov and Askarov v. Turkey, cited above, paras 40-53, and Bayatyan v. Ar-
menia, cited above, para 105.
38  For more on this notion, see: K. Dzehtsiarou, ‘European Consensus and the Evolutive 
Interpretation of the European Convention on Human Rights’ (2011) 12(10) German Law 
Journal 1730-1745.
39  E.g. the judgments of 9 January 2003, L. and V. v. Austria, applications nos. 39392/98 and 
39829/98, para 47 and of 7 October 2010, Konstantin Markin v. Russia (Chamber), applica-
tion no. 30078/09, para 49. Compare, however, the judgment of 16 December 2010, A,B and 
C v. Ireland, application no. 25579/05, paras 235-237, where the ECtHR stated that in spite 
of the adoption of certain solutions in a vast majority of states, they still enjoy a wide margin 
of appreciation. In this case, however, the Court justified this position by the exceptional sen-
sitivity of a matter decided – the permissibility of abortion based on medical considerations. 
40  E.g. the judgment of 11 July 2002, Goodwin v. the United Kingdom, application no. 28957/95, 
para 84. This leads some authors to claim that the idea of European consensus is in fact the one 
of a hypothetical consensus used more as a tool to achieve evolution towards ‘the moral truth’ 
than the actual commonly accepted standard (G. Letsas, A Theory…, p. 79).
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of the introduction of more restrictive regulations in the Contracting States 
or in international law), the Court clearly links the living instrument doc-
trine to a tendency to advance human rights protection. In Demir and 
Baykara v. Turkey, the Court noted that: 
it is appropriate to remember that the Convention is a living instrument 
which must be interpreted in the light of present-day conditions, and 
in accordance with developments in international law, so as to reflect 
the increasingly high standard being required in the area of the protection 
of human rights, thus necessitating greater firmness in assessing breaches 
of the fundamental values of democratic societies.41 [emphasis added]
This view corresponds with one of the goals of the Convention, expressed 
in its Preamble, namely “the maintenance and further realisation of hu-
man rights and fundamental freedoms”. 
Moreover, as indicated above, the wording of cases employing the doc-
trine of the living instrument indicates that once the Court decides that 
certain matter became the subject of European consensus, it removes this 
matter from the scope of a state’s margin of appreciation. It consequently 
heightens the minimal standard of protection binding on the state.
4. Examples of the application of the living instrument doctrine
The way in which the living instrument doctrine is applied in order 
to unify human rights standards in the areas in which initially there were 
significant differences between the States Parties to the Convention is well 
illustrated by the development of the jurisprudence concerning gender dis-
crimination and the rights of sexual minorities in the context of the pro-
tection of private and family life. Those areas are also a good example 
41  Judgment of 12 November 2008, Demir and Baykara v. Turkey, application no. 34503/97, 
para 146. For more on this subject, see: H. Senden, Interpretation of Fundamental Rights in 
a Multilevel Legal System. An analysis of the European Court of Human Rights and the Court of 
Justice of the European Union, (Intersentia, Cambridge 2011) 269-270, as well as K. Dzehtsia-
rou and C. O’Mahony, ‘Evolutive Interpretation of Rights Provisions: A Comparison of the 
European Court of Human Rights and the U.S. Supreme Court’ (2013) 44 Columbia Hu-
man Rights Law Review 339-340.
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of socially sensitive issues in which the Court initially granted the states 
a considerably wide margin of appreciation, but then gradually decided 
that the states can no longer rely on social or cultural differences in order 
to justify discriminatory treatment of particular groups of population.42 
4.1. Legal status of transsexuals
The evolution of the Court’s approach towards socially sensitive issues 
is well illustrated by the series of cases connected to the issue of transsex-
uality, namely the right of post-operative transsexuals to obtain legal rec-
ognition of their gender reassignment and – consequently – the possibility 
to enjoy certain rights as a person of their acquired gender (for instance: 
the right to marry).43
In early cases – such as Rees v. the United Kingdom44 and Cossey v. 
the United Kingdom45 – the Court held that the Convention did not require 
the states to fully recognise gender reassignment and to allow post-opera-
tive transsexuals to marry the person of the same sex as the one indicated 
in their birth certificate. However, already in the Rees judgment, the Court 
noted that it was “conscious of the seriousness of the problems affecting 
these persons and the distress they suffer”46 and emphasised the princi-
ple according to “which the Convention has always to be interpreted and 
applied in the light of current circumstances”.47 It therefore noted that 
“the need for appropriate legal measures should (…) be kept under re-
view having regard particularly to scientific and societal developments”.48 
42  It is worth noting that from the very early stage of the development of the living instrument 
doctrine, it was applied in cases concerning family status and discrimination (see e.g. Marckx 
v. Belgium, cited above, and the judgment of 22 October 1981, Dudgeon v. the United King-
dom, application no. 7525/76). For more on the advancement of the ECtHR’s jurisprudence 
related to discrimination, see: C. Danisi, ‘How far can the European Court of Human Rights 
go in the fight against discrimination? Defining new standards in its nondiscrimination juris-
prudence’ (2011) 9(3-4) International Journal of Constitutional Law 793-807.
43  For more on the problem of transsexuality in the jurisprudence of the ECtHR, see: K. Osajda, 
‘Orzecznictwo ETPCz dotyczące transseksualizmu’ (2009) 5 Europejski Przegląd Sądowy 35-41.
44  Judgment of 17 October 1986, Rees v. the United Kingdom, application no. 9532/81.
45  Judgment of 27 September 1990, Cossey v. the United Kingdom, application no. 10843/84.
46  Rees v. the United Kingdom, cited above, para 47.
47  ibid.
48  ibid.
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In Cossey, decided 4 years later, the Court examined whether there were 
reasons to change its approach to the issue. It acknowledged some legal 
changes, seeking to encourage the harmonisation of laws and practices in 
the field of gender-reassignment recognition, though it stated that there 
was still little common ground between the Contracting States in this area 
and therefore this still remained the realm in which the states enjoyed 
a wide margin of appreciation.49 The Court indicated that the conclusion 
reached in Rees still remained “in line with present-day conditions”.50 Sim-
ilar reasoning was adopted in other cases decided in the 1990s.51 How-
ever, the Court repeatedly indicated successive developments of medical 
knowledge and social acceptance for transsexuals. In Sheffield and Hor-
sham, it was stressed that although the ECtHR did not state that the vi-
olation of the Convention had occurred, the Court was dissatisfied with 
the lack of any legislative changes concerning the legal status of transsexu-
als in the United Kingdom. The Court indicated that the States Parties to 
the Convention should consider the necessity of the introduction of such 
changes.52 
The approach of the ECtHR changed in the judgment of the Grand 
Chamber in Goodwin v. the United Kingdom.53 The Court acknowledged 
both the development of the scientific knowledge on transsexualism and 
changes in legal regulations concerning this problem in the States Parties 
to the Convention. It noted that there still was no consensus between 
the states as to the legal recognition of gender reassignment. However, it 
declared that it attached 
less importance to the lack of evidence of a common European ap-
proach to the resolution of the legal and practical problems posed, than 
to the clear and uncontested evidence of a continuing international 
trend in favour not only of increased social acceptance of transsexuals 
49  Cossey v. the United Kingdom, cited above, para 40. 
50  ibid.
51  Judgment of 22 April 1997, X, Y and Z v. the United Kingdom, application no. 21830/93, 
and the judgment of 30 July 1998, Sheffield and Horsham v. the United Kingdom, applications 
nos. 22985/93 and 23390/94. 
52  Sheffield and Horsham v. the United Kingdom, cited above, para 60.
53  Goodwin v. the United Kingdom, cited above.
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but of legal recognition of the new sexual identity of post-operative 
transsexuals. 54
The Court linked the right of every person to establish details of their iden-
tity as individual human beings to the values underlining the Convention 
(such as respect for human identity and human freedom) and stated that:
In the twenty first century the right of transsexuals to personal devel-
opment and to physical and moral security in the full sense enjoyed 
by others in society cannot be regarded as a matter of controversy re-
quiring the lapse of time to cast clearer light on the issues involved. In 
short, the unsatisfactory situation in which post-operative transsexuals 
live in an intermediate zone as not quite one gender or the other is no 
longer sustainable.55
It then directly overruled its previous jurisprudence and stated that the mat-
ter did no longer fall within a Contracting State’s margin of appreciation.56 
Consequently, the state’s failure to recognise the status of post-operative 
transsexuals was held to violate the applicant’s right to respect for private 
life (Article 8 of the Convention).
The Court considered also the right of transsexual persons to marry (Ar-
ticle 12 of the Convention). It noted that, since the adoption of the Con-
vention, major changes had occurred in both the social understanding 
of the institution of marriage as well as the medical and scientific under-
standing of transsexuality. It established that, in the light of those develop-
ments, it was legitimate to claim that the refusal to grant the right to marry 
a person of an opposite sex (as to the one acquired as a result of gender 
reassignment) infringed the very essence of a person’s right to marry.57 The 
Court therefore stated that although the Contracting States could decide 
to introduce particular conditions under which a person claiming legal 
recognition as a transsexual would establish that gender reassignment had 
54  Goodwin v. the United Kingdom, cited above, para 85. 
55  ibid. 90.
56  ibid.  93.
57  ibid.  100-101. 
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been properly effected or could sort out formalities applicable to future 
marriages, it was no longer within the state’s margin of appreciation to bar 
the transsexual from enjoying the right to marry under any circumstances.58
4.2. Gender equality 
The other strand of jurisprudence in which social changes influenced 
the standard of protection enforced by the ECtHR is related to gender 
equality. The Court analysed a number of cases concerning benefits granted 
to parents who decided to take a leave in order to take care of their infant. In 
many states, legal regulations provided that such benefits were available only 
to women, not to men who wished to exercise their right to parental leave. 
In Petrovic v. Austria,59 the ECtHR assessed a regulation which grant-
ed the right to parental leave only to women. The applicant – a father 
of a child born in the late 1980s – claimed that the refusal to grant parental 
leave allowances to men violated Article 14 (the prohibition of discrimi-
nation) read in conjunction with Article 8 of the Convention (the right 
to respect for family life). The Court however stated that although the ad-
vancement of the equality of the sexes is a major goal in the Member States 
of the Council of Europe and very weighty reasons would be needed to 
justify the difference in treatment, “the Contracting States enjoy a certain 
margin of appreciation in assessing whether and to what extent differences 
in otherwise similar situations justify a different treatment in law”.60 It un-
derlined that, at the end of the 1980s, there was no consensus as to wheth-
er parental leave allowances should be paid also to fathers and that the idea 
that the states should grant financial assistance to whichever parent decid-
ed to stay at home to look after the children was a relatively recent one.61 
58  Goodwin v. the United Kingdom, cited above, para 103. For more on this case and its back-
ground, see e.g. A. Campbell and H. Lardy, ‘Transsexuals – The ECHR in Transition?’ (2003) 
53(3) Northern Ireland Legal Quarterly 209-252, and J. N. Erdman, ‘The Deficiency of Con-
sensus in Human Rights Protection: A Case Study of Goodwin v. United Kingdom and I. v. 
United Kingdom’ (2003) 2(2) Journal of Law and Equality 318-347.
59  Judgment of 28 February 1998, Petrovic v. Austria, application no. 20458/92.
60  Petrovic v. Austria, cited above, para 38
61  Petrovic v. Austria, cited above, para 40. The Court directly stated also that even at the 
time its judgment was delivered (almost 10 years after the case was initiated, there was no 
common standard that would oblige the States Parties to grant parental leave allowances to 
fathers (para 42)). 
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It then held that the refusal to grant relevant benefits to the applicant did 
not violate the Convention. 
More than a decade later, the ECtHR delivered two judgments in 
the case of Konstantin Markin v. Russia in which it clearly declared this 
approach outdated. Deciding on whether granting the right to parental 
leave only to female military personnel amounted to discrimination on 
the ground of sex, the Court (sitting as a Chamber) stated that: 
 (…) since the adoption of the judgment in the Petrovic case the legal 
situation as regards parental leave entitlements in the Contracting States 
has evolved. In an absolute majority of European countries the legisla-
tion now provides that parental leave may be taken by both mothers and 
fathers (…). In the Court’s opinion, this shows that society has moved 
towards a more equal sharing between men and women of responsibility 
for the upbringing of their children and that men’s caring role has gained 
recognition. The Court considers that it cannot overlook the widespread 
and consistently developing views and associated legal changes to the do-
mestic laws of Contracting States on this issue (…). It follows that the re-
spondent State can no longer rely on the absence of a common standard 
among the Contracting States to justify the difference in treatment be-
tween men and women as regards parental leave.62
It then clearly referred to the emerging consensus between European coun-
tries as a reason to depart from the opinion expressed in its previous ju-
risprudence. It also very harshly criticised the reference to the traditional 
gender roles as a reason for the differentiation between men and women. 
The Court stated that: 
To the extent that the difference [between men and women] was found-
ed on the traditional gender roles, that is on the perception of women 
as primary child-carers and men as primary breadwinners, these gen-
der prejudices cannot, by themselves, be considered by the Court to 
62  Judgment of 7 October 2010, Konstantin Markin v. Russia (Chamber), application 
no. 30078/06, para 49.
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amount to sufficient justification for the difference in treatment, any 
more than similar prejudices based on race, origin, colour or sexual 
orientation.63
It then ruled out the possibility that the states could refer to their vision 
of the traditional roles of women in order to justify differences in their 
legal status. 
The case was then referred to the Grand Chamber,64 which agreed with 
the Chamber’s ruling that the exclusion of male military personnel from 
the right to parental leave constituted a violation of the Convention (Ar-
ticle 14 in conjunction with Article 8).65 It also further commented on 
the Court’s role in the advancement of human rights and the tradition-
al gender roles. The Court stated inter alia that since the Convention is 
a system for the protection of human rights, the Court “must (…) have 
regard to the changing conditions in Contracting States and respond, for 
example, to any emerging consensus as to the standards to be achieved”66 
and underlined that the advancement of gender equality is a major goal in 
the European states. Therefore, the Grand Chamber also clearly stated that 
“references to traditions, general assumptions or prevailing social attitudes 
in a particular country are insufficient justification for a difference in treat-
ment on grounds of sex”.67 The Grand Chamber explicitly gave preference 
to the European tendency towards gender equality over the social and cul-
tural particularities of certain states.
4.3. Same-sex partnership – change in progress
The other strand of jurisprudence in which social attitudes and legal 
changes seem to influence the position of the ECtHR – though the impact 
of those changes has not yet resulted in a definite change of the standard 
enforced by the Court – is related to the rights of homosexuals. 
63  Konstantin Markin v. Russia (Chamber), cited above, para 58.
64  Under Article 43 of the Convention. 
65  Judgment of 22 March 2012, Konstantin Markin v. Russia (Grand Chamber), application 
no. 30078/06.
66  Konstantin Markin v. Russia (Grand Chamber), cited above, para 126.
67  Konstantin Markin v. Russia (Grand Chamber), cited above, para 127. See also para 140. 
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In Schalk and Kopf v. Austria,68 the Court examined the question 
whether the Convention grants the right to marry or to enter another le-
gally recognised form of relationship to same-sex couples. The applicants – 
who had been living in a long-term homosexual relationship – alleged that 
their rights were violated, first of all, because they did not have access to 
marriage, and secondly, because no alternative means of legal recognition 
were available to them before the introduction of the Registered Partner-
ship Act, which entered into force in 2010. 
The first problem was analysed under Article 12 of the Convention 
(the right to marriage). The Court stated that the provision of the Con-
vention guarantees the right to marry to “men and women” and that, at 
the moment of drafting the Convention, the right was clearly understood 
as referring only to the marriage in a traditional sense (as a union between 
partners of different sexes).69 The Court noted that since the adoption 
of the Convention major social and legal70 changes had occurred, but un-
derlined that those changes did not result in a European consensus regard-
ing same-sex marriage.71 It then stated that: 
61. (…) the Court would no longer consider that the right to marry 
enshrined in Article 12 must in all circumstances be limited to marriage 
between two persons of the opposite sex. Consequently, it cannot be said 
that Article 12 is inapplicable to the applicants’ complaint. However, as 
matters stand, the question whether or not to allow same-sex marriage is 
left to regulation by the national law of the Contracting State.
62.  In that connection, the Court observes that marriage has deep-root-
ed social and cultural connotations which may differ largely from one 
society to another. The Court reiterates that it must not rush to substi-
tute its own judgment in place of that of the national authorities, who 
are best placed to assess and respond to the needs of society (…)72
68  Judgment of 24 June 2010, Schalk and Kopf v. Austria, application no. 30141/04.
69  Schalk and Kopf v. Austria, cited above, paras 54-55.
70  It noted especially the adoption of Article 9 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the 
European Union, in which the reference to the sex of spouses had been deliberately omitted. 
71  It noted that at the moment when the judgment was delivered only 6 out of 47 States Parties 
to the Convention allowed same-sex marriages (Schalk and Kopf v. Austria, cited above, para 58).
72  Schalk and Kopf v. Austria, cited above, paras 61-62.
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Although the Court did not directly refer to the doctrine of the margin 
of appreciation, the wording of the quoted paragraphs clearly indicated 
that the decision whether to allow same-sex marriage – and consequently 
the decision about the scope of the application of Article 12 of the Con-
vention – was left to the appreciation of domestic authorities. It is also 
clear that this position was motivated by social and cultural differences 
between the Council of Europe Member States. Consequently, the Court 
decided that the lack of a possibility to enter marriage by same-sex couples 
does not violate Article 12 of the Convention. It also did not give any in-
dication as to a foreseeable change in its approach.
The second problem (the right to another form of legal recognition 
of same-sex relationships) was analysed under Article 14 (the prohibition 
of discrimination) read in conjunction with Article 8 (the right to respect 
for private and family life) of the Convention. The Court noted that social 
attitudes towards same-sex couples have undergone a rapid revolution in 
many European states and clearly indicated that there was no longer a rea-
son to exclude such stable relationships from the notion of ‘family life’ 
used in Article 8 of the Convention. The Court clearly departed from its 
previous jurisprudence in which it claimed that a long-term partnership 
between homosexuals did not fall within the scope of the right to respect 
for “family life” and that the states enjoy a wide margin of appreciation as 
to the legal recognition of such relationships and their legal consequences.73 
The Court noted however that the changes in the legal orders of the States 
Parties to the Convention were still ongoing. It stated: 
73  See e.g. the decision of 10 May 2001, Mata Estevez v. Spain, application no. 56501/00. 
See also the decision of the European Commission of Human Rights of 3 May 1983, X and 
Y v. the United Kingdom, application no. 9369/81. For more on the changes of jurisprudence 
towards homosexuals, see: S.L. Cooper, ‘Marriage, Family, Discrimination & Contradiction: 
An Evaluation of the Legacy and Future of the European Court of Human Rights’ Jurispru-
dence on LGBT Rights’ (2011) 12(10) German Law Journal 1746-1763; G. Willems, ‘La vie 
familiale des homosexuels au prisme des articles 8, 12 et 14 de la Convention européenne des 
droits de l’homme: mariage et conjugalité, parenté et parentalité’ (2013) 93 Revue trimestrielle 
des droits de l’homme 65-96. On pre-2010 jurisprudence, see also: P. Johnson, ‘“An Essentially 
Private Manifestation of Human Personality”: Construction of Homosexuality in the Europe-
an Court of Human Rights’ (2010) 10(1) Human Rights Law Review 67-97.
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The Court cannot but note that there is an emerging European consen-
sus towards legal recognition of same-sex couples. Moreover, this ten-
dency has developed rapidly over the past decade. Nevertheless, there is 
not yet a majority of States providing for legal recognition of same-sex 
couples. The area in question must therefore still be regarded as one 
of evolving rights with no established consensus, where States must also 
enjoy a margin of appreciation in the timing of the introduction of legisla-
tive changes (…)74 [emphasis added]
The Court therefore referred to the evolutive interpretation but noted that 
the current state of legal developments in the States Parties to the Conven-
tion does not allow it to declare that the lack of legal recognition of same-
sex partnerships violated the Convention. The Court evoked the notion 
of ‘the margin of appreciation’, but – unlike in other cases – referred it not 
to the decision whether to introduce a certain legal regulation or not, but 
as to the timing of its introduction. 
On the one hand, such reference may be explained by the circum-
stances of the case decided by the Court. At the moment of the delivery 
of the judgment in Schalk and Kopf v. Austria, the state had already intro-
duced the law on same-sex partnerships, so the complaint of the applicants 
was related rather to the fact that the appropriate regulation had not been 
introduced earlier than to the lack of the existence thereof. On the other 
hand, however, the wording of the judgment and the strong emphasis on 
the ongoing changes – in both social attitudes towards same-sex couples 
and the legislation of the European countries – indicates that the ECtHR 
assumed that the standard in regard to the legal recognition of same-sex re-
lationships changes and the States Parties to the Convention will be com-
pelled to comply with the new standard in the foreseeable future. It may 
then be expected that in future cases concerning same-sex relationships, 
the ECtHR will examine the validity of the view adopted in Schalk and 
74  Schalk and Kopf v. Austria, cited above, para 105.
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Kopf and – if the tendency indicated in this judgment is sustained – it will 
decide that the change in the European standard will have occurred.75
5. Conclusions
From the very beginning of its existence, the European system for hu-
man rights protection has been based on the assumption that a certain 
catalogue of common values exists between the European States and that 
common standards within the scope of the protection of individual rights 
between those states can be achieved.76 Consequently, the idea that the Eu-
ropean States share a common identity – understood as a convergence 
of certain fundamental values and principles on which their legal systems 
are based – can be viewed as being at the very core of the Convention. 
It is also enhanced by reference to the notion of ‘a democratic society’ 
used in the text of the Convention and developed in the jurisprudence 
of the ECtHR.77 Nonetheless, neither the sole recognition of the existence 
75  See also: W. Brzozowski, ‘Małżeństwa, życie rodzinne, związki osób tej samej płci – glosa 
do wyroku ETPCz z 24.06.2010 r. w sprawie Schalk i Kopf v. Austria’ (2011) 4 Europejski 
Przegląd Sądowy 45. Compare also the judgment of 7 November 2013, Vallianatos and Oth-
ers v. Greece, applications nos. 29381/09 and 32684/09, in which the Court considered the 
possibility of denying homosexual couples the right to enter a legal relationship other than 
marriage which is available to heterosexual couples. Analysing current legal trends, the Court 
emphasised both the tendency to introduce same-sex partnerships and the fact that out of 19 
states which introduced some kind of a legally recognised form of relationship other than mar-
riage (e.g. a civil union or partnership), only in 2 this form was limited to heterosexual couples. 
According to the Court, such a restriction diverges from the European tendency and violates 
Article 14 in conjunction with Article 8 of the Convention. As much as the Court did not 
comment on the possibility of changing the approach taken in Schalk and Kopf as to the ob-
ligation to introduce a legal partnership, it did determine that in the case of its introduction, 
they would have to include also same-sex couples. Currently there are a few cases concerning 
the legal recognition of same-sex relationships pending before the ECtHR (see e.g. Chapin and 
Charpentier v. France, application no. 40183/07, communicated in April 2009, and Orlandi and 
Others v. Italy, application no. 26431/12 as well as others, communicated in December 2013).
76  See: Preamble to the Convention. 
77  For instance in free speech cases, the Court consistently emphasises that such a society is 
characterised by pluralism, tolerance and broadmindedness (see among many others: Handyside 
v. the United Kingdom, cited above, para 49; judgment of 7 February 2012, Axel Springer AG 
v. Germany, application no. 39954/08, para 78). For more on the notion of a democratic so-
ciety, see: S. Marks, ‘The European Convention on Human Rights and Its “Democratic Soci-
ety’’’ (1995) 66 The British Year Book of International Law 209.
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of common values, nor the vague reference to the values of the democratic 
society solves the problem of delimitation between the content of the com-
mon ground between the States Parties to the Convention and their par-
ticularities rooted in different social, cultural or legal circumstances. It 
also does not answer the question to what extent the latter circumstances 
should at all influence the shape of human rights standards, which by their 
very nature can be regarded as universal.78 
The ECtHR does not give an abstract answer to those questions. In-
stead, in its jurisprudence, it creates tools to solve problems which arise in 
particular cases and to gradually advance standards of protection adopted 
towards all the states. The doctrine of the living instrument serves as such 
a tool. As its adoption requires establishing the existence of (or at least 
a tendency towards creating) the European consensus on certain issues, 
the discussed doctrine is aimed at a dialogue with the States Parties to 
the Convention.79 However, the Court does not require unanimity between 
the European states in order to establish that a consensus has been reached, 
and this results in situations where changes of standards recognised by 
some states (in their internal law or by means of international agreements) 
can be used by the ECtHR as a reason to impose the heightening of stand-
ards on all Parties to the Convention. Such changes in the jurisprudence 
can be justified only by the assumption that the developments in human 
rights standards which occur in separate states are a part of one – common 
to all the states – development of the understanding of the scope and pos-
sible limitation of the rights guaranteed by the Convention. In this way, 
the development of jurisprudence based on the evolutive interpretation 
of the Convention can be considered as an element of the creation of a dy-
namic “European” identity common to all the states. Its content is limited 
to the issues of the protection of rights guaranteed by the Convention and, 
in this respect, it complements the constitutional identities of national 
states. As the development of standards at the European level should in-
fluence the states to guarantee the same level of protection at the nation-
al level, the substantive content of a European common identity should 
78  See especially G. Letsas, A Theory …, passim. 
79  See e.g. Ch. L. Rozakis, ‘The European Judge…’, p. 270ff.
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also impact the national ones. Moreover, it serves an important persuasive 
function which should contribute to the effectiveness of the implementa-
tion of conventional standards. In practice, however, its significance will 
be higher in countries which are prone to the unification and development 
of standards. By contrast, it can face obstacles in states in which moral 
convictions and legal trends oppose the implementation of standards es-
tablished in the ECtHR’s jurisprudence.
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secret surveillance, national security and 
Journalistic privilege: 
in search of a balance between conflicting 
values in the age of new telecommunications 
technologies
1. The nature of the research problem
1.1. The purpose of this paper is to outline the problem of violations 
of professional secrecy that binds journalists, and in particular the con-
fidentiality of journalistic sources of information, with regard to the use 
of special surveillance measures by police forces and intelligence services, 
especially the so-called mass surveillance measures.
1.2. The development of new technologies based on telecommunica-
tions networks and satellite communications has contributed to changes in 
the collecting, processing and transferring of data between different types 
of entities. Apart from fixed and mobile telephony – constituting the pri-
mary source of communicating information – there have also appeared 
electronic mail, Internet telephony (VOIP) and other Internet messengers, 
as well as satellite communication, which is becoming increasingly com-
mon. In practice, those forms of communication have basically replaced 
the traditional ones, such as letter correspondence. Nowadays, the Internet 
is no longer just a form of communication.2 It is becoming increasingly 
important in the sphere of cloud computing, enabling universal and con-
venient access granted on demand to a shared pool of resources, includ-
ing disc spaces and servers, or applications to edit texts, images and other 
1 PhD, Post-Doctoral Researcher at the Department of Private International Law, Faculty of 
Law and Administration, Jagiellonian University, on the post-doctoral internship “FUGA 2” 
financed by the National Science Centre.
2 See e.g.: J. Zittrain, The Future of the Internet and How to Stop It (Yale University Press 2008).
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multimedia.3 These solutions allow remote access to the resources stored 
in the cloud from anywhere in the world and from any device that has an 
Internet connection, without storing the data on hard/flash drives and 
without any physical contact with the drive.
1.3. Technological development is one of the factors that have contrib-
uted to a fundamental change in the operating model of police forces and 
intelligence services. The mass transfer combined with extraterritoriality 
of data stored in virtual space, migrating between servers located in differ-
ent countries, and the possibility of editing data without leaving trace have 
caused police forces and intelligence services to take steps in order to keep 
up with the changing reality. The individual surveillance of certain per-
sons – consisting in targeted wiretapping or the obtaining of a court order 
for the release of certain documents or other relevant objects, in the event 
of a suspicion of committing a criminal offence – has been replaced by 
the so-called preventive surveillance. This preventive surveillance is based 
on intelligence systems used for collecting, storing and analysing the con-
tent of messages transmitted via telecommunications networks, informa-
tion stored on virtual discs or operations performed by applications offered 
by cloud computing. They operate not only to detect already committed 
criminal offences, such as espionage or terrorism, but mainly to identify 
threats and prevent their occurrence, since currently the focus has been 
shifted from threat detection to threat prevention.
The specificity of the functioning of individual systems for collecting 
and analysing data or even the mere fact of obtaining classified informa-
tion is kept largely secret. In view of all the circumstances, the disclo-
sure of surveillance would inevitably cause its ineffectiveness.4 In practice, 
the public obtains rudimentary knowledge about undertaken actions on 
3  J.W. Rittinghouse, J. F. Ransome, Cloud Computing: Implementation, Management, and 
Security (CRC PressINC 2010); S. Pearson and G. Yee (eds), Privacy and Security for Cloud 
Computing (Springer 2012).
4  See the judgment of the Constitutional Tribunal of Poland of 12 December 2005, K 32/04, 
part III, point 1.1.
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the basis of laconic reports prepared by supervisory authorities. Howev-
er, the public also receives additional information through the activities 
of whistle-blowers.5
It seems that the degree of misinformation of the public – even about 
applied forms of surveillance and related statistics – has exceeded the crit-
ical point. Not only in the countries of the former Soviet bloc, where 
after the World War II organised systems of surveillance were established, 
but also in countries with a well-established democracy, society does not 
agree to sacrifice its own freedom and privacy for the sake of an uncertain 
promise of safety. Reluctance towards the new methods of national securi-
ty protection, involving interference in the private sphere, becomes more 
common, especially as the effectiveness of the so-called mass surveillance 
is criticised even by former senior members of the services who are well 
aware of the efficacy of such measures.6
1.4. Various forms of secret acquisition of information by police forces 
and intelligence services are provided for in legal systems all over the world. 
The most common forms are e.g. wiretaps and other technical means, en-
abling access to the content of messages exchanged by telephone and via 
the Internet. Typically, they are allowed by law in order to combat serious 
5  A model example of parliamentary control over police forces and intelligence services is the 
reaction of the European Parliament to E. Snowden’s disclosure of information on the massive 
collection of data by the National Security Agency (NSA) and its cooperation with Member 
States’ agencies. As a result of Snowden’s whistleblowing, the problem was examined. There-
fore, the Commission on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs of the European Parlia-
ment carried out its own investigation and issued a working document of 11 December 2013 
on the US and EU surveillance programmes and their impact on the fundamental rights of 
EU citizens. Then, on this basis, it adopted the European Parliament resolution of 12 March 
2014 on the US NSA surveillance programme, surveillance bodies in various Member States 
and their impact on EU citizens’ fundamental rights and on transatlantic cooperation in Jus-
tice and Home Affairs (2013/2188(INI)). 
6  According to an open memorandum submitted to President Obama by Former NSA Sen-
ior Executives/Veteran Intelligence Professionals for Sanity (VIPS) on 7 January 2014, the 
massive collection of data does not enhance the ability to prevent future terrorist attacks; the 
authors stress that mass surveillance conducted by the NSA has resulted in the prevention of 
zero attacks and that billions of dollars have been spent on programmes which are less effec-
tive and vastly more intrusive on citizens’ privacy than an in-house technology: <http://con-
sortiumnews.com/2014/01/07/nsa-insiders-reveal-what-went-wrong>.
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criminal offences. An approval of a court or another independent body is 
required for their use.7
For several years police forces and intelligence services have been ben-
efiting from telecommunications data.8 The obligation to collect the data 
was imposed on enterprises providing telecommunications services in 
EU Member States by the Data Retention Directive 2006/24/EC,9 which 
was ruled null and void by the European Court of Justice (the ECJ).10 
Generally speaking, the Directive required operators to retain certain cat-
egories of data (for identifying users and details of phone calls made and 
emails sent, excluding the content of those communications) for a period 
between six months and two years and to make them available, on request, 
to law enforcement authorities for the purposes of investigating, detecting 
and prosecuting serious crimes and acts of terrorism. On the basis of such 
data, it was possible to determine the flow of information within a group 
of communicating individuals, to reconstruct decision-making processes 
and even the hierarchy of criminal groups, or to finally identify which 
7  See e.g. the following judgments of the ECtHR: 6 September 1978, Klass and Others v. 
Germany, application no. 5029/71; 2 August 1984, Malone v. the United Kingdom, applica-
tion no. 8691/79; 24 April 1990, Kruslin v. France, application no. 11801/85; 25 September 
2001, P. G. and J. H. v. the United Kingdom, application no. 44787/98; 29 June 2006, Weber 
and Saravia v. Germany, application no. 54934/00; 1 March 2007, Heglas v. Czech Republic, 
application no. 5935/02; 28 June 2007, Association for European Integration and Human Rights 
and Ekimdzhiev v. Bulgaria, application no. 62540/00; 10 February 2009, Iordachi and Oth-
ers v. Moldova, application no. 25198/02; 2 September 2010, Uzun v. Germany, application 
no. 35623/05; 23 October 2012, Hadzhiev v. Bulgaria, application no. 22373/04.
8  See F. Bignami, ‘Privacy and Law Enforcement in the European Union: The Data Retention 
Directive’ (Spring 2007) Chicago Journal of International Law; Duke Science, Technology & 
Innovation Paper No. 13, p. 233 et seq.; S. Stalla-Bourdillon, ‘Privacy vs. Security – Are We 
Done Yet?’ in S. Stalla-Bourdillon, J. Phillips and M. D. Ryan, Privacy vs. Security (Springer 
2014) 59 et seq. On data retention in Canada, China, the UK, the US, Germany, Israel, India, 
Australia and Japan, see also papers published in: (2012) 2(4) International Data Privacy Law.
9  Directive 2006/24/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 March 2006 
on the retention of data generated or processed in connection with the provision of public-
ly available electronic communications services or of public communications networks and 
amending Directive 2002/58/EC.
10  See the ECJ judgment of 8 April 2014 in the case of Digital Rights Ireland and Seitlinger 
and Others, C-293/12.
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individuals communicate with each other in a particular place and time.11 
According to the ECJ, having regard to the growing importance of means 
of electronic communication, data which must be retained pursuant to 
that Directive give additional opportunities to national authorities for 
criminal prosecutions to shed light on serious crime and, in this respect, 
they are therefore a valuable tool for criminal investigations. Consequent-
ly, the retention of such data may be considered to be appropriate for 
attaining the objective pursued by that Directive. The fight against serious 
crime, and in particular against organised crime and terrorism, is indeed 
of the utmost importance, in order to ensure public security, and its effec-
tiveness may depend, to a great extent, on the use of modern investigation 
techniques. However, as the ECJ stated, the Directive does not lay down 
any objective criteria by which the number of persons authorised to access 
and subsequently use retained data is limited to what is strictly necessary 
in the light of the objective pursued. Above all, the access of competent na-
tional authorities to the retained data is not made dependent on a prior re-
view carried out by a court or an independent administrative body, whose 
decision would seek to limit access to the data, and the use thereof, to what 
is strictly necessary for the purpose of attaining the objective pursued, and 
whose intervention follows a reasoned request of those authorities, sub-
mitted within a framework of procedures for crime prevention or detec-
tion, or for criminal prosecution. Nor does the Directive impose a specific 
obligation on EU Member States to establish such limits. Furthermore, 
the period of retention is set between the minimum of 6  months and 
the maximum of 24 months, but it is not stated that the determination 
of the period must be based on objective criteria in order to ensure that it 
is limited to what is strictly necessary. The said Directive does not lay down 
clear and precise rules governing the extent of interference with the funda-
mental rights enshrined in Articles 7 and 8 of the Charter of Fundamental 
Rights.
11  See J. Xu, B. Marshall, S. Kaza, H. Chen, ‘Analyzing and Visualizing Criminal Network 
Dynamics: A Case Study’ in H. Chen et al. (eds), Intelligence and Security Informatics (Spring-
er 2011); see also the judgment of the Federal Constitutional Court of Germany of 2 March 
2010, 1 BvR 256/08.
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Nowadays there is intelligence software for mass surveillance that ena-
bles officers to collect data from unidentified individuals and then to ana-
lyse that data in terms of programmed criteria (e.g. to select conversations 
or files containing tagged words from all the data by means of keywords). 
Programmes such as PRISM, Xkeyscor, MUSCULAR, Tempora and oth-
ers12 – which give intelligence services access to the resources of private 
providers of telephone or Internet services – will be discussed further be-
low. In such cases, outstanding risks associated with the aforementioned 
preventive surveillance of citizens are rightly acknowledged, since such 
surveillance is targeted not against people suspected of illegal activity, but 
against anyone who uses new means of distant communication or tools for 
processing and storing data. Thus, it is not the act of committing a crim-
inal offence which poses a risk that one will be subjected to surveillance, 
but the mere fact of using certain means of communication.
1.5. Technological development, on the one hand, and a change in 
the operational methodology of police forces and intelligence services, on 
the other, redefine the legal classification of privacy and journalistic privi-
lege. The central problem with which legal systems are now being confront-
ed is not the question of whether one can demand disclosure of the iden-
tity of informants from a journalist through a court order (a fundamental 
issue in the era of analogue communication), but rather – how the effects 
of interference in journalistic privilege with regard to the use of automatic 
tools for collecting and analysing data could be minimised. At this point, 
the following fundamental questions arise: When can we speak of a breach 
of journalistic privilege? Is downloading personal data stored in the cloud, 
including information subject to journalistic privilege, already a breach? Is 
only a direct data analysis which leads to identifying the journalist and his/
her source considered to be an interference? Similar concerns are related 
to circumstances in which information is obtained by intelligence services. 
For example, the question arises of whether a breach of journalistic privilege 
12  See: Motion for a European Parliament resolution on the US NSA surveillance programme, 
surveillance bodies in various Member States and their impact on EU citizens’ fundamental 
rights and on transatlantic cooperation in Justice and Home Affairs (2013/2188(INI)), and the 
Report of 21 February 2014 by the Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs.
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will occur only after the journalist’s refusal to provide the information, in-
voking journalistic privilege, or maybe a violation of journalistic privilege 
takes place whenever a given police force or intelligence service comes into 
possession of information generated and associated with the journalistic 
activity of a certain person. Finally, a further problem concerns entitle-
ment to protection, and in particular whether that entitlement includes 
individuals engaged in citizen journalism (not working as professional 
journalists). To some extent, such dilemmas result from the shortcomings 
of legislative solutions implemented in the period of analogue communi-
cations. The solutions are not suitable for the mass processes of informa-
tion exchange in the present age of digital communication.
1.6. Addressing all of the above-mentioned research issues is not pos-
sible at the moment. Therefore, I will only focus on three main questions. 
Firstly, do the existing case law of the European Court of Human Rights, 
based on the Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms,13 
as well as the case law of the Polish Constitutional Tribunal relating to 
journalistic privilege remain adequate for the evaluation of interference, 
consisting in the use of mass surveillance and new technologies? Secondly, 
what criteria should be taken into account in order to assess the necessi-
ty of interference in journalistic privilege caused by surveillance? Thirdly, 
I would like to refer to the case concerning the constitutionality of Polish 
provisions on the so-called operational surveillance and data retention. On 
30  July  2014, the Constitutional Tribunal of Poland ruled14 that some 
provisions of Polish surveillance law were unconstitutional. The contest-
ed provisions inter alia did not sufficiently protect professional secrecy, 
especially in the context of lawyers, journalists or medical practitioners. 
For this reason, the provisions were declared inconsistent with the right to 
defence (Article 42(2) of the Constitution) and the freedom of expression 
(Article 54(1) of the Constitution).
13  Hereinafter referred to also as: the European Convention; the Convention.
14  See the judgment of 30 July 2014, ref. no. K 23/11 (available in the database of English 
translations on the website of the Polish Constitutional Tribunal: <http://trybunal.gov.pl/en/
news/judgments/>).
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2.  The meaning of ‘journalistic privilege’ and the protection of 
the privilege in the light of the European Convention and 
the Polish Constitution of 1997
2.1. The use of information obtained from confidential informants is 
one of the most valuable tools for journalists, especially those involved 
in investigative journalism. By means of material submitted by inform-
ants, it becomes possible to alert the public about irregularities, fraud or 
criminal offences of those in power, which has remained carefully hidden. 
As the European Court of Human Rights (the ECtHR) explained, with-
out such information provided by sources, the vital public-watchdog role 
of the press may be undermined and the ability of the press to provide 
accurate and reliable information may be adversely affected.15 Therefore, 
the protection of journalistic privilege from pressure exercised by the state 
– which would like to know the identity of informants for various reasons 
– is of particular importance. Hence, the protection of journalistic priv-
ilege is widely considered to be one of the cornerstones of a free press.16
The legal basis of journalistic privilege and its scope of protection under 
the European Convention and the Constitution of the Republic of Poland are 
outlined below. Neither the Convention nor the Polish Constitution expressis 
verbis stipulates journalists’ right to conceal the identity of their sources.17
A. The European Convention
2.2. The Convention does not refer directly to journalistic privilege. In 
its case law, the ECtHR has pointed out that the protection of the privilege 
15 See the following judgments of the ECtHR: 27 March 1996, Goodwin v. the United King-
dom, application no. 17488/90, para 39; 20 May 1999, Bladet Tromsø and Stensaas v. Norway, 
application no. 21980/93, para 59; 25 February 2003, Roemen and Schmit v. Luxembourg, ap-
plication no. 51772/99, para 57; 15 December 2009, Financial Times Ltd and Others v. the 
United Kingdom, application no. 821/03, para 59; 27 November 2007 Tillack v. Belgium, ap-
plication no. 20477/05, para 53.
16  See the ECtHR judgment of 14 September 2010 in the case of Sanoma Uitgevers B.V. v. 
the Netherlands, application no. 38224/03, para 50.
17  However, such a right – as an integral element of press freedom – is clearly prescribed by 
Art. 38 (2)(b) of the Constitution of Portugal.
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derives from Article  10(1) of the Convention.18 Hence, it is an element 
of the freedom of communication and dissemination of information, as 
well as of the freedom of the press (media freedom), embedded therein. The 
ECtHR’s position on this issue seems to have stabilised by now. As the Court 
explained, the right of journalists not to disclose their sources cannot be con-
sidered a mere privilege to be granted or taken away, depending on the law-
fulness or unlawfulness of their sources, but is part and parcel of the right to 
information, and must be treated with the utmost caution.19
2.2.1. Treating journalistic privilege as an element of the freedom 
of expression is justified, especially in the light of Article 10(1) of the Con-
vention, which refers to the concept of ‘the freedom to receive and impart 
information’. It seems that the concept of this freedom should be perceived 
not only in the positive dimension, as a possibility of sharing available in-
formation with others, but also in the negative dimension, as ‘the freedom 
not to disclose information to other parties’, or otherwise – as ‘the free-
dom to remain silent’. The essence of journalistic privilege is the negative 
dimension (aspect) of the freedom of journalists20 – the freedom not to 
disclose information to others, especially to state authorities, and a corre-
lated right to ensure that no person obtains information against the will 
or without the knowledge of the person concerned. This point of view im-
plies that journalistic privilege is a value protected under the Convention 
as an element of the freedom to receive and impart information. Taking 
this into consideration, an obligation to disclose information, as provided 
by law, each time implies a violation of Article 10(1) of the Convention, 
unless it meets the criteria of proportionality expressed in Article 10(2) 
of the Convention.21 On the other hand, journalistic privilege should 
be seen as a legal and ethical obligation of the journalist not to disclose 
the identity of his/her sources. 
18  See e.g. the ECtHR judgments of: 27 November 2007, Tillack v. Belgium, application 
no. 20477/05, para 60; 16 July 2013, Nagla v. Latvia, application no. 73469/10, para 95.
19  See Tillack v. Belgium, para 65; Nagla v. Latvia, para 97.
20  See the ECtHR judgment of 29 October 1992 in the cases of Open Door and Dublin Well 
Woman v. Ireland, nos. 14234/88 and 14235/88. 
21  See  I.C. Kamiński, Ograniczenia swobody wypowiedzi dopuszczalne w Europejskiej Konwencji 
Praw Człowieka. Analiza krytyczna (Warszawa 2010) 510 et seq.
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Regardless of the fact that Article  10 of the Convention comprises 
also the freedom to disclose information on the authors of press releases 
or the freedom not to disclose information about the identities of jour-
nalistic sources, the protection of these values should be reviewed also in 
the context of other provisions, especially Article  8 of the Convention, 
which guarantees ‘respect for private life’ and ‘respect for correspondence’. 
Therefore, two of these provisions of the Convention should be seen as 
complementary safeguards.22
2.2.2. Article 10 of the Convention does not only protect anonymous 
sources assisting the press in informing the public about matters of public 
interest.23 It also guarantees the right not to disclose their identities in press 
material (e.g. by means of an anonymous article or an article signed with 
a pseudonym) forwarded in a letter to the editor.
A complex issue which has not been adequately resolved in the case 
law of the Strasbourg Court is whether journalistic privilege applies also 
to people involved in citizen journalism, in particular, bloggers and oth-
ers occupied with non-profit editing of websites (such as Facebook, Twit-
ter, etc.), where content is published in the public interest. It seems that 
there are no legal obstacles for non-professionals – they can benefit from 
the freedom of expression and invoke journalistic privilege. After all, in 
the light of the wording of Article 10(1) of the Convention, the freedom 
to impart information is not limited within the scope ratione personae and 
is vested in everyone, not just journalists. However, another issue concerns 
the extent of the margin of appreciation a given state has in introducing 
limitations to this privilege, which involve establishing a legal obligation to 
provide information or permitting the acquisition of information without 
the consent of the person concerned. In other words, to what extent can 
states construct the legal framework of journalistic privilege? It seems that 
narrowing the scope of the protection only to persons providing infor-
mation on a permanent or professional basis, and as such acting as social 
watchdogs, should be regarded as justified. With this assumption, those 
22  See the judgment of 22 November 2012 in the case of Telegraaf Media Nederland Landeli-
jke Media B.V. and Others v. the Netherlands, application no. 39315/06, para 102.
23  See the ECtHR decision of 8 December 2005 in the case of Nordisk Film & TV A/S v. Den-
mark, application no. 40485/02.
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who only incidentally inform the public via the means of social communi-
cation could not demand the same protection as journalists. The reason for 
this assumption is, in particular, the need to ensure the effective protection 
of the values referred to in Article 10(2) of the Convention. If any per-
son – even the one informing the public only accidentally – could invoke 
‘the freedom to remain silent’ and demand legal protection, the protection 
of the values referred to in Article 10(2) of the Convention would, in fact, 
be illusory.
It is worth mentioning that the ECtHR did not hesitate to take into 
account the guarantees derived from Article 10(1) of the Convention, as 
regards the right to receive information about public affairs, in the context 
of social activities of non-governmental organisations. Such organisations 
play a similar role to the role of the media as public watchdogs and, there-
fore, can rely on the protection arising from Article 10(1) of the Conven-
tion, at least when it comes to access to public information.24
2.2.3. The scope ratione materiae of the protection of journalists and 
their sources seems wide. It comprises not only the protection of the iden-
tity of a source (in a strict sense) but also the protection of data ena-
bling the identification of that identity. Therefore, apart from the sur-
name of a person, the protection also covers his/her address, voice and/
or image. In the case law of the ECtHR – following the Recommenda-
tion of the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe25 – it is 
assumed that when identifying information provided by a source, there 
should be regard for: the factual circumstances of acquiring information 
from a source by a journalist; the unpublished content of the information 
provided by a source to a journalist; and personal data of journalists and 
their employers, related to their professional work.
The substantive framework of the protection of journalistic priv-
ilege, expressed in the Recommendation and adopted in the case law, 
24  See the ECtHR judgments of: 14 April 2009, Társaság a Szabadságjogokért v. Hungary, ap-
plication no. 37374/05, para 27; 25 June 2013, Youth Initiative for Human Rights v. Serbia, 
application no. 48135/06, para 20.
25  See: Recommendation No. R (2000) 7 of the Committee of Ministers to Member States on 
the right of journalists not to disclose their sources of information (adopted by the Committee 
of Ministers on 8 March 2000, at the 701st meeting of the Ministers’ Deputies).
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if  determined as a closed catalogue, would be insufficient. In the era 
of technological development, identifying a source is possible mostly 
through various analyses of the metadata of a communication process. 
The use of the telephone, the Internet, or other means of communica-
tion or transmission of information, always leaves an anonymous trace 
in the virtual reality, just like a fingerprint, enabling one to immediately 
identify a given person. Generally speaking, the analysis of metadata may 
lead to the identification of a person who created a file or persons who 
communicated with each other.
Taking this into consideration, it seems that in the digital era, it is nec-
essary to redefine the scope of the protection of journalistic privilege and 
to include in that all data used in the process of communication, prepa-
ration, or gathering of information that would enable the identification 
of an informant or an author of a press release, even if such identifica-
tion would require significant time and effort. Such data would comprise, 
inter alia, telecommunications data (e.g. telephone billing data, location 
data, and IP numbers) or metadata contained in the file source code (e.g. 
the address or geographical location of the place where the file was created, 
the data of the equipment which was used to create the file).
B. The Constitution of the Republic of Poland
2.3. In the Polish Constitution of 1997 – as well as in the European 
Convention – the protection of journalistic privilege is not explicitly stat-
ed. Nevertheless, this does not create an obstacle for the Polish Constitu-
tional Tribunal to interpret the provisions of the Constitution broadly and 
in accordance with European standards. It is well-established in the Tribu-
nal’s case law that the normative content of the European Convention and 
the case law of the ECtHR may not be omitted in the process of applying 
the Constitution.26 In fact, the standard of the protection of fundamental 
rights and freedoms is at least the same. The starting point for the Consti-
tutional Tribunal is the assumption that the Convention sets out the min-
imal standards, and the Polish Constitution – as a normative act that is 
26  See the judgment of the Constitutional Tribunal of 20 November 2012, SK 3/12.
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the supreme law of the Republic of Poland (Art. 8 of the Constitution) 
– could only set higher standards, not lower.
2.3.1. In the Polish legal system, the protection of the identities 
of journalistic sources derives from the freedom of the press (Art. 14) 
and the freedom to acquire and to disseminate information (Art. 54(1) 
of the Constitution), where the latter is closely related to the former.27 
Moreover, the said protection should be seen as related to the protection 
of privacy (Art. 47) and to informational self-determination (Art. 51(1) 
of the Constitution). This was also confirmed in the judgment of 30 July 
2014 issued by the Constitutional Tribunal (ref. no. K 23/11). The Tribu-
nal’s approach regarding “the roots” of journalistic privilege is consistent 
with the one presented by the ECtHR.
Article 14 of the Constitution is one of the main systemic rules indi-
cated in the first chapter of the Constitution, laying down the foundations 
of the legal order and legal system of the Republic of Poland. The provision 
reads as follows: “The Republic of Poland shall ensure freedom of the press 
and other means of social communication”. By contrast, the freedom to 
acquire and to disseminate information is explicitly stated in Article 54(1) 
of the Constitution. This provision, included in the chapter on freedoms, 
rights and obligations of persons and citizens, has the following wording: 
“The freedom to express opinions, to acquire and to disseminate informa-
tion shall be ensured to everyone”.
While interpreting Article  14 and Article  54 of the Constitution, 
the Tribunal referred extensively to the ECtHR’s assumptions as regards 
Article 10 of the Convention, thereby confirming significant convergences 
between standards on the protection of press freedom that arise from 
the European Convention and those derived from the Polish Constitution 
of 1997.28
2.3.2. A special emphasis is given to the protection of information 
acquired, in the course of fulfilling professional duties, by persons holding 
27  See the judgments of the Constitutional Tribunal of: 4 April 2001, K 11/00; 30 October 
2006, P 10/06.
28  See the judgments of the Constitutional Tribunal of: 30 October 2006, P 10/06; 6 July 
2011, P 12/09.
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the so-called professions of public trust.29 Apart from the profession of doc-
tor or that of attorney, the profession of journalist is also regarded as one 
of public trust. Contacts between those professionals and other individu-
als are based on trust, not only as regards professional qualifications, but 
also when it comes to maintaining confidentiality. Hence, the protection 
of the confidentiality of “information acquired” (however, not the pro-
tection of “a person acquiring the information”) is an immanent require-
ment of a complex protection of trust, both in the individual and private 
dimension.
2.3.3. The Constitution guarantees the freedom to remain silent and 
the freedom not to disclose information, as elements of the freedom of ex-
pression. However, the Constitutional Tribunal does not consider journal-
istic privilege to be a privilege of journalists, as does the ECtHR. Journal-
istic privilege is not ‘a negative freedom of journalists’. On the contrary, 
the Tribunal has clearly pointed out that professional secrecy constitutes 
a legal and ethical obligation on the part of all professionals it binds, and 
not their privilege or right.
Therefore, from the constitutional point of view, it is acceptable to ab-
rogate journalistic privilege, if this serves the legitimate objectives of a dem-
ocratic state and is in accordance with the proportionality rule. Pursuant 
to Article 31(3) of the Constitution, the legitimate aims of a democratic 
state comprise protecting the following: national security and public order; 
the natural environment, health and public morals; as well as the rights 
and freedoms of other persons. Although Article 31(3) of the Constitution 
seems to be worded in a more general way than Article 10(2) of the Con-
vention, standards for interference with journalistic privilege seem to be 
concurrent.
29  See the judgments of the Constitutional Tribunal of: 22 November 2004, SK 64/03, part III 
point 3; 2 July 2007, K 41/05, part III point 7; 13 December 2011, K 33/08, part III point 6.4.
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3.  Surveillance and the scope of the protection of journalistic 
privilege
3.1. According to established case law, compelling journalists to give 
up their right of silence, and provide information on their sources or give 
access to journalistic information, interferes with journalists’ freedom 
of expression.30
3.2. The ECtHR has acknowledged that a search carried out in order 
to identify journalistic sources is more intrusive – from the point of view 
of the protection of journalistic privilege and the freedom of the press – 
than an official order to surrender documents or to provide information on 
the identities of journalistic sources.31 Consequently, in such a situation, 
a journalist is only a passive observer of a search carried out by public au-
thorities in his/her home or workplace; whereas in the case of the judicial 
order, s/he could refuse to cooperate and decide not to reveal the identities 
of his/her sources.
In my opinion, an interference with journalistic privilege by means 
of secret surveillance should be recognised at least as equally intrusive as 
the search of a home or a workplace (or even more intrusive, from the point 
of view of respect for privacy and the freedom of the press). In the case 
of secret surveillance, journalists are not just passive observers, they do not 
even know about the use of secret measures or the acquisition and analysis 
of data that are subject to journalistic privilege.
Taking the above into consideration, requests for disclosing certain 
documents or the identities of journalistic sources, as well as the acquir-
ing of such pieces of information by means of surveillance without jour-
nalists’ consent, should be considered as interference with the protection 
granted by Article 10 of the Convention (the freedom of the press and 
the principle of journalistic privilege). The possibility of using these meth-
ods triggers a chilling effect not only on the right to respect for private 
30  See: Goodwin v. the United Kingdom, para 39; Sanoma Uitgevers B.V. v. the Netherlands, 
para 59; Financial Times Ltd and Others v. the United Kingdom, para 56.
31  See: Roemen and Schmit v. Luxembourg, para 47; Tillack v. Belgium, para 56; Nagla v. Lat-
via, para 95.
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life and correspondence, granted under Article  8, but also on the free-
dom of expression and the freedom of the press, enshrined in Article 10 
of the Convention.32
3.3. Considering the importance of new technologies in the effective 
detection, prevention and combating of threats, it should be assumed that 
an absolute prohibition on using, for evidentiary purposes, information 
subject to journalistic privilege leads to difficulties in gathering evidence 
in the case of e.g. cybercrime, in the commission of which journalists may 
also be involved. Therefore, nowadays, the focus has been put on the estab-
lishment of appropriate procedural safeguards that would mitigate the risk 
of disclosing information protected by law, subject to journalistic privi-
lege, which should remain undisclosed to functionaries of police forces 
and intelligence services.
3.4. As it has already been mentioned, only those who professionally 
or regularly provide the public with information, and might be considered 
as public watchdogs, may invoke journalistic privilege. A problem arises 
when a person under surveillance is not a journalist but a third party (e.g. 
the owner of a server or a computer on which a journalist’s data are being 
stored). Analogous difficulties occur in the case of mass surveillance, which 
is not directly focused on revealing the identities of journalistic sources, as 
mentioned before.
3.4.1. The judgment in the case of Weber and Saravia v. Germany con-
tains some guidance on requirements which are to be met by domestic leg-
islation in this respect. In the judgment, the Strasbourg Court examined, 
inter alia, a breach of Article 10 of the Convention in the context of the us-
age of the so-called strategic monitoring with regard to a journalist. The 
32  In the judgment in the case of Weber and Saravia v. Germany (para 144), the ECtHR held 
that the problem of surveillance of journalists and the disclosure of journalistic sources should 
rather be examined in the context of Art. 8 of the Convention, and the right to respect for pri-
vate life and correspondence, which is expressed therein, than from the point of view of the 
freedom of expression from Art. 10 of the Convention. While in Telegraaf Media, the ECtHR 
explained that although questions raised by surveillance measures are usually considered un-
der Art. 8 alone, in that case they were so intertwined with the Article 10 issue that the Court 
found it appropriate to consider the matter under Articles 8 and 10 concurrently.
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applicant argued that the possibility of strategic monitoring33 was in itself 
an interference with the freedom guaranteed by Article 10 of the Con-
vention. The ECtHR held that there had been no violation of Article 10 
of the Convention. The German provisions did not aim at revealing 
the identities of journalistic sources but at combating serious crimes. Such 
an interference cannot be described as “particularly serious”. In addition, 
there were numerous procedural safeguards ensuring the proportionality 
of the measures used, thus reducing the disclosure of journalistic sources 
to “an unavoidable minimum”.
The above-mentioned remarks lead to the conclusion that in or-
der to evaluate whether there has been an interference with the freedom 
of the press that is incompatible with the Convention, it is necessary to 
assess if the purpose of obtaining information was to disclose journal-
istic sources. This reasoning is confirmed by the judgment in the case 
of Telegraaf Media Nederland Landelijke Media BV and Others v. Nether-
lands. The application in this case was brought by a Dutch newspaper and 
its two journalists. The applicants’ phones had been tapped and they had 
found themselves under investigation by secret services. The ECtHR held 
that there had been a violation of Articles 8 and 10 of the Convention. The 
use of secret surveillance measures against the applicants had not been or-
dered, nor had it been supervised by a court or an authority of comparable 
independence and impartiality. The applicants could only submit a com-
plaint ex post facto against the usage of such measures. Such a possibility is 
not enough, because – in the case of revealing the identities of journalistic 
sources – when trust in journalists is betrayed, it cannot be restored.
3.4.2. Procedural safeguards that result in the protection of journalistic 
privilege – as implied by the above-mentioned Strasburg case law – must 
33  Under the Act on Restrictions on the Secrecy of Mail, Post and Telecommunications Act 
(also called the G10 Act): “Strategic monitoring is aimed at collecting information by inter-
cepting telecommunications in order to identify and avert serious dangers facing the Federal 
Republic of Germany, such as an armed attack on its territory or the commission of interna-
tional terrorist attacks and certain other serious offences. (…) In contrast, so-called individual 
monitoring, that is, the interception of telecommunications of specific persons, serves to avert 
or investigate certain grave offences which the persons monitored are suspected of planning or 
having committed” (para 4 of the ECtHR judgment).
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include provisions on the participation of a court or an independent body. 
In Sanoma Uitgevers BV v. the Netherlands, the Strasbourg Court stated: 
First and foremost among these safeguards is the guarantee of review 
by a judge or other independent and impartial decision-making body. 
(…) The requisite review should be carried out by a body separate 
from the executive and other interested parties, invested with the pow-
er to determine whether a requirement in the public interest overrid-
ing the principle of protection of journalistic sources exists prior to 
the handing over of such material and to prevent unnecessary access to 
information capable of disclosing the sources’ identities if it does not.34
4. The Constitutional Tribunal’s judgment of 30 July 2014
4.1. The constitutional problem in that case stemmed from differ-
ent levels of interference with professional secrecy that were provided for 
in the Polish legal system. While in criminal proceedings – at the stage 
of prosecuting and trying – the legislature had guaranteed the protection 
of journalistic privilege, inter alia, by prohibitions on the use of certain 
material as evidence (specific evidentiary rules), it had not established sim-
ilar guarantees for the procedures of secret obtaining of information in 
the course of pre-trial activities.
4.2. The statutory scope of the protection of journalistic privilege 
in Poland is as follows. According to Article 180 of the Polish Criminal 
Procedure Code (hereinafter: the CPC), a person bound by the obliga-
tion of professional secrecy may refuse to testify as a witness in criminal 
proceedings as to the circumstances which fall within the scope of this 
obligation. The right to refuse to testify may be exercised by the witness 
who is bound by the obligation of professional secrecy under provisions 
applicable to a particular group of professionals. In the case of journalists, 
that obligation arises from Article 15 of the Press Act. This protection fully 
34  Sanoma Uitgevers BV v. the Netherlands, para 90.
189
Podkowik, Secret Surveillance, National Security and Journalistic Privilege...
applies to documents held by journalists, which is determined by Arti-
cle 226 of the CPC. 
The statutory protection of professional secrecy is not absolute in 
character. The public prosecutor or the court may exempt a person from 
the obligation of secrecy (Art. 180 in fine of the CPC). Such exemption 
implies that there is no possibility for the witness to evade giving testi-
mony because of the obligation of discretion.35 Based on Article  226 
of the CPC, that rule is also applicable to certain documents containing 
information protected by professional secrecy. The exemption from the ob-
ligation of professional secrecy is permissible only when it is necessary in 
the interest of the administration of justice, and when a given fact cannot 
be determined on the basis of other evidence (Art. 180(2) of the CPC). 
However, in the case of journalists, the legislature has also introduced an 
additional restriction on the admissibility of exemption from the obliga-
tion of professional secrecy, and thus, as a rule, it is absolute in character. 
A journalist may not be exempted from maintaining the confidentiality 
of data that permit the identification of authors of press material, letters 
to the editor, or other material of this nature, as well as the identification 
of persons who have provided information already published or submitted 
for publication, if they have invoked the right of non-disclosure of their 
data (Art. 180(3) of the CPC). Journalists are not entitled to rely on jour-
nalistic privilege if this information pertains to serious offences which in-
clude, among others, crimes posing a danger to the Republic of Poland 
(i.e. treason or espionage), the armed forces or people’s lives, including 
terrorist crimes. In such cases, there is no effective right to remain silent 
and invoke journalistic privilege.
4.3. The Polish legal system does not provide for any procedural guar-
antees with a similar scope as those applicable in the procedure for exemp-
tion from the obligation of professional secrecy in the course of criminal 
proceedings, which could prevent breaches of professional secrecy by po-
lice forces and state security services. In particular, there is no subsequent 
judicial or prosecutorial supervision over the content of material collected 
35  M. Rusinek, Tajemnica zawodowa i jej ochrona w polskim procesie karnym (Warszawa 2007).
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in secret. The legislature has neither excluded nor minimised the risk of po-
lice officers or functionaries of state security services becoming familiar – in 
the course of secret surveillance – with information which normally they 
would have no access to or would receive only due to an order of the court 
or the public prosecutor, issued in separate proceedings.
In the context of the current legal situation in Poland, the protec-
tion of journalistic privilege actually remains dependent on the manner 
of communication with informants. In the case of the use of a telephone or 
the Internet by a journalist, the scope of the said protection is significantly 
narrower than if the journalist talks to an informant face-to-face, and not 
via modern technologies of data processing.
This shows that the Polish legislator proves to be inconsistent in keep-
ing up with technological changes, resulting from the spread of the In-
ternet and distance communication technology. Despite introducing leg-
islative solutions which enable police forces and state security services to 
use new technologies to combat threats to public security, no adequate 
guarantees of fundamental rights, including the freedom of expression, 
were established.
4.4. In the judgment of 30  July 2014, the Tribunal ruled the chal-
lenged provisions on operational surveillance – insofar as they did not pro-
vide for a guarantee that material containing information prohibited from 
being used as evidence should be subject to immediate, witnessed and 
recorded destruction, in the case where the court had not waived the re-
quirement of professional secrecy – to be inconsistent with Article 42(2), 
Article 47, Article 49, Article 51(2) and Article 54(1) in conjunction with 
Article 31(3) of the Constitution. 
In the Tribunal’s opinion, the statute’s aim was to ensure that proce-
dural guarantees would be in place to eliminate unauthorised access to 
information by police forces and intelligence services; the said information 
should be safeguarded by the law, due to its content and the circumstances 
in which it was imparted. A certain model solution exists in the crimi-
nal procedure, as set out in Article 180(2) of the Polish Criminal Proce-
dure Code. The said provision authorises a court to waive the requirement 
of professional secrecy, if this is necessary for the proper administration 
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of justice, whereas a given circumstance may not be determined in any 
other way, i.e. without compromising professional secrecy. A similar mech-
anism could be in place with regard to operational surveillance. At present, 
such a mechanism does not exist. The legislator did not provide for an ob-
ligation to verify – under the supervision of a given court – data gathered 
in the course of operational surveillance that may contain information 
subject to professional secrecy.
To sum up, the Tribunal’s approach is stricter than that of the ECtHR. 
While the ECtHR requires independent and effective supervision over 
the ordering of surveillance, the Polish Tribunal requires judicial, or at 
least independent, review before and after the collecting of material, if 
such material contains information subject to professional secrecy. The 
court should have a power to abrogate journalistic privilege if this proves 
necessary.
5. Challenges for the legislator and practice
The nature of participation of a court or an independent authority in 
the procedure concerning the waiving of a journalist’s obligation of profes-
sional secrecy is not as obvious as it seems at first glance. Namely, the ques-
tion is whether permission of a court or an independent authority is, or is 
not, necessary for carrying out surveillance, and whether subsequently – 
after material has been collected – the court or the independent authority 
should verify the material and issue a decision abrogating journalistic priv-
ilege if the material contains information subject to journalistic privilege, 
or whether the ex ante permission for surveillance is enough as it comprises 
permission to abrogate the privilege.
However, despite the fact that the sole existence of independent over-
sight of the material collected in the course of secret surveillance has many 
advantages and enables a very wide scope of protection of journalistic priv-
ilege, in practice it might be unrealistic. Firstly, it is not always possible to 
assess, in the course of surveillance, whether collected material is subject to 
journalistic privilege. Secondly, one cannot lose sight of the technical limi-
tations that may impact the actual possibility of exercising effective super-
vision over the material collected in the course of surveillance. This applies 
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mainly to telecommunications data, metadata files, as well as telephone 
calls and other forms of communicating information determined during 
untargeted surveillance. Phone numbers alone, calling lists or metadata 
of files – without proper IT tools and operational knowledge – are not 
enough to establish e.g. the identity of a source or relevant facts from 
a journalist’s life. Therefore, it is not clear how and to what extent the court 
or the independent authority would assess whether the acquired material is 
subject to journalistic privilege and whether the abrogation of the privilege 
would be justified. Moreover, such records are usually massive datasets. 
A thorough analysis of the data and the granting of permission for the ab-
rogation of the privilege seem almost impossible to be accomplished.
Therefore – in my opinion – in the digital era, the one and only nec-
essary and feasible means of protecting journalistic privilege is judicial re-
view at the stage of ordering surveillance (the first step). That is to say, per-
mission granted by a court, or an independent authority, for the ordering 
of surveillance is sufficient to protect the freedom of the press. Indeed, this 
reasoning is confirmed by the above-cited ECtHR judgments in the cases 
of Weber and Saravia and Telegraaf Media.
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Jan wawrzyniak 1
les défis posés aux médias contemporains dans 
le domaine d’information de l’opinion publiQue 
(les problèmes choisis)
Les médias, d’une part c’est la notion populaire, d’autre part, ils ne sont 
pas univoques et par conséquent la définition est difficile à décrire préci-
sement. Une chose paraît sûre : à part de la notion mentionnée, on utilise 
un nombre des expressions voisines ou qui se trouvent dans la sphère de 
la notion « média », aussi bien dans la langue courante, que dans la langue 
juridique. Je pense aux mots comme : la presse, les moyens de mass média, 
les moyens de l’information sociale, les nouveaux médias, etc.
Il paraît difficile de concentrer notre attention sur l’analyse profonde 
de la notion dans ce court article. Pour faire la référence au sujet, placé 
dans le titre, il nous faudrait plus de lieu. C’est à ce titre, je vais aborder 
seulement quelques problèmes de ce vaste sujet.
En rapport avec cela, j’accepterai, à l’usage de ce traité, la définition gé-
nérale des médias (sans le dire à grands traits). Je comprends par cela tous 
les instruments, moyens et méthodes qui servent à la communication im-
personnelle. En même temps il faut marquer que la communication aura 
le caractère public même quand l’expéditeur – au moins hipothétiquement 
– admettra et acceptera la réception officielle. En ce sens, on classera aux 
médias les textes écrits, ceux qui sont présentés traditionnellement par la 
radio et la télévision, aussi bien que les textes, inclus dans la presse, et 
ceux – inclus par quelqu’un à l’internet et des autres médias nouveaux. La 
lettre envoyée par la poste et les entretiens privés par téléphone ne seront 
pas classés aux médias. En observant les médias, du point de vue histo-
rique, il faut faire attention sur leur évolution, surtout dans les décennies 
dernières. Pour montrer mieux cela, il faut comprendre les médias autre-
ment et inclure à cette notion tous les moyens qui fixent, transforment et 
1 Professeur, L’Université de L. Kozminski à Varsovie. 
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transmettent l’information entre les gens. On connaîtra ainsi des médias 
« morts », nommés aussi les médias de musée et ceux de « la découverte ». 
Il s’agit des anciens médias qui servaient à informer, comme : la plume de 
l’oie, le papyrus, le télégraphe, les cylindres du tourne-disque, etc... . Ce 
sont sûrement les moyens qui peuveut avoir leur usage, ayant en effet le 
caractère du violon d’Ingres, dans le cercle des gens peu nombreux.
Mais les connaisseurs des médias expriment leurs opinions que les mé-
dias populaires et usés en masse actuellement, comme : la radio, la télévi-
sion, la presse quotidienne, auront le même destin. Cependant, il y a des 
opinions contraires, qui soulignent la vivacité des médias mentionnés, 
malgré la compétitivité de la part des médias nouveaux, comme  : CD, 
audio, vidéo, DVD, des jeux et la console et surtout l’internet avec ses 
services différents.
Il paraît que « l’histoire le montre, les médias ne disparaissent pas tota-
lement, mais ils se transforment dans la complexité. C’est le principe de la 
« médiamorphose », qui était formulé par Roger Fidller en 1992 »2.
La « médiamorphose » exige l’analyse complexe de l’évolution techno-
logique des moyens de communication. On ne doit pas traiter séparément 
chaque forme de communication. De cette façon, on peut voir que les mé-
dias nouveaux ne se forment pas indépendamment et spontanément, mais 
naissent progressivement par la métamorphose des médias qui existaient 
avant.
C’est, peut-être pour cela, la formation des nouvelles formes de médias 
ne cause pas la disparition des formes plus âgées, mais leur évolution, dont 
le but est l’adaptation aux conditions nouvelles.
Ces considérations préliminaires pourront être sommées au sens opti-
miste et, dans aucun cas, il n’y a pas de danger de la chute de l’importance, 
ou même, la mort de différentes formes des médias (aussi celles, de masse), 
profétées par certains connaisseurs des médias. Il faut être plutôt conscient 
des changements (constants), de l’évolution des formes, des instruments et 
des méthodes de communication.
2  Comp. Goban-Klas T. , Le futur des mass médias. Est-ce que les mass médias ont le futur dans : 
Le futur. Le monde– Europe – la Pologne, no 1, 2008, p.  41. 
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II
Est-ce que les changements qui arrivent continuellement – d’une ma-
nière générale – dans le fonctionnement des médias n’influent pas sur la 
réalisation de leurs deux tâches principales :
– d’approvisionnement de l’information aux gens et aux sociétés,
– de formation des opinions publiques ?
En analysant le problème plus largement : est-ce que les médias sont et 
seront en état de répondre aux défis, lesquels sont créés par eux-mêmes et 
les mégachangements qui se passent dans le monde et qui ont le caractère 
politique, économique, social, idéologique et, à la fin, technologique ? 
Je me rends compte que la réponse plus profonde à ces questions exi-
gerait l’écriture d’une oeuvre plus large. Je vais signaler ici les problèmes 
– selon moi – les plus importants concernant les médias et le monde (qui 
nous entoure).
III
On ne peut pas écrire du rôle des médias et de la formation de l’opi-
nion publique sans traiter le problème de la liberté de la parole, ou, (au 
sens plus large), de la liberté de l’expression, comme le fondement pour la 
liberté des médias.
La liberté de l’expression a pris déjà la signification importante, du 
point de vue de la loi, dans la deuxième moitié du XVIIIe siècle, c’est –à– 
dire, dès le début de la formation de la constitution moderne. Les actes de 
la loi au degré constitutionnel, à cette époque, règlent ce problème. L’ar-
ticle XI de la Déclaration des Droits de l’Homme et du Citoyen, résolue le 
26 août 1789, constitue l’un des exemples premiers. Cette règle constate 
que « La liberté de transmettre les pensées et les opinions constitue la loi 
la plus précieuse de tous les droits de l’homme. Chaque citoyen possède 
donc la liberté de la parole, de l’écriture et de l’impression, en prenant la 
responsabilité pour l’abus, dans les cas déterminés par la loi. Cela vaut la 
peine de remarquer que cette règle (comme toute la Déclaration) est im-
portante, non seulemenét du point de vue historique. La Déclaration du 
1789 constituait le préambule à la Constitution française du 3 septembre 
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1791, ce qui a initié sa présence dans le constitutionisme en France. La 
déclaration discutée actuellement constitue – comme on le sait – la partie 
intégrale de la Constitution de la Ve République Française.
La règle citée de la Déclaration de 1789 était la première présentation 
juridique de la liberté de l’expression en France. Plus tôt, ce sujet était 
entrepris sur le continent américain à un mois avant la proclamation de la 
Déclaration de l’Indépendance. A savoir, c’est le 12 juin 1776 L’Assemblée 
Constitutionnelle de Virginie établissait dans l’article 12 de la Déclaration 
des Droits : « La liberté de la presse est l’un des bastions de la liberté et ne 
peut jamais être limitée ; ce sont les gouvernements despotiques qui intro-
duisent des limites ». La Constitution des États Unis déclare pareillement, 
mais réellement, ce n’est pas dans le texte primaire mais dans la Ie Correc-
tion, qui est entrée en vigueur le 15 décembre 1791. Elle proclame, dans la 
partie concernant la liberté de la parole : « Le Congrès ne peut pas établir 
des lois qui limitent la liberté de la parole ou de la presse ».
Les citations ci-dessus montrent que la liberté de l’expression peut être 
perçue d’une manière différente. La Déclaration française admet la possi-
bilité de limiter cette liberté, mais seulement dans les cas déterminés par 
la loi. Les prescriptions constitutionnelles américaines octroient la dimen-
sion absolue à la liberté de la parole. Cependant on ne peut pas oublier que 
malgré l’entrée en vigueur de la Ie Correction, on a proclamé aussitôt les 
premières prescriptions qui limitaient la liberté de la parole et de la presse. 
On a fait cela à plusieurs reprises, surtout pendant les conflits militaires3.
En général, au début des régulations juridiques de la liberté de l’expres-
sion, ce sont en majorité des prescriptions du caractère plutôt laconique 
qui dominent. Le temps écoulé, quand des normes juridiques concernant 
la thèmatique mentionnée deviennent la partie indispensable des stan-
dards du pays démocratique, on parvient à l’élargissement remarquable 
et au précisement de ces régulations. Après la IIe guerre mondiale, la loi, 
déterminant la liberté de l’expression, devient incorporée aux documents 
internationaux du caractère universel, mais aussi local. Ces premiers do-
cuments, ce sont avant tout  : La Déclaration Universelle des Droits de 
3  Com. Biłgorajski A., Les limites de la liberté de l’expression. Une étude constitutionnelle, Var-
sovie, 2013, p. 19. 
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l’Homme et le Pacte des Droits Civiques et Politiques, qui étaient créés 
sous les auspices de l’Organisation des Nations Unies.
La Convention Européenne des Droits de l’Homme et des Libertés 
Fondamentales est l’exemple d’étendard des autres documents (régionaux). 
Ses résolutions sont appliquées et interprétées par le Tribunal Européen des 
Droits de l’Homme.
D’un côté, plusieurs constitutions se forment, peu après la IIe guerre 
mondiale, réglant amplement la thèmatique ici débattue. L’article 21 de 
la Constitution de la République Italienne constitue l’exemple parfait qui 
décrète : « Tous possèdent le droit de s’exprimer librement à l’aide de la pa-
role, d’écriture et de tous les autres moyens de la propagation. La presse ne 
peut pas être soumise ni à la concession ni à la censure. La confiscation peut 
arriver seulement en vertu de l’acte motivé du pouvoir juridique en cas de 
la transgression des prescriptions, prévoyant l’indication à des personnes 
responsables. Dans des situations absolument inattendues, quand il n’avait 
pas la possibilité d’agir à temps par le pouvoir juridique, la confiscation de 
la presse temporelle peut être fait par les employés de la police judiciare qui 
doivent avertir immédiatement le pouvoir judiciare, jamais plus tard, que 
pendant 24 heures. Si le pouvoir judiciaire ne confirme pas la confiscation 
durant vingt-quatre heures suivantes, celle-ci sera traitée comme suppri-
mée et privée de toutes les conséquences. La prescription constituant la 
norme de caractère général, peut établir que les moyens de financement de 
la presse périodique doivent être portés au savoir de tous. Les publications 
de presse, les spectacles et tous les autres évenements qui s’opposent aux 
bonnes coutumes restent interdits. La loi détermine les moyens préventifs 
et qui peuvent suspendre la transgression de cette interdiction » . 
Les Constitutions des autres pays qui se formaient après la Seconde 
guerre mondiale ne diffèrent pas excessivement de l’ampleur et de la pré-
cision des normes citées ci-dessus. On peut affirmer généralement que ces 
normes règlent le contenu de la liberté de l’expression d’une façon com-
plète, la sphère des limites admissibles et des garanties élémentaires.
La lecture de la constitution montre, que la liberté de l’expression est 
la notion constitutionnellement traditionnelle et se trouve pratiquement 
dans toutes les lois principales dès le début de l’ère moderne du constitu-
tionalisme jusqu’à nos temps. 
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Cela vaut la peine de remarquer aussi que la liberté débattue se trouve 
aussi bien dans les constitutions des pays démocratiques que dans les pays 
qui ne les sont pas. Cela signifie que dans ces derniers, la liberté a le carac-
tère fortement illusoire.
La sphère de la régulation constitutionnelle de la liberté de l’expression 
élargissait progresivement le contenu, comme aussi, le catalogue de ses 
garanties et limites.
Généralement, on peut constater que la liberté de l’expression c’est 
celle de la recherche, de la réception et de la propagation d’information et 
d’idée par tous les moyens et sans égard des frontières4.
IV
L’analyse du plan juridique de la liberté de l’expression peut – comme 
cela nous paraît – se délecter de l’optimisme. Pour que cet optimisme ait 
des principes plus solides, il faudrait – à mon avis – entreprendre l’essai 
initial de la réponse à la question concernant l’influence des processus, 
qu’on observe dans le monde des médias, sur la réalisation de la liberté de 
l’expression. Autrement dit, il s’agit de la réponse à la question si le phé-
nomène qu’on a nommé « la médiamorphose » a influencé sur la liberté 
de l’expression  ; est-ce que c’est une influence positive ou négative, ou 
les deux  ?   Enfin si « la médiamorphose  » favorise ou menace la meil-
leure forme d’informer les gens et la formation de leurs attitudes et des 
opinions ?
Pour répondre, au moins partiellement à ces questions compliquées 
et difficiles, j’essaierai considérer brèvement les problèmes suivants, qu’on 
peut trouver dans le monde contemporain, qui ont – à mon avis – l’in-
fluence essentielle sur des questions qui nous intéressent. 
1) les médias et la société du risque;
2) les médias et la globalisation;
3) l’influence des médias électroniques sur la liberté de l’expression ;
4) le rôle, de ce qu’on appelle, du langage de la haine ;
5) les médias et le pouvoir.
4  Ibidem, s. 32, 33.
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Ad. 1) Il y a quelques décennies, donc dans le passé qui n’est pas 
tellement éloigné, il dominait la conviction dans des opinions des poli-
ticiens, des publicistes, mais aussi des gens, que le monde du futur sera 
en progression constante, en développement à cause de technologies plus 
nouvelles, facilitant la vie des gens et à cause des bénéfices, qui résultent 
du fonctionnement des principes de la démocratie et du marché libre 
sur le terrain de plus en plus vaste. Il y avait un facteur qui assombrait 
ce tableau claire; c’était généralement la crainte de la mondiale catas-
trophe nucléaire. En même temps on se rassurait de cela que la structure 
politique bipolaire du monde de cette époque-là, la confrontation de 
deux potentats nucléaires (les États-Unis et l’Union Soviétique) forme 
un barrage efficace contre la tragédie mondiale. On ne peut pas oublier, 
non plus que l’existance de ces deux « gendarmes  », les plus puissants 
contreagissait efficacement à la formation des conflits locaux, très dan-
geureux pour le monde entier. 
La situation a changé entièrement à la fin du siècle passé. La bipolari-
té était remplacée par la pluripolarité mais avec la clause suggérée par les 
États-Unis univoquement, lesquels devenant le vainqueur de la « guerre 
froide », constituent la puissance mondiale capable à l’intervention mi-
litaire dans tout le coin du monde et qui peut imposer sa vision consti-
tutionnel, idéologique et politique. On s’est rendu compte rapidement 
que malgré la conviction des politiciens américains – ce ne sont pas tous 
les pays et les sociétés qui désirent contracter le modèle offert par les 
États – Unis. En plus, plusieurs erreurs commises par ce pays dont les 
méthodes d’activité pour exporter « american way of life », surtout dans 
les populations arabes, différentes mentalement, pratiquant une autre 
religion, représentant une autre civilisation, différente du modèle amé-
ricain. Cela a provoqué le conflit entre les États-Unis (l’Occident) avec 
les fractions de sociétés islamiques, radicales. L’attentat terroriste sur les 
deux tours à Manhattan, qui avait lieu la première année du XXIe siècle, 
est devenue presque le symbole de cette hostilité. Depuis cet évenement 
toutes les prédictions optimistes et claires au sujet du futur de monde 
se sont obscurcies. Cela devenait de plus en plus évident – à mésure des 
attentats terroristes suivants et des autres évenements – que le monde 
contemporain apparaît de plus en plus incertain et imprévisible. Ce n’est 
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pas sans cause qu’on a créé la nouvelle expression qui décrit le monde 
actuel – « la société globale du risque »5.
Cela pose une question comment les médias doivent - elles agir dans 
cette nouvelle réalité. Et, avant tout, si cette réalité influe ou devra influer 
sur le principe de la liberté des médias ? 
La réponse est positive, sans aucun doute, quoique cela ne doit pas bar-
rer le principe mentionné. La limitation de la liberté doit se lier, avant tout, 
avec la nécessité de garantir la sécurité de l’État et de ses citoyens.
Les média doivent informer et transmettre des opinions au sujet des 
événements actuels, mais sans accent sensationnel. Cela peut être difficile 
pour certains moyens de communication, surtout du caractêre de tabloïde, 
mais ils doivent être respectés, dans leur propre intérêt à long terme. L’autre 
attitude pourra – même inconsciemment – aider les activités des terroristes 
et d’autres forces qui augmentent le sentiment du risque. Le Conseil euro-
péen a partagé cet avis dans son appel de 2005.
Il paraît que Janah Aleksander dans son livre : « Combattant le terro-
risme » a traité concrètement et synthétiquement le problème des médias 
dans la société du risque :
a) les médias doivent aspirer à l’autolimitation  ; ils doivent éviter la 
répétition des scènes violantes, de la description trop émotionnelle des évé-
nements extraordinaires, et d’éviter la glorification des terroristes ;
b) les politiciens doivent se retenir de tirer profit des attaques terroristes 
au but de promouvoir et populariser leurs propres intérêts ;
c) les journalistes, les politiciens mais aussi les citoyens doivent remar-
quer la nécessité constante de l’analyse objective et de la discussion au sujet 
de l’abus de la liberté de la presse, des médias ; toutes les mentions à propos 
de la nécessité, ou de l’obligation de limiter cette liberté sont traitées, sur-
tout par les journalistes, comme l’attentat à la possibilité d’effectuer leur 
profession6.
5  Beck U., La société du risque. En chemin en autre modernité, Varsovie, 2002. 
6  Selon : Goban-Klas, La liberté journalistique dans les situations des actes terroristes, des cata-
clysmes, des catastrophes, des banqueroutes et des scandales, autrement dit, les médias dans la société 
du risque ; en Les aspects pratiques de la liberté de l’expression; réd. scientifique Lis W., Husak  Z. ; 
Toruń, 2011, p. 513.
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Autrement dit, les médias doivent être libres mais sans exagération. 
Cependant on observe, pas rarement, la dérogation de ce postulat.
Ad. 2) C’est très difficile de trouver actuellement le propagateur de 
la thèse que le phénomène de la globalisation n’influe pas sur l’activité 
des médias. Il faudrait constater plutôt que les médias contemporains se 
sont devenus l’un des facteurs essentiels qui renforcent le processus de la 
globalisation.
La globalisation (la mondialisation) peut être définie de diffêrentes 
manières. Ce phénomène possède déjà la littérature énorme et de grand 
nombre de partisants et d’adversaires. C’est le résultat de différentes ma-
nières de la compréhension du phénomène de la globalisation. Sans des 
considérations approfondies concernant ce sujet, je voudrais souligner seu-
lement que la globalisation actuellement est caractérisée par des processus 
suivants : l’uniformisation des échanges de produits et de services (média-
tiques aussi), l’écoulement libre du capital à l’échelle mondiale, la mobilité 
augmentée des gens (dans l’aspect international), la création des entre-
prises supranationales, géographiquement dispersées. Tout cela est possible 
à cause, entre autres, de la révolution technonogique dans les moyens de la 
communication massive.
La globalisation influe sur la liberté des médias positivement et négati-
vement aussi. Parmi des côtés positifs on peut trouver, avant tout, l’accès 
à l’information, à l’échelle exceptionnelle dans l’histoire de l’humanité, la 
possibilité de la vérifier et la possibilité de nouer les relations interperson-
nelles à l’échelle – pratiquement – de tout le globe. Parmi les côtés positifs 
il faut voir aussi des instruments traités comme les médias nouveaux qui 
sont subordonnés à la popularisation, restant largement accessibles, ce qui 
pourra être favorable à l’usage de l’information dans le processus de la 
démocratisation. 
Mais il y a des conséquences négatives de la globalisation des systêmes 
médiatiques. Umberto Eco écrit à propos de certaines de ces conséquences, 
qui appartiennent sûrement aux plus importantes : « La globalisation de 
communication a repoussé via internet la notion de la frontière. Cette no-
tion est vieille comme l’espèce humaine, franchement, comme toutes les 
espèces d’animaux. L’éthologie nous enseigne que chaque animal range la 
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zone autour de lui et de ses propres : c’est le terrain, dans le cadre duquel, 
il se sent sûrement et il traite comme ennemi chacun qui traverse cette 
frontière. L’anthropologie culturelle a montré que cette zone protectrice 
se change selon le modèle culturel  : la proximité de l’interlocuteur pour 
certaines nations – sentie par les autres comme expression de la familiarité 
– constitue le symptôme de l’importunité et de l’agression »7.
L’intellectuel italien (mentionné au-dessus) attire notre attention 
non seulement sur le problème de la globalisation de la communication. 
Il constate que: « La suppression des frontières a provoqué deux phéno-
mènes contradictoires. D’une part, il n’y a plus de communité nationale, 
qui pourrait interdire, aux propres citoyens, la connaissance de ce qui se 
passe dans des autres pays; bientôt, on ne pourra pas empêcher aux gens, 
qui vivent sous la dictature n’importe laquelle, de s’informer en peu de 
temps, de ce qui se passe ailleurs ? D’autre part, le contrôle des activités 
des citoyens a été intercepté de l’état des autres centres gouvernementaux, 
lesquels, du point de vue technique sont capables (quoique pas toujours 
légalement) se renseigner à qui cette information était écrite, quels voyages 
étaient choisis, quels sont nos intérêts cognitifs et même, quelles sont nos 
préférences sexuelles (...). Le citoyen a un grand problème concernant la 
protection de sa vie privée contre les pirates informatiques qui ne sont 
plus nombreux que les brigans, qui autrefois pouvaient voler un voyageur 
ou un commerçant. Les « cookies » et les autres miracles de la technolo-
gie constituent le danger véritable, permettant ramasser des informations 
concernant chacun de nous »8. 
L’un des symptômes les plus vifs de la globalisation dans les mass médias 
est l’internationalité significative du marché des médias électroniques et du 
secteur des médias nouveaux qui résultent de la vaste expension du capital 
étranger à ce but. La pratique jusqu’à présent montre que tous les efforts 
entrepris par l’état de limiter l’afflux des capitaux (au moins également) au 
secteur de médias restent, en effet, inéfficaces. Cependant, il faut souligner, 
que les investissements étrangers de capitaux dans l’espace de mass médias 
peuvent être traités comme la pénétration dans les structures nationales, la 
7  Eco U. Rakiem, La guerre chalereuse et le populisme des médias; Varsovie, 2007, p.  95. 
8  Ibidem, p.  97.
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violation de l’identité culturelle des systèmes d’état de la communication 
de masse. On perçoit le plus souvent et le plus clairement le phénomène 
de la formation de l’image des médias et de la condition morale et pro-
fessionnelle des journalistes contemporains par le capital, c’est-à-dire, par 
les propriétaires qui créent des corporations supranationales. Cela conduit 
aussi à la concentration d’un nombre majeur des médias dans les mains du 
moindre groupe des propriétaires qui peuvent limiter la liberté et le font 
souvent, dans le cadre de son groupe médiatique. On ne peut pas parler 
de la pleine monopolisation dans des médias, néanmoins sa concentration 
excessive constitue le danger potentiel: les groupes médiatiques trop forts 
peuvent menacer des structures démocratiques, parce qu’il y a la limita-
tion des groupes médiatiques qui restent indépendants entre eux. Alors 
le marché est submergé par les titres différents, les auditions et les autres 
instruments médiatiques qui représentent en effet les mêmes opinions ou 
les avis, les notes pareils ou les informations du caractère semblable. Même 
s’il existe des autres journaux, périodiques ou les programmes de radio ou 
de télévision, c’est à cause de leur petite activité ou le manque des moyens 
pour l’autopublicité, etc – leurs informations pénètrent le cercle des desti-
nataires sans importance.
La domination de grands groupes médiatiques de capitaux et non 
seulement à l’échelle d’un pays mais du monde, devient difficile pour les 
nouveaux groupes médiatiques qui entrent sur le marché. Les médias, en 
cherchant des clients (destinataires) se concentrent sur la distraction, la 
sensation et ce qui domine, c’est la pratique de populariser des formules 
prêtes et des schémas concernant la vision du monde, culturels, politiques. 
Parallèlement on observe la duration du processus de la disparition des 
opinions différentes, des avis, des notes; on observe que les valeurs de 
caractère local disparraissent, caractéristiques pour certain pays, pour sa 
partie, pour les milieux sociaux déterminés. La concentration des médias, 
résultant de la concentration des capitaux, ne sert pourtant pas mieux à la 
démocratie parce que le business (le marché médiatique le devient aussi) 
n’est pas l’institution démocratique. Donc, il ne faut pas s’étonner que la 
thèse est formulé dans la littérature, soulignant que la globalisation porte, 
en conséquence, le phénomène de «  l’impérialisme culturel  ». Il faut se 
rendre compte de cela que la lutte contre ce type de processus n’est pas 
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facile9. Malgré les activités de caractère juridique dans des pays différents, 
le processus de la globalisation renforce plutôt, qu’affaiblit. Il ne faut cer-
tainement pas ajouter que cela a des conséquences négatives, déterminées 
pour la qualité des informations et pour le processus de la formation des 
opinions de la société.
Ad. 3) Les médias influent sur la conscience de la société, forment 
leurs modèles de comportement, des modèles culturels, influencent la fa-
çon de la vie. En effet, c’était toujours. Mais la largeur et l’intensité de 
l’influence sur la population change, en dépendance de cela, quels moyens 
médiatiques sont usés par leurs utilisateurs. Autrefois ces moyes étaient 
relativement modestes, l’accès à eux était difficile. Je me réfère à la presse 
écrite. A cette époque (et aussi plus tôt) les moyens de la communication 
directe (comme les sermons dans les églises) jouaient le rôle des mass mé-
dias actuels. 
Actuellement la situation est absolument différente. Les médias qui 
utilisent la technique électronique (internet et ses dérivées) ont pratique-
ment la possibilité d’influer sur toute la population. L’intensité d’influence 
médiatique est tellement haute qu’on peut parler de la formation (de cette 
façon) de la population nouvelle. Est-ce la société mieux informée repré-
sentant les opinions plus sublimées à propos de la réalité qui nous entoure 
– c’est plutôt douteux.
U. Schnabel, dans son livre « L’art de fainéanter. Du bonheur de ne rien 
faire » exprime expressivement son premier doute. Il écrit de cette façon : 
« Est-ce que vous avez aussi le sentiment que le chaos décide de notre vie ? 
Est-ce que vous vous sentez pareillement comme nous, les journalistes, 
quand chaque matin nous nous jetons dans le torrent d’information, lisant 
les centaines d’e-mails, quand nous plongeons dans le réseau en googlant 
et cliquant, téléphonant pendant la pause pour attraper la respiration et le 
9  Comp. Jaskiernia A., Les menaces pour la différence de la transmission médiatique au temps de 
la globalisation et les standards européens du contenu de la transmission ; en Le Conseil européen 
et les changements démocratiques dans les pays de l’Europe Centrale et Orientale dans les années 
1989-2009; la réd. scientifique Jaskiernia J.; Toruń, 2010, p.  603 et les autres.
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soir nous nous posons la question : qu’est-ce qu’on faisait pendant toute la 
journée ? »10.
Cette citation décrit – je crois – la situation nommée dans les années 
70 du siècle passé, « le transbordement d’informations ». Il faut le sou-
ligner que « le transbordement » de cette époque-là n’est pas le même que 
celui qu’on observe dans le monde contemporain. En rapport avec cela, 
actuellement c’est beaucoup plus difficile de filtrer les informations pour 
trouver seulement celles, qui nous restent indispensables.
Cette situation provoque le problème suivant : en restant dissipé par 
des informations qui écoulent partout, nous ne pouvons pas nous concen-
trer. Autrefois, on pouvait sans difficulté s’enfoncer dans la lecture pen-
dant quelques heures. Maintenant après avoir lu quelques pages de cette 
lecture, la concentration s’affaiblit; enfin nous sommes impatients, s’il ne 
faut pas jeter un coup d’œil à l’internet où ( il y a, peut être, une nouvelle 
importante ?) Le psychologue américain Edward M. Hallowell nomme ce 
phénomène « l’incapacité acquise de la concentration »11.
Ce phénomène, lié avec « le transbordement d’information » mention-
né, mène à la formation de la société nouvelle, indiquée auparavant. Dans 
ce cas le mot « nouvelle » ne signifie point, « meilleure ou parfaite ». Il s’agit 
de la société qui consomme la grande quantité d’informations, mais qui 
n’est pas capable, en restant en état de « l’incapacité acquise de la concen-
tration », de les transformer en science, en opinions cohérentes, en concep-
tions et de réfléchir profondément quand on est bombardé partout par des 
informations de la pesenteur et de la valeur différentes.
Il semble que P. Kozłowski résume justement les problèmes mention-
nés : « Le dialogue est repoussé par le brouhaha, la science par les infor-
mations. (...) C’est peu vraisemblable que cette société puisse fonctionner 
longuement. Il est susceptible de l’assujetissement d’idée qui arrive de loin 
ou qui apparaît de près »12.
10  Cité après Piotrowska A., L’enfer on line; en « Rzeczpospolita » ( République) 22/23 février 
2014, p.  P2.
11  Ibidem. 
12  Kozłowski P., Les médias nouveaux et la société nouvelle; en Le futur ..., op.cit., p.  88. 
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ad. 4) Du point de vue de deux tâches les plus importantes, mention-
nées dans l’introduction de cet article, c’est-à-dire les tâches des médias 
publiques  : d’informer la société et former ses attitudes, on ne peut pas 
omettre le problème du langage de la haine, qui a acquéri les dimensions 
rares avec l’apparition des médias nouveaux (surtout l’internet) à grande 
échelle, (pratiquement dans la dimension globale)13. 
Le Comité des Ministres du Conseil d’Europe a défini la question 
du langage de la haine, ce que souligne l’importance du problème. On 
constate dans ce texte que c’est «chaque forme de l’expression qui diffuse, 
fomente, propage ou justifie la haine raciale, la xénophobie, l’antisémi-
tisme ou d’autres formes de la haine basées sur l’intolérence manifestée en 
forme du nationalisme agressif ou de l’ethnocentrisme, de discrimination 
ou de la hostilité envers les minorités, les migrants ou les personnes prove-
nant de la société des émigrants »14.
Comme j’ai déjà souligné, les médias nouveaux (surtout l’internet) 
rendent possible l’écoulement libre et vite de l’information et de la concep-
tion. Malgré des activités variées, des pays autoritaires et ceux où règnent 
la dictature, les technologies contemporaines facilitent le monitoring étant 
le garant du respect des droits de l’homme. 
« Malheureusement, les mêmes technologies rendent possible l’intégra-
tion supra frontalières avec les milieux racistes, fascistes à l’échelle incon-
nue jusqu’aujourd’hui. En même temps la communication globale basée 
sur la loi locale assure l’impunition à ces groupes radicaux, parce qu’ils 
profitent des serveurs localisés dans ce pays où la propagation de la haine 
raciale n’est pas interdite »15.
Le problème du langage de la haine comme le défi pour la liberté des 
médias contemporains est difficile additionnellement pour des opinions 
univoques, parce que ce n’est pas seulement la loi locale qui est différente 
– mais en effet – ce serait difficile d’affirmer l’uniformité des opinions pu-
bliques et de la loi internationale. 
13  Comp. Podemski K., La globalisation du langage de la haine; en Le langage de la haine et la 
liberté de la parole. Les aspects légaux et sociaux, sous la réd. de Wieruszewski R., Wyrzykowski 
M., Bodnar A., Gliszczyńska-Grabias A.; Varsovie, 2010, p. 207-219. 
14  Comp. avec Le langage de la haine, op.cit., p. 13.
15  Podemski K., op.cit., p. 207. 
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D’un côté, c’est le débat publique qui joue le rôle particulier dans la ju-
risdiction de Strasbourg, d‘un autre côté, c’est l’article 17 de la convention 
européenne concernant la protection des droits de l’homme et des libertés 
principales qui constitue qu’ « aucune résolution de la convention ci-des-
sous ne peut pas être interprétée comme l’attribution au pays n’importe 
lequel, au groupe ou à la personne, le droit d’entreprendre des activités ou 
de réaliser l’acte qui vise au but d’anéantir des droits et des libertés qui y 
sont mentionnés ou, de les limiter au plus grand degré selon  la convention 
prévue ». 
La formule citée peut, d’un côté, causer des doutes s’il faut tirer la mo-
tion que les  déclarations du caractère antisémite ou raciste doivent mener 
aux actes de violence faits sur la population juive ou étrangère, du point de 
vue racial. Ce doute peut être additionnellement appuyé par l’argument 
qui indique, que l’interdiction des déclarations citées au-dessus ne mène 
point à la réduction significative ou totale des dégâts, comme : les viola-
tions ou la discrimination au fond national, religieux, racial ou n’importe 
lequel. 
En rapport avec cela on évoque les données grâce auxquelles on peut 
comparer les actes de la force dans les pays européens et aux États-Unis. 
Dans les premiers, les déclarations racistes sont interdites et leurs auteurs 
sont punis, recevant de hautes amendes, ou sont privés de la liberté. Aux 
États-Unis le Tribunal Suprême rejette la possibilité d’interdiction des 
énonciations racistes, xénophobes, etc, seulement à cause de cela que ces 
déclarations peuvent potentiellement provoquer les destinataires (de ces 
énonciations) à commettre des délits. L’existence de différents standards 
européens et américains dans ce domaine, ne mène point aux statistiques 
plus profitables, ni sur le premier, ni sur le deuxième territoire16. Sans au-
cun doute, cela vaut la peine de faire attention indubitablement et de ré-
fléchir sur les méthodes de la lutte contre le racisme, le totalitarisme ou le 
nazisme.
Malgré que le phénomène du langage de la haine existe toujours, il y 
a des gens qui le traitent comme peu dangereux. On trouve la preuve de 
16  Biłgorajski A., Le langage de la haine et la liberté de la parole (l’expression pendant la discus-
sion); en Le langage de la haine..., op.cit., p. 193-195.
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cela dans l’article intitulé « Le langage ignoble »17. Les auteurs de cet article 
constatent que l’expression «  le langage de la haine  » était associée avec 
le racisme, l’intolérance ethnique, religieuse ou avec la relation négative 
envers les minorités sexuelles. Selon leurs opinions – en traitant les médias 
nouveaux comme un instrument – dernièrement nous trouvons dans les 
textes publiés beaucoup de grossièreté, d’insinuation, d’épitètes, de haute 
tension d’hostilité dans le langage politique qu’ils ont nommé « le langage 
ignoble ». Ils présentent les exemples des expressions usées dans le cadre 
de ce langage (publiés sur les portals sociaux ou les twitters), qui ne sont 
pas convenables pour les introduire dans les médias publiques. Malheu-
reusement ces expressions prennent le caractère publique grâce à l’accès 
de masse des expéditeurs et des destinataires aux nouvelles technologies. 
Le but de l’usage du « langage ignoble » est la tendance «d’enfoncer dans 
la terre », d’anéantir chacun qui ne partage pas les opinions déterminées. 
En rapport avec cela, l’usage de l’épithète le plus brutal et offensant, paraît 
le meilleur. Le danger qui résulte de ce genre d’informations politiques 
consistent généralement en cela que ces informations dégénèrent cette 
sphère de la vie publique. La séparation des mots usés des pensées des expé-
diteurs et des destinataires de ces expressions n’est pas possible. L’action de 
la deshumanisation des ennemis politiques que se passe actuellement dans 
la sphère du langage peut (et dans certaine mesure doit) se transmettre sur 
le terrain réel, dans les activités concrètes. 
« Le langage ignoble », connu avant l’apparition des technologies 
médiatiques avait l’étendue assez bornée (on peut le dire, privée), 
aujourd’hui en effet a pris le caractère publique. L’un des défis futurs pour 
les médias contemporains est de limiter des influences du langage ignoble, 
surtout dans le contexte du principe de la liberté de la parole.
Ad. 5) Le problème des relations entre les médias et le pouvoir devient, 
surtout dans les décennies dernières, le plus abordé dans des travaux du 
17  Comp. avec Janicki M., Włodyka W., Le langage ignoble; en « Politique », no 8, 19-25 II 
2014, p. 14-16. 
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caractère scientifique et aussi dans le publireportage18. M. Castells, dans 
son livre, analyse amplement le phénomène de pouvoir, sa nature dans 
la société contemporaine du réseau de la communication de masse. Si on 
voulait concerner tous les problèmes abordés dans la monographie men-
tionnée, il faudrait écrire encore un livre – aussi ample que celui de M. Cas-
tells. Mais ce n’est pas nécessaire à l’usage de ce traité. Mais il faut noter 
au moins un problème abordé par l’auteur cité. Il s’agit d’un complément 
essentiel de la conception du pouvoir d’état, faite par M. Castells. Il part 
du principe juste – du point de vue historique – que le monopole est, en 
général, l’instrument principal du pouvoir pour appliquer la force. Mais, il 
ajoute : « la capacité de l’application efficace de la violence ou de faire peur, 
dépend de la vaccination des barrages dans les esprits des individus et des 
collectivités »19. La guerre à l’Iraq constitue un bon exemple de l’activité, 
qui selon M. Castells est possible grâce à la campagne de la désinformation 
menée sous la devise rusée de la lutte contre le terrorisme, après l’attaque 
sur les Deux Tours en 2001 par le pouvoir américain avec G. Bush en tête. 
Cette campagne de la désinformation avait pour le but de s’emparer des 
esprits des Américains et obtenir l’appui pour la croisade suivante, de facto 
anti-arabes et anti-islamistes20. 
Le conflit concernant l’Ucraine (l’année 2014) témoigne de l’efficacité 
des activités de la désinformation, menées en effet par les pouvoirs d’état 
à l’aide de différents instruments médiatiques. Les informations présen-
tées par les médias, concernant le plus souvent les mêmes événements, les 
mêmes faits, sont totalement différentes. En rapport avec cela l’opinion 
publique de la Russie et l’opinion publique des pays occidentaux sont dif-
férentes à propos des événements en Ucraine. Les soldats armés complè-
tement jusqu’aux « dents », qui depuis les premiers jours de mars 2014 
se sont trouvés en grand nombre en Crimée, nommés par les pouvoirs 
et les médias « les forces de l’autodéfense », formées par les citoyens de la 
18  Il suffit dire – pour approuver cette thèse – que dans le livre de M. Castells, Le pouvoir de 
la communication, l’un des travaux les plus importants concernant cette thèmatique, la bi-
bliographie contient 37 pages de grand format ; Castells M. , Le pouvoir de la communication, 
Varsovie, 2013, p. 465-502.
19  Ibidem, p. 409. 
20  Ibidem, p. 412.
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péninsule crimée, par contre, les pouvoirs et les médias de l’Occident les 
déterminent comme l’armée russe. Malgré cela, que la version russe paraît 
peu vraisemblable, cependant celle est obligatoire formellement en Russie. 
L’opinion De S. Łavrov, le ministre des affaires étrangères de la Russie, le 
certifie en constatant que (le 5 mars 2014) la Russie ne peut pas ordonner 
le recul de ses soldats de la Crimée. Cette opinion de S. Łavrov sert au 
renforcement général de la conviction de la société russe de la vérité des 
opinions propagées par les médias et les pouvoirs de la Russie. 
Tout cela mène à la motion triste, pour le moins, peu optimiste qui 
concerne la liberté réelle des médias. Il s’avère que même l’instrumentation 
tellement vaste, dont les médias contemporains disposent actuellement ne 
doit pas amener toujours à la diffusion des informations véritables et de la 
formation, à leur base, des opinions adéquates aux événements passés. Il 
existe toujours (et peut être, a augmenté) la capacité du pouvoir d’état à la 
création de la mentalité de la population souhaitable par eux-mêmes. Cela 
s’enchaîne, entre autres, avec la concentration, mentionnée auparavant, 
des médias – et par conséquent – avec la possibilité de la quasi-monopoli-
sation de la transmission médiatique. Mais dans le contexte de la relation 
entre le pouvoir et les médias, il faut faire attention sur le facteur addition-
nel – très important– qui influence la force d’activité des médias, l’activité 
qui n’est pas adéquate à la réalité, aux événements et aux faits qui ont lieu. 
Ce facteur additionnel c’est justement le pouvoir d’état. C’est sûrement 
pour cela M. Castells décrivant des propriétaires et des surveillants des cor-
porations médiatiques pensait aux entrepreneurs comme des propriétaires, 
en traitant les gouvernements, les pouvoirs d’état comme les surveillants. 
Ils disposent ensemble de suffisants moyens financiers, légaux, institution-
nels et techniques, pour déterminer le contenu dominant et le format des 
transmissions présenté à la société. 
* * *
En concluant : quoique les médias contemporains puissent potentielle-
ment devenir, et en certaine partie sont ceux, qui préviennent les principes 
de la liberté et les formes différentes d’influencer sur les destinataires, pour-
tant l’approbation de la thèse que le progrès technologique dans la sphère 
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de la transmission médiatique constitue la garantie suffisante contre les 
informations n’importe lesquelles, ou contre la transmission menteuse, se-
rait une erreur. L’influence sur l’amélioration de cette situation, à l’aide des 
règles légales doit avoir (actuellement  a) le caractère très limité. 
